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'study ''RIPOSTE'' 
12 April 1964 


Historical Evaluation and Research Organization 

1075 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W. 

WASHINGTON 7, D. C. 


































RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL 
AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS 

Study ^Riposte” 


A Report prepared for the United States Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency under ACDA Contract GC-l?, dated 
March 29, 1963 


No statements or opinions expressed in this 
report or its annexes are to be interpreted 
as reflecting official viev7S of the United 
States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
or of any official of the United States 
Government 


Not to be quoted at length, ab¬ 
stracted, or reproduced without the 
specific permission of the Historical 
Evaluation and Research Organization 


Historical Evaluation and Research Organization^ /vl 

1075 Wisconsin Avenue, N. V\J. 

Washington 7, D. C. 


12 April 1964 



I. ■ •* 


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RESPONSES TO VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL 
AND DISARI^AMENT AGREEMENTS 


Ms- 




f 




Study ^^Riposte'^ 


Table of Contents 

Chapter Page 

INTRODUCTION. 1 

PART ONE--TREATIES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT. ... 7 

1 Arms Control and the Nature of Treaties. 9 

2 Enforcement of Treaties and Agreements . 15 

PART TWO--MODERN TREATY EXPERIENCE . 29 

3 Treaties and International Organizations Between 

the World Wars. 31 

4 Treaties and International Organizations after 

World War II. 41 

5 Recent Western-Communist Agreement Experience... 49 


PART THREE--ANALYSIS OF MODERN TREATY EXPERIENCE. . 61 

6 Public Opinion and Treaty Experience . 63 

7 Observations on Cold War Negotiating Experience. . 77 

8 Patterns of Treaty Violations. 87 

9 Patterns of Responses.103 


PART FOUR--THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE. . 117 

10 Modern Treaty Trends . 119 

11 Arms Control Significance of Treaty Experience . . 127 

12 Thoughts for the Future.137 


Appendix A Chronology.147 

Appendix B Methodology of the "Riposte”’ Study.161 

Bibliography . 163 

Index..213 


1 




















List of Annexes 


Annex 

Annex 

Annex 


Annex 

Annex 

Annex 


ANNEX VOLUl^E I—THEORETICAL PAPERS 


I-A The Rationale of Treaty Law and Treaty Negotiations; 

by Albert J. Esgain 

V 

I-B The Theory and Practice of Sanctions; by Howard J. 
Taubenfeld 


ANNEX VOLUME II--HISTORICAL PAPERS 

Part One 


II-A Negotiation and Enforcement of Multilateral Agree¬ 
ments; by Richard M. Leighton 

Enclosure 1—The Post-1815 Alliance System as an 
‘ Instrument of-Collective Enforcement 
and Collective Security; by Richard 
M. Leighton 

Enclosure 2—Negotiation and Enforcement of Major 

Peace Settlements after World Wars I 
and II; by Richard M. Leighton and 
Grace P. Hayes 

Enclosure 3—The Quest for Disarmament 1919-1939; 

by Raymond G. O’Connor 

Enclosure 4—The Enforcement Problem in Disarmament 

Negotiations 1945-1963; by Richard M. 
Leighton 

II-B Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency; 

by Robert M. Langdon 

II-C The Antarctic Treaty of 1959; by Howard J. Taubenfeld 

II-D The League of Nations and Sanctions; by Howard J, 

Taubenfeld 

Enclosure 1--The Disarmament of Germany after World 

War I; by Wlodzimierz Onacewicz 


11 



Annex 

Annex 

Annex 

Annex 

Annex 

Annex 



Annex 


Enclosure 2-"-Soviet-German and Soviet-British- 

French Negotiations in 1939; by 
Wlodzimierz Onacewicz 

Enclosure 3--United States Responses to Treaty 

Violations by the Use of Sanctions 
1931-1941; by Raymond G. 0^Connor 


Part Two 


II-E The Use of Sanctions under the United Nations 

Charter; by Howard J. Taubenfeld and Grace P. Hayes 

II-F The Application of Sanctions under the Inter- 
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance; by 
William Manger 

II-G Agreements on Berlin: Violation and Response; 
by Jean Edward Smith 

II-H The Korean Armistice Agreement; by Martin Blumenson 

II-I The 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina and the 1962 

Geneva Agreement on Laos; by Richard L. Butwell 

II-J The Sanction of Nonrecognition as Practiced by the 
United States; by Raymond G. 0^Connor 


ANNEX VOLUME III--ANALYTICAL PAPERS " 


III-A The Role of Public Opinion; by R. Ernest Dupuy 

Enclosure 1--Public Opinion: Its Definition, For¬ 
mation, Stimulation, and Analysis; 
by R. Ernest Dupuy 

Enclosure 2--Public Opinion in the Soviet Union; 

by Wlodzimierz Onacewicz 
Enclosure 3--Public Opinion and the Problems of 

Arms Control; by Theodore Ropp 

III-B Special Factors in Negotiation and Enforcement of 
Agreements with Communist Nations; by Francis H. 
Heller 


111 




Annex III-C 

Patterns of Treaty Violation; by Raymond G, O’Connor 

Enclosure-“A Group of Treaty Violations in Depth: 

The Treaty of Versailles; by Stefan T. 
Possony 

Annex III-D 

Patterns of Response to Treaty Violations; by Albert 
J, Esgain and Gay M. Hammerman 

Annex IV~A 

ANNEX VOLUME IV--CLASSIFIED PAPERS 

Access to Berlin 

Part One—Decisions Leading to the Soviet Blockade 

of Berlin and to the Initiation of the 
Western Allies’ Berlin Airlift, 1947- 
1948; by William R, Harris 

Part Two--Erosion of Ground Access Rights on the 
Autobahn; A Chronology compiled by 

Laszlo Hadik 

Annex IV-B 

The 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina and the 1962 
Geneva Agreement on Laos; by Richard L. Butwell 

Annex IV-C 

Additional Classified Conclusions and 

Recommendations 


IV 


Study ^Riposte^^ 


INTRODUCTION 


Purpose of the Study 


Study ^^Riposte’’—so titled because it pertains to ^^re¬ 
sponses to violations of arms control and disarmament agreements^' 
--has been undertaken for the US xArms Control and Disarmament 
Agency (USACDA) by the Historical Evaluation and Research Organi¬ 
zation (HERO). In essence, the terms of reference require HERO to 
^do research in, analyze, and make proposals concerning" three 
major areas: (1) basic historical surveys of relevant recent 
US experience; (2) analysis of this historical experience; and 
(3) the general applicability of the experience, as analyzed, 
to current and future problems of treaty negotiation and enforce¬ 
ment, particularly in the area of arms control and disarmament.* 


Scope and Content 


To provide a common background for the surveys and analyses 
of historical experience provided for in the terms of reference, 
HERO first reviev/ed the rationale of treaties and the theory and 
practice of sanctions from the perspectives of history, politi¬ 
cal science, and international lav;. It then proceeded to the 
first requirement of the terms of reference and directed' its 
attention to relatively detailed surveys of the following areas 
of historical experience: 

--General agreements for mutual advantage, not providing 
for sanctions, including the Statute for the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the Antarctic Treaty. 


* USACDA Contract No. ACDA/GC-17, Article I, "Services," 
as amended. 





--Multilateral treaties for mutual advantage which Include 
provisions for sanctions, with particular attention to the sanc¬ 
tions experience of the League of Nations, the United.Nations, 
and the Organization of American States. 

--Recent agreements negotiated to avoid or to end armed con¬ 
flict, specifically those relating to Berlin, the Korean Armi¬ 
stice, and the Geneva Accord of 1954 regarding Indochina, and 
that of 1962 regarding Laos. 

--To assure a balanced perspective of all modern treaty ex¬ 
perience, HERO also surveyed the recent history of the negotia¬ 
tion and enforcement of multilateral agreements to assure minimum 
appraisal of all significant considerations relevant to the study. 

For the second requirement of the terms of reference, HEROES 
analysis of the historical experience paid particular attention 
to the following problems: 

--The.role of public opinion in treaty negotiation, viola¬ 
tion, and enforcement. 

--Patterns of violation of treaties and agreements, if any. 

—Patterns of response to treaty and agreement violations, 
if any. 

--Special factors affecting negotiation and enforcement of 
agreements with Communist nations. 

The final requirement of the terms of reference was met by 
evaluations of the relevance of historical experience to treaty 
matters in general and to present and future arms control negoti¬ 
ations in particular. 

This report, which presents the results of HEROES research 
and analysis in the ’’Ripostestudy, comprises two complementary 
principal parts: (1) a comprehensive but relatively brief sum¬ 
mary report, to synthesize the work done on this study, and (2) 
a collection of all the basic historical and analytical study 
papers which are appended to the report as annexes, to provide 
detailed consideration of the topics specified in the terms of 
reference. Thus, the reader who desires a more complete coverage 
of any of these topics than is provided in the report proper, or 
v/ho wishes to note documentation, can refer to the appropriate 
annex. For example, if he is concerned with the hard details of 
violation of recent specified treaties and agreements he can con¬ 
sult- -among others--the papers on Berlin, Laos and Vietnam, and 




Korea. If he wants to see what patterns have emerged from this 
and comparable experience, he will find an extensive analysis 
of patterns of violations and responses among the annexes and 
a general discussion of the relationship of these patterns in 
the report proper. 

This ’^Riposte” summary report thus considers the whole sub¬ 
ject of responses to violations of treaties and agreements and 
the relevance of this experience to problems of arms control and 
disarmament. The report^s individual annexes are studies of 
topics included in, or arising out of, treaty experience, studies 
which collectively form the factual and analytic foundation of 
the report. 


The Classified Annexes 


The terms of reference for Study "Riposte’^ provide that 
HERO should utilize for the study such ’^classified and unclassi¬ 
fied information as is made available.” The Agency made clear 
that it particularly desired review of relevant classified 
material in the investigations of recent agreement experience 
relating to Berlin, to the Korean Armistice, and to Vietnam and 
Laos. It was also agreed betv;een HERO and the Agency that, in 
the interests of utility, the classification of material actu¬ 
ally included in the report should be as low as allowable under 
pertinent provisions of law and that as much of the report as 
possible should remain unclassified. 

Accordingly, to the maximum extent possible, HERO has en¬ 
deavored to base this report and its annexes on unclassified 
sources. Classified materials v;ere consulted extensively, 
however, and particularly in reviewing the case histories of 
recent or current Cold War disputes. Nothing was found in 
classified material to add materially to the facts or conclu¬ 
sions presented in Annex II-H on the Korean Armistice experi¬ 
ence. However, in order to deal adequately with the Berlin 
Blockade and to supplement some aspects of the unclassified, 
portions of the paper relating to recent crises affecting 
Berlin (Annex II-G), some reference to classified material was 
essential. Similarly, supplemental classified material has 
been referred to in our study of recent agreement experience 
in Vietnam and Laos. Thus additional classified studies, sup¬ 
plementing but not replacing the unclassified annexes, are 
included in Annex Volume IV. A fevj further observations, 
arising from analysis of these classified studies, are also 
included in that volume. 


3 



The Study "Riposte^’ report, then, in combination with 
Annex Volumes I, II, and III, is a complete and unclassified 
document. It is enriched, and made more relevant, however, to 
readers having the appropriate clearances and "need to know," 
by Annex Volume IV. 


Study Participants 


Listed below are the authors and co-authors of one or more 
individual papers included in the annexes of Study "Riposte." 

It should be noted that several of these also assisted materially 
in the over-all reviev; of the study and of this report: 

Martin Blumenson, Historian, Department of the Army; HERO 
Associate 

Richard L. Butwell, Associate Professor of Government, 
University of Illinois; HERO Associate 
R. Ernest Dupuy, Colonel, USA, Retired; HERO Staff 
Associate 

Albert J. Esgain, International Laivyer, Department of the 
Army; HERO Associate 

Gay M. Hammerman, Research Staff Member, HERO Permanent 
Staff 

William R‘ Harris, Harvard Law School; Special Consultant 
Grace P. Hayes, Research Staff Member, HERO Permanent 

Staff 

Francis H. Heller, Associate Dean, University of Kansas; 

HERO Associate 

Robert M. Langdon, Associate Professor of History and 
Government, US Naval Academy; HERO Associate 
Richard M. Leighton, Historian, Industr5-al College of the 
Armed Forces; HERO Associate 

William Manger, Professor of Political Science, Georgetovm 
University; HERO Associate 

Raymond G. 0^Connor, Professor of History, University of 
Kansas; HERO Associate 

Wlodzimierz Onacev;icz, Lecturer-in History and Government, 
Georgetov;n University; HERO Staff Associate 
Stefan T. Possony, Director, International Studies Program, 
Hoover Institution' of War, Revolution and Peace; HERO 
Associate 

Theodore Ropp, Professor of History, Duke University; 

HERO Associate 

Jean Edward Smith, Department of Government, Dartmouth 
College; Special Consultant 


4 



Howard J. Taubenfeld, Professor of Lav;, Southern Methodist 
University; HERO Associate. HERO is particularly indebted 
to Dr. Taubenfeld, not only for his splendid papers in 
the annexes, but also for his special and exceptional 
contributions to the report proper. 

The follov;ing scholars have also contributed greatly to 
the study by intensive and frequent participation as consultants 
and in the review process: 

Ernest R. May, Professor of History, Harvard University; 

HERO Associate 

Louis Morton, Professor of History, Dartmouth College; 

HERO Associate 

Laurence I. Radv;ay, Professor of Government, Dartmouth 
College; HERO Associate 

Frank N. Trager, Professor of International Affairs, Nev; 
York University; HERO Associate 

Valuable contributions to the study v;ere also made by the 
following scholars: 

H. T. W. Blockley, former Canadian diplomat; Special 
Consultant 

Sharon Burdge, Temporary Research Assistant 
William R. Emerson, Visiting Professor, US Naval War 
College; HERO Associate 

Laszlo Hadik, Institute for Defense Analyses; HERO 
Associate 

Harold C. Hinton, Professor of History, Trinity College; 

HERO Associate 

Joseph R. Friedman, Department of the Army; HERO 
Associate 

W. Barton Leach, Professor of Lav;, Harvard University; 

HERO Associate 

Charles B. MacDonald, Historian, Department of the Army; 

HERO Associate 

Maurice Matloff, Historian, Department of the Army; 

HERO Associate 

Merze Tate, Professor of History, Howard University; 

HERO Associate 

Adam B. Ulam, Professor of Government, Harvard University; 
HERO Associate 

Karen Wilner, Temporary Research Assistant 


5 


As Study Director, and as editor-in-chief of this report, 
the undersigned assumes responsibility for the report proper and 
for the editing of the individual contributions in the annexes. 





T. N. Dupuy 
Executive Director 


V^ashington, D. C. 
1 April.1964 



Part One 


TREATIES AND THEIR 


ENFORCEMENT 








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Chapter 1 


arms CONTROL AND THE NATURE OF TREATIES 


The Need for Analysis 


The recent conclusion of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and of 
the ^^Hot Line^' Agreement* are only two of many reflections of 
the serious attention which nations of the world are today pay¬ 
ing to the subject of arms control and disarmam.ent. Though rela¬ 
tively new as a topic in the area of international relations, 
the field of arms control and disarmament has a rapidly grov;ing 
literature, it forms the substance of at least five scholarly 
periodicals in the English language, and it probably receives 
more continuing attention in the public press than any other 
single international issue. 

The objective of all of this interest and activity is the 
conclusion of suitable international treaties'or agreements 
v/hich v/ill--hopefully--reduce or totally eliminate the possi¬ 
bility of v/ar or the employment of armed force in international 
affairs. Whether or not they think this object is realistic, 
or meaningful, or even desirable, most national governments are 
officially committed to its achievement. This commitment is due 
in large part to the fact that there is V7idespread sentiment 
among the peoples of the world that such treaties are urgently 
needed to save mankind from che threat of destruction through 
nuclear v;ar. 

Though the United States has been in the forefront of the 
effort to establish international agreements which will elimi¬ 
nate or reduce the threat of war, American policy-makers knov; 


* Officially titled: (1) Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon 
Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, and 
(2) Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of 
a Direct Communications Link. 






from long, and sometimes bitter, experience that the achievement 
of such agreements V7ill be extremely difficult. It is also clear 
from US experience, and that of many other nations, that mere 
conclusion of a treaty does not necessarily mean automatic con¬ 
summation of its intent. Treaties have been violated in the 
past and may be broken again in the future. And, since arms 
control agreements have for their principal purpose the elimi¬ 
nation or mitigation of the horrors of war, it is obvious that 
violations of arms control treaties or agreements could have the 
most serious possible consequences. 

There is an urgent need, therefore, to ascertain by careful 
and realistic analysis not only the feasibility and practicality 
of such agreements but, above all, the problems of enforcing 
them through adequate measures which v;ill deter or effectively 
correct possible violations. In light of the relatively recent 
emergence of this new field of arms control and disarmament, how¬ 
ever, and the consequent paucity of existing treaties or agree¬ 
ments in this field, arms control experience does not yet have 
a norm against which gaps and apparent contradictions can be 
assessed; thus it is difficult to discover in this experience an 
adequate basis for systematic analysis. 

Yet there is nothing new in the conclusion of tx^eaties or 
agreements concerned with major issues of war and peace. Since 
the beginning of organized society there have been attempts to 
order the relations between different peoples throughout the 
world by agreements formal or otherwise. From the study of 
human experience v;ith some of the more important of these agree¬ 
ments a great deal about treaties and treaty enforcement in 
general can be ascertained, including much that v;ill have some 
relevance to possible future arms control and disarmament 
agreements. 

Such a study of general treaty experience is the purpose 
of this report. In a broad sense, it tests the concept that the 
lessons of history can help us to discover the hopeful road, as 
well as the snares and delusions to be avoided, in seeking the 
twin goals of v;orld peace and national security. The United 
States is committed to international peace, freedom, and order 
under law. Clearly v/orld order with security for nations and 
for all mankind involves the control of arms whether by agree¬ 
ment or mutual restraints. Clearly the world in which we live 
is dangerous, disorganized, lacking in a common outlook or 
community of spirit, and subject at best to a primitive, de¬ 
centralized legal regime which, in general, lacks effective 
authority to control the activities of major powers in matters 


10 


they consider of vital concern. It is a v7orld in which nations 
must still rely primarily, or at least initially, on their own 
strength for survival. VJhat, then, can the past tell about the 
least dangerous, most secure roads to international arrangements 
for controlling national action which affects the peace and 
security of all nations? 


Treaties in General* 


Treaties are cast in many forms. They may be established 
by the exchange of relatively brief and simple notes between 
tv;o pov7ers or-^-at the other extreme--they may be long, detailed, 
and complex products of an international conference such as the 
1919 VersailDes Treaty between the victorious Allies and Germany. 
There is little that is common to all treaties, beyond the fact 
that they are legally binding contracts drav7n up for a specific 
purpose, between sovereign states or organizations of states. 

Though the greatest number of treaties concluded are con¬ 
cerned with purely economic or administrative matters, the most 
important are political treaties. It is this latter category 
with V7hich V7e are concerned in this report, and in particular 
with those political treaties that attempt to regulate fundamen¬ 
tal issues which, if not resolved, ivould be likely to generate 
frictions leading to V7ar. 

Save for peace treaties imposed by victors, it is rare that 
any signatory can be fully satisfied V7ith a treaty, since agree¬ 
ment can be reached only after concession and compromise 
on the part of all participants (and this is true to some extent 
even for the victor in V7ar). Thus treaties in the region of 
high politics are fragile things--hard to construct and easy to 
break; in short, more or less unguaranteed instruments for pre¬ 
serving peace among nations. Yet states still find it desirable 
to conclude treaties. Though politically independent, they are 
otherv7ise so interdependent that they are forced to forego cer¬ 
tain of their interests--by means of treaties--so as to enhance 
other, more important, interests which require or depend upon 
international cooperation. 


* See Annex I-A, for a comprehensive discussion of the 
nature, theory, and categorization of treaties. 


11 




Considerations of self-interest are of primary importance 
in a national decision to make a treaty--or to break one--and 
can also cause the failure of attempts to conclude a treaty when 
potential gains from individual nonconformity to the agreed goal 
appear great in contrast to their cost. Disarmament conferences, 
for example, have generally failed because the participants re¬ 
fused to consider limitations on the types of v;eapons that vjould 
give them an advantage in v;ar, although v;illing to limit those 
that were of less significance to them. Yet, despite repeated 
disappointments v/ithin their ov;n lifetimes, statesmen of virtu¬ 
ally all nations continue to rely upon the treaty-making process 
in the effort to add some semblance of order to the chaotic 
international scene, to provide protection for their country, or 
to achieve some sort of political or strategic advantage. 


Treaty Theory and Vital National Interests 


Treaties which deal with the vital interests of states-- 
treaties of peace, treaties outlawing ^\var’^ as a legal action, 
general disarmament treaties, and the like—are particularly 
vulnerable to demands for change and to evasion. In the last 
century several attempts have been made to submit security- 
suffused problems to voluntary, cooperative agreements--largely 
or wholly without enforcement provisions--often for some commonly 
desired end such as ^’disarmament” or ’’peace.” These attempts 
have uniformly failed to solve the problems they were designed 
to meet and, v;orse yet, often appear to have seriously aggravated 
some aspect of international behavior, or have served to weaken 
the more honorable of the signatories. And yet, V7hen statesmen 
try to draw up disarmament treaties with more thoroughly elabo¬ 
rated terms of enforcement, v/hich avoid such past mistakes, agree¬ 
ment seems impossible. 

There are obviously many reasons for the repeated failure 
of the application of the technical, functionalist approach to 
security-vested problems. Three, however, are fundamental. 

First, there is almost always a basic difference in national 
objectives with respect to any specific substantive issue or 
dispute between nations. Second, there is frequently a differ¬ 
ence in the way in v;hich the subtly different conceptual ends 
of cooperation--security, survival, or peace--are arranged in 
the over-all scale of preferences of each sovereign state. 

Third, is the inability of the nation-state system itself to 
provide an adequate mechanism for assuring the achievement of 
these ends, even if agreement can be reached on the substantive 


12 



issues involved. Though these reasons for possible lack of agree¬ 
ment are distinct, they are obviously intertivined and are invari- 
ably present. They explain the resistance of nations to any 
genuine sacrifice of the rights of sovereign independence: the 
rights to protect the nation^s value system internally and to 
defend its interests externally, by force if necessary. 

The thought that at least human survival is the unquestioned 
ultimate goal of all national governments or even, as is more 
likely, of their peoples may be delusive. Individuals, and even 
nations, have throughout history faced personal extinction hero¬ 
ically for an important cause. It is difficult, of course, to 
assert v/ith assurance that a modern nation state v;ould choose 
such ”heroism,^^ and it brings up a somevjhat different point 
which may shed light on another popular paradox: ”If no one 
Vins^ a war any more, why do national leaders start them?” 

There are, of course, substantial differences in the nuclear 
age between major confrontations of the superpowers and the wide 
variety of possible limited wars. It is beyond the scope of 
this study to examine this fundamentally strategic issue in de¬ 
tail, and so we merely suggest that even a limited war can carry 
within itself the possible seeds of general war through escala¬ 
tion. But in a dispute betv;een nations the relative importance 
given to such conflicting objectives as peace, the spreading of 
an ideology, and the growth of competitive national power may be 
affected by disagreement or misinformation as to their respective 
costs, or a failure to give sufficient consideration to the 
dangers of escalation. It is particularly crucial that states 
and their peoples have accurate information if they are to make 
rational decisions, even about their scales of preference. In¬ 
deed, accurate information v;ould probably bring their scales of 
preference closer together. If, for example, the issue v/ere 
clearly survival, it is quite possible that all might agree to 
give genuine peace first place on their scales. Yet it appears 
to be impossible, even for the decision-making leaders, to ob¬ 
tain clear, unequivocal information on the prospective, objec¬ 
tive costs of various military and security alternatives, if 
only because honest disagreement is to be expected, even among 
experts, as to the facts themselves and as to their significance. 
It is also difficult for mere mortals, even with information, 
to take seriously such concepts as human extinction or even 
national disaster and to integrate these into their habitual 
responses to old problems. 

The conclusion seems apparent, then, that in the future, 
as in the past, differences between nations will almost 


13 


inevitably create v/ell-nigh overwhelming pressures leading to- 
v/ard treaty violations . 


Chapter 2 


ENFORCEMENT OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 


General Problems of Treaty Enforcement 


No system of enforcement yet devised has proved to be 
wholly effective in discouraging the violation of treaties when 
nations have considered violation more to their interest than 
observance. Indeed, as will be seen, violations have sometimes 
occurred even as a treaty was being written, or immediately 
thereafter, when one of the contracting parties acted in less 
than good faith or when there has been a misunderstanding, in¬ 
tentional or not, of the terms of the agreement. 

'^ Pacta sunt servanda ^^ (^treaties must be observed”) is a 
customary rule of international law, but this has never provided 
any real assurance that an agreement would not be violated were 
it in the national interest of a signatory to do so. There 
exists, for instance, another tenet of international law that 
can qualify or dilute the concept of pacta sunt servanda . This 
is the principle of ” rebus sic stantibus ” ("circumstances re¬ 
maining the same”). Attempts could be made in the name of this 
doctrine to denounce a treaty merely on the grounds that changed 
circumstances have vitiated it or rendered it intolerable. 

Far more important than legal doctrine, however, is the 
simple fact that there is no worl.d authority capable of forcing 
sovereign nations to observe their obligations under the terms 
of a treaty. The durability of a treaty, then, must depend on 
several factors, including the attitudes of the various signa¬ 
tory nations toward the terms of the agreement itself and toward 
the other participants. In the final analysis, nations observe 
treaties primarily for the same reasons that they enter into 
them: national self-interest. 

For instance, states comply with treaties in order to pre¬ 
serve their international reputations at home and abroad; to 
ensure continuance of the benefits which they enjoy under the 
provisions of the treaty or under other treaties which they may 







have with the same parties; to avoid the censure of world public 
opinion; from fear of retortive action, reprisals, or even war; 
through fear of other international repercussions, including 
nonmilitary sanctions; in the hope of effecting modification of 
unfavorable provisions through negotiation; as a quid pro quo 
for other potential agreements on matters that may be less oner¬ 
ous or of substantial benefit. In brief, even when a nation 
feels that the terms of a treaty have become onerous, it will 
frequently continue to observe the agreement simply because the 
results of breaking it would be even more detrimental than the 
results of observance. 

When, for whatever reason, a state does contemplate viola¬ 
ting an agreement, it must weigh carefully all of the consequences. 
Obviously it must conclude that the advantages to be gained will 
outweigh the liabilities incurred by a breach. Such consequences 
as loss of international reputation, the censure of world opin¬ 
ion, the effect of a violation on future bargaining positions, 
and the like, are intangible. But many treaties contain specific 
measures that may be taken by other parties to prevent or halt a 
violation. Further, if the violation is serious enough, other 
signatory nations, and even third parties, may take a wide 
variety of measures to protect their interests. 


Concepts of Enforcement 

7\n age-old method of treaty enforcement was the exchange of 
hostages as guarantee of the good faith of the parties. Religious 
oaths have frequently been inserted, binding the contracting 
parties in the sight of their deities to observe their treaty 
obligations. Military occupation of the territory of the defeated 
party to ensure compliance with peace terms has often been used, 
as after both world wars of the 20th Century. In the case of 
future total or partial disarmament treaties, where military oc¬ 
cupation may be inapplicable and no other system of guarantee 
seems feasible, most theorists have deemed it necessary to provide 
for some system of verification to warn of, and to inspect, vio¬ 
lations. Inspection by international teams has, in fact, been 
used as a means toward enforcing compliance with the disarmament 
provisions of the Versailles Treaty and the more recent cease¬ 
fires in Korea and Southeast Asia. 

Multilateral agreements have often been made to enforce 
political treaties, as part of the treaties themselves or as 
separate agreements which are concerned with the enforcement of 
others. Such systems of enforcement may be divided into three 


16 




general and overlapping categories: enforcement by guarantee , 
enforcement by pact , and collective enforcement . 

Treaties of guarantee became a common feature of interna¬ 
tional diplomacy in the 19th Century, in the form of mutual 
"hands off" agreements among the great powers with respect to 
specific political settlements. The neutrality of Switzerland 
w'as so guaranteed in 1815 and reaffirmed at Versailles in 1919; 
Germany's attack on Belgium in 1914 was in violation of such a 
treaty signed in 1839, Territorial settlements also have been 
guaranteed by treaty. Thus the signatories of the Treaty of 
Paris, which ended the Crimean War in 1856, guaranteed the ter¬ 
ritorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. More recently, the 
Locarno Pact^s Treaty of Mutual Guarantee pledged Germany, 
France, Belgium, Great Britain, and Italy "collectively and 
severally /to/ guarantee . . . the frontiers between Germany 
and Belgium, and between Germany and France, and tho inviola¬ 
bility of the said frontiers," which had been established by 
the Treaty of Versailles. Another type of guarantee for en¬ 
forcement provided for a third party to assume an obligation to 
ensure that the two opposing parties observed the terms of the 
treaty. Nothing, however, ensured that the guarantor would live 
up to his obligations. 

Closely related to enforcement by guarantee is the device 
of forming pacts or alliances among interested parties, usually 
directed tacitly or explicitly against a specific power or 
group of powers. Such alliances, part of the play of balance 
of power politics, serve as instruments of treaty enforcement 
to the extent that they serve to deter violation of the inter¬ 
national agreements v;hich maintain the status quo . NATO is 
such a treaty. In 1379 the Dual Alliance between Germany and 
Austria-Hungary, a treaty of mutual support, was designed to 
protect the status quo against pressure from France, thought 
to be desirous of reversing the results of the Franco-Prussian 
War, and from Russia, humiliated by the Balkan Settlement of 
1878 . 


Collective enforcement is similar to enforcement by a 
group of nations in alliance, not for the purpose of upholding 
specific treaties but rather to assure generally responsible 
behavior by all of the parties involved. Thus, under the 
Covenant of the League of Nations and under the Charter of the 
United Nations, signatories agreed to refrain from acts of ag¬ 
gression and to use peaceful methods for settling disputes. 

Both instruments stressed the sanctity of treaty rights and 
obligations in general and the Covenant, written into the peace 


17 













treaties ending World War I, brought the entire peace settlement 
within the purview of its peace-keeping machinery. 

The Charter of the Organization of American States and the 
Rio Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, like the League Covenant 
and the UN Charter, make their signatories responsible not only 
for the enforcement of treaty obligations but also for the pre¬ 
vention of aggressive war and for action in the event of a 
breach, or threatened breach, of the peace. They belong in the 
class of treaties of mutual security and of pacts which, by re¬ 
nouncing war as a means of settling international problems, 
serve to enforce existing treaties of political settlement. 


Responses and Sanctions as 

Enforcement Measures* 


Generally speaking, measures or responses taken by other 
parties to protect their interests in the event of a treaty vio¬ 
lation are called "sanctions.^’ Strictly speaking, sanctions are 
measures which can be taken only by treaty signatories, though 
the term is sometimes applied more widely. And since there ap¬ 
pears 'to be no single approved definition of ’^sanctions” in 
international law, it is essential to the purposes of this re¬ 
port to adopt firm definitions of this and the related term, 
"responses." 

For the purposes of Study "Riposte," a response has been 
defined as any official reaction of a government to a treaty 
violation. Thus the word response covers the entire range of 
possible measures which a state may take as a result of another's 
treaty violation, ranging at one extreme from a calculated de¬ 
cision to ignore the violation (i.e., do nothing) to the employ¬ 
ment of armed force in actual combat at the other. Though in 
general a response will be made by a party to the violated treaty, 
it is obvious that third parties can also respond to violations, 
even if they are not signatories, if their national interests 
are affected by the violation. Furthermore, the term response 
can be applied to any act which threatens a nation^s security or 
interests, even if the act is not clearly a treaty violation. 

A sanction is a response to a treaty violation in which 
specific measures are taken, or provisions of the treaty invoked, 
by or for an injured signatory of the treaty to protect its 
interests. Thus, for the purposes of this study, a sanction is 


* See Annex I-B for a comprehensive survey of the theory of 
sanctions. 


18 





a specific^form of the broader term, response. This somewhat 
limited derinition of sanctions does not include inaction, or 

P-9 diplomatic protests, or any other responses that 

do not in some way either involve unfavorable conseQuences to 
the violator, or otherwise tend to remedy the situation created 
by the violation. It will be noted, furthermore, that under 
this definition the response of a third party, or nonsignatory, 
cannot properly be termed a sanction. In sum, then, as used in 
this text, a sanction is a coercive measure taken by a treaty 
signatory in support of law in the event of a treaty violation. 
Sanctions can run the gamut from simple termination of the ar¬ 
rangement after breach by one party, to war, or to the penalties 
made legally available to the international collectivity under 
the League Covenant and the UN Charter. 

There are also varieties in the definition of various cate¬ 
gories of sanctions and responses by international legal author¬ 
ities. So, again, for the purposes of this report, sanctions and 
responses have been arbitrarily categorized in four classes: 
preventive, deterrent, corrective, or punitive. It should be 
realized that there is no clear line which can be drawn between 
these categories, and in practice there is considerable overlap 
between them. 

A preventive response or sanction --such as the arrest of 
one about to break the law--seeks to assure that disputes will 
be settled or law-breaking dealt v;ith in advance. It can also 
be applied to actions preventing the continuation or renewal of 
a violation already committed. 

A deterrent sanction involves actions or postures that 
render it impracticable for a potential violator actually to 
initiate any moves leading toward violation. Obviously the 
distinction between preventive and deterrent sanctions is in 
some instances thin and probably not very important. 

A corrective response or sanction is one that seeks to 
remedy damage caused by a violation and if possible to return 
the situation to the status quo ante the violation. 

A punitive response or sanction is one that exacts retri¬ 
bution from the treaty violator as a consequence of his illegal 
acts. Obviously, the distinction is not always clear between 
corrective .and punitive sanctions. Further, if the likelihood 
of effective employment of corrective or punitive action is 
recognized in advance by a potential violator, the existence of 
a punitive clause in a treaty can, in effect, be a deterrent 
sanction. 


19 
















Sanctions in Covenant 

and Charter Theory 

The types of measures anticipated under the League Covenant 
and the UN Charter are probably most properly conceived of as 
deterrent, preventive, and corrective, rather than punitive. 

They operate first by threat; that is, they are intended to in¬ 
dicate to a member contemplating a breach of its obligations 
that it will be subjected to penalties designed to thwart its 
ambitions and that, if it still proceeds, it will not be per¬ 
mitted to retain the fruits of its illegal activity. Second, if 
a breach occurs, they seek to prevent gain arising from illegal 
activity. Essentially, the sanctions are designed to preserve 
or to restore the status quo . 

The conception of sanctions envisaged in the Covenant of 
the League of Nations was itself not entirely new. The Treaty 
of Munster, part of the settlement of Westphalia of 1648, for 
example, provided for peaceful settlement of disputes and col¬ 
lective action against violators. Later, in dealing with the 
question of slave trade in the early 19th Century, England's 
Lord Castlereagh made the direct suggestion of a collective boy¬ 
cott of the colonial products of any nation failing to prohibit 
the trade effectively. 

Looking at the League and the United Nations, we find that 
the Covenant and Charter do not use the term sanctions at all, 
yet measures to keep or restore the status quo have always been 
so termed in practice. It is apparent that the League especially 
looked upon sanctions essentially as being of a nonmilitary 
nature. Clearly, the distinction between military and nonmili¬ 
tary measures is as blurred here as in all other areas.* 

Recalling the actual experience of the League,‘the framers 
of the UN Charter dropped the formal elements of certainty, im¬ 
mediacy, totality, and universality from its sanctions provi¬ 
sions. Also dropped was the need to determine who was right and 
who was wrong at the outset. Instead, the Charter provides for 
Security Council action in the event of a "threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression" (Article 39). This 
action could be nonmilitary, military, or both. In theory, the 
great powers, the possessors of overwhelming might in the world. 


* For instance, would such acts as closing the Suez Canal 
in 1935-1936, or blockading Italy in that period, have been 
nonmilitary in nature? See also discussion in Annex II-D. 


20 







were, through agreement, to wield that power as needed and to 
direct the actions of other states to the same ends, through the 
United Nations. In practice the distinction between the League 
and Charter systems for peace-keeping has become indistinct. 


Specific Sanctions Available 

to States and Organizations 

In tY\e broader theory of the practice of sanctions, what 
measures are available for use in the event of a breach of an 
international obligation and what is it anticipated that the 
measures will achieve? Discussed briefly below are the practi¬ 
cal sanctions available to a state or to the international 
community to prevent a breach of an arrangement or to restore 
the status quo. 


General Sanctions. 


A. Rescission of an Agreement . In domestic lav;, the 
breach by one party to a bilateral agreement or an important 
part of the agreement leads to the right of rescission on the 
part of the aggrieved party. Whatever other rights he may also 
have, it is clear that he has the right to consider the arrange¬ 
ment terminated. In international bilateral dealings, the same 
right and expectation are generally considered to follov;, though 
the matter is by no means as clear. Furthermore, a multilateral 
treaty is certainly not necessarily ended for all parties vis-a- 
vis each other because of a violation by one party, though it 
may be appropriate to consider it legally terminable with respect 
to the rights of the offending state. The problem is sometimes 
dealt v;ith diplomatically by express language in the convention 
dealing with the case of a party^s breach of treaty-imposed 
obligations. The theory and presupposition is that, under the 
agreement, benefits are flowing to each side so that a party 
v;ill continue to honor its obligation in order to ensure reci¬ 
procity by the other party. 

Obviously at some point a party may consider that, in 
effect, it has more to gain than to lose by terminating the 
agreement if no other specific penalty follov/s. In this case 
the most obvious response available to injured parties is ter¬ 
mination of their own obligations under the agreement, whether 
or not the treaty expressly provides for termination. The 
partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and the Antarctic Treaty 
of 1959 are examples of the prospective use of this type of 


21 











*1 





: 




sanction, if it can be so called. Similarly, this type of sanc¬ 
tion is the prime sanction supporting treaties of friendship and 
commerce, and indeed, most existing bilateral, and many multi¬ 
lateral, arrangements. 

Of course particularly in security-suffused or humanitar¬ 
ian conventions, it may be essential to insist that a party 
remain bound despite its conduct violating the treaty. If a 
party wants a treaty ended, it is scarcely a sanction to permit 
that nation, by unilateral action, to achieve its purpose. 
Politically, however, it may be very difficult in a country like 
the United States to insist on the continued validity of, say, an 
arms limitation treaty in the face of violation of one provision 
--though in some circumstances it may be unwise to consider the 
treaty ended. Nevertheless, it may be appropriate for a party 
to consider a treaty suspended or terminated in part rather than 
terminated in toto . This is, in effect, an implicit renegotia¬ 
tion of the treaty; the injured party can, of course, take ad¬ 
vantage of this suspension or termination by selective response 
or redress in kind, thus creating a condition of reciprocal non - 
observance with respect to the provision in question. 


B, Payment of Damages by Violator . Damages have been 
awarded by arbitrators in international matters and have also 
been av;arded in a case such as that before the International 
Court of Justice involving the Corfu Channel even though this 
was probably not a specific treaty violation. As in domestic 
lav;, damages may be used to compensate the victimized party or 
to punish the transgressor. Systems of fines and forfeits have 
also been suggested in the arms control sphere but can only be 
mentioned here as an area for research. 


C. Denial of the Benefits of an Agreement . A form of 
"remuneratory sanction” is typically employed in international 
functional organizations and this has been true since the first, 
the Universal Postal Union, was created in 1874. Participation 
in this type of arrangement is presumed to be of great benefit 
to a participating state and denial of the privileges of member¬ 
ship and the services of the organization are the prime sanc¬ 
tions for a breach of obligations, nonpayment of an assessment, 
or the like. 

Difficulties in applying this sanction in a political inter 
national organization are apparent, as the current UN financial 
problems indicate. Denial of benefits can itself range from a 
suspension of voting rights in one organ of an organization 


22 









(UN Charter, Article 19), through suspension of all rights and 
privileges in the organization (UN Charter, Article 5), to 
expulsion from the organization (UN Charter, Article 6). 


D. Publicity . This term is used to denote the focusing 
of local, national, or international attention on a violation. 

In the somewhat naive climate of 1919-1920, it was often 
asserted that fear of the mere bestowal of the name aggressor 
on an offending state would normally be enough to prevent an 
illegal act. Aroused world public opinion was to be the basic 
strength of the League. In a practical sense, too, it might 
lead to private boycotts of its goods, serve to cut down tour¬ 
ism to the disgraced country, and the like. 

Internationally, it is questionable that unfavorable 
publicity has ever, by itself, thwarted a determined aggressor.* 
International condemnation has been more useful, perhaps, in 
frequent efforts to consolidate opinion at home. Nevertheless, 
exposure to the light of public debate has been given credit, 
at least in part, for such withdrawals as that of Soviet forces 
from Iran in 1946. It is a sanction that cannot be ignored yet, 
in its general form, cannot be relied on to have the intended 
effects. 


Diplomatic Sanctions . All international sanctions involve 
political decisions. In addition, there are some measures which 
are aimed expressly at political relationships and are grouped 
here for convenience. It is generally assumed, too, that these 
measures or responses are less stringent than economic or mili¬ 
tary measures and cannot in all instances be considered as 
sanctions. 


A. Protest . This is the simplest form of diplomatic 
sanction. Its efficacy obviously depends on the seriousness 
v;ith which the addressed state regards the power and intent of 
the protesting state. The protest is often used, of course, 
not as a sanction but merely as a response in an effort to keep 
the legal record clear. It may be made by a single state or by 
several acting together. It may be used also to bring the 
matter to public attention. 


* See Annex II-D, also p. 35, this report. 


23 











Where it is an international organ, such as the League or 
the United Nations, a preliminary step may involve an appeal to 
the party or parties to settle a dispute peacefully, or by a 
specific method, or to refrain from provocative activities, or 
to comply with provisional measures if these have been ordered. 
There is again the focusing of attention on the problem and the 
creation of a feeling that more drastic measures may follow. 


B. Withdrawal of a Chief of Mission . This primarily 
symbolic measure serves to focus attention on the disputed 
matters. It is also possible to withdraw trade missions, con¬ 
sular officers, and other delegations or groups of representa¬ 
tives. A collective withdrawal of ambassadors was endorsed as 
a sanction against Spain by the United Nations in 1946. It was 
unsuccessful in causing any change in the Spanish government, its 
avowed aim. 


C. Severance of Relations . Because the diplomatic staff 
is withdrawn, this more severe measure breaks all official direct 
contact with the sanctioned state. This measure implies con¬ 
siderable moral onus. To some extent, however, it inconveniences 
the state or states applying the sanction, as well as the offend¬ 
ing state, because of loss of contact, slowness of communications, 
and the like. 


D. Nonrecoqnition of the Results of Treaty Violation . A 
prime problem with this form of sanction, of course, is that it 
is probably not very effective as a deterrent and is usually 
available only after the successful breach of an international 
arrangement. Although recognition of the change, and the re¬ 
spectability that it implies, may be a useful means of influenc 
ing action subsequent to a violation, the effectiveness of non¬ 
recognition is inevitably impeded by the pov;erful force of the 
fait accompli. 


Economic and Financial Sanctions . In the modern world it 
is not really practicable to attempt too narrow a set of dis¬ 
tinctions betv;een economic and financial measures. In prin¬ 
ciple, both types seek to cripple, or at least to interfere with, 
the economy of the sanctioned country by denying it strategic 
goods from abroad, or all goods from abroad; by preventing it 
from obtaining foreign exchange through sale of its goods abroad 
and the like; in fact by distorting its economy so that breach¬ 
ing its obligations will become so painful through shortages, 


24 








inflation, or unemployment, that it will either not move (if the 
threat of sanctions is believed) or be unable to attain its 
illicit goals (if it has already started). Moreover, while it 
is clear that economic and financial sanctions involve costs 
both to the sanctioned state and the sanctioners, sanctions 
theory assumes that the collective cost, spread over many states, 
will be bearable by each while the sanctioned state feels the 
full weight. 

Sanctions in history and an evaluation of economic sanc¬ 
tions are considered later, but it must be noted that it has 
alv;ays been reasonably clear that these measures were, at the 
most, of doubtful utility, particularly against a relatively 
self-sufficient, continent-sized nation such as the United 
States or the Soviet Union. The embargo on strategic East-West 
trade in the post-World War II period (though not a treaty sanc¬ 
tion), the embargo on China since the Korean War, and the em¬ 
bargo on Cuban trade are all recent, and on the whole dis¬ 
couraging, examples of the effects of this type of measure. 


A. Exports to the Offending Country . Sanctions action 
may involve depriving the sanctioned state of imports in order 
to make it difficult or impossible for it to breach, or to con¬ 
tinue to breach, its obligations, or in fact to carry on the 
daily work of an industrial state. An embargo on exports to an 
offending nation seeks directly to prevent it from obtaining the 
manufactured items, or raw materials, it needs and to make the 
implements necessary for conflict and even for survival. Export 
embargoes include: (1) total embargo; (2) selective embargo; 

(3) arms embargo--arms, ammunition, and implements of war. It 
does not appear that anything approaching a total embargo has 
been applied by a collectivity of states except in major wars. 


B. Imports from the Offending Country . An embargo on im¬ 
ports from an offending nation attacks it more indirectly by 
cutting off what is normally the chief means of financing foreign 
purchases. 


C. Severance of Financial Relations . Without attempting 
to distinguish among the various forms, the severance of finan¬ 
cial relations is in principle designed also to cut off sup¬ 
plies to the offending state by weakening its purchasing power. 
These measures would normally be used together with other 
economic sanctions. Action in this field might include: with¬ 
holding of loans and credits, suspension of payments on balance 


25 





due, blocking and freezing of gold and other assets, forbidding 
the floating of shares, forbidding the remitting of funds for 
any purpose, applying similar rules to private persons and legal 
entities as well as to the government involved, sequestration of 
the property of nationals of that state, etc. Such measures are . 
\ised during major wars and some of them v;ere used against Italy 
by the League in 1935. 

Where one nation is heavily dependent on another, the threat 
of such sanctions alone may be quite effective. One of the 
prime reasons given by the Israelis in 1957 for their v;ithdrawal 
from Egypt was the action of the United States in suspending aid 
talks then in progress and the threat to ban aid, loans, and 
private aid payments to Israel as well. 

Prospectively at least, this raises the possibility of 
using as a formal sanction the suspension of aid and assistance 
either by a state or an international organization: the United 
Nations, the World Bank (IBRD), etc. (Such measures have, of 
course, been used by the United States as instruments of diplo¬ 
macy.) To a state heavily dependent on such assistance, the 
threat of a cut-off might prove quite serious. The question of 
the political feasibility or desirability of imposing such a 
sanction would, of course, have to be considered separately in 
each instance. 


D. Severance of Transport and Communications . Another 
technique for isolating an offending nation involves the denial 
of ships and shipping service, railraod service, air service,- 
and the like to that state. International and national water¬ 
ways, airports, and other facilities could be closed to nationals 
of that state. Telephone, wire, postal, and radio communica¬ 
tions could be severed. Measures of this type if widely adopted 
vjould presumably do direct harm to a nation ^s ability to sur¬ 
vive and would also bring home the effect of sanctions to its 
populace. . 


Military Sanctions . Without considering initially the effect 
of the existence of the UN Charter, military sanctions may be 
broken dovm into categories of (a) measures ”short of war^’ and 
(b) ,v;arlike measures, including war. The categorization obvi-r 
ously depends on the nature of the reaction of the sanctioned 
state; if it resists a measure short of war with force, then 
conflict, and probably de facto war, obviously ensues. 


26 










Traditionally measures short of war have included military 
displays, massing of troops on the border, mobilization, naval 
demonstrations, and pacific blockade. In history, this last 
has generally implied a close blockade limited to ships of the 
blockaded state close to its ports. Perhaps today should be 
added the status of quarantine. These all imply the threat or 
use of at least some force. It seems unnecessary to describe 
further the use of force as a sanction though, except as barred 
by the Charter, it remains in practice the basic sanction, used 
individually or collectively, supporting the international legal 

structure. 


Sanctions Involving Assistance . A form of response or 
sanctions action which differs from the above and yet might 
serve the same goals involves the furnishing of assistance and 
support, economic, financial, and even military, to a state 
which is the victim of a breach of an international obligation. 
Such aid v;ould presumably make it more difficult for the vio¬ 
lator to gain from his breach. 


Envoi 


In closing this discussion of the enforcement of treaties, 
it is essential to stress one basic fact, which has been fre¬ 
quently alluded to above. In the world of sovereign states, 
v;ith no internationally recognized policing authority, treaties 
are only conditionally enforceable; their continuance is de¬ 
pendent upon the v;il].ingness of the parties to observe their 
obligations under the terms of the agreement. Willingness to 
observe the agreement continues only as long as the terms of 
the treaty satisfy individual national self-interest (as 
defined by its elite, or the party in power); enforcement in 
the event of violations is dependent on the will, determination, 
and strength of the injured party or parties. 


27 










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Chapter 3 


TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS* 


As nations have become increasingly interdependent, 
treaties have become more complex. The long and complicated 
European wars of the last three centuries resulted in settle¬ 
ments that sometimes included several treaties involving vir¬ 
tually all European nations. Some of these treaties became 
outmoded, many were violated in relatively small ways, and many 
fell victim to new wars. Violations, then as now, were met 
with a variety of responses, generally aimed at the violator's 
area of greatest vulnerability. A reviev; of the experience 
under some of these treaties could be useful, but for the pur¬ 
poses of this summary report it is more instructive to survey 
important treaty experience since World War I.** 


The Treaty of Versailles 


The 1919 Treaty of Versailles was drafted so soon after 
the cessation of World War I hostilities that anti-German feeling, 


'' This and the remaining chapters of Part Two of this re¬ 
port comprise a brief summary of the extensive historical sur¬ 
veys contained in Annex Volume II. This summary is included 
in the report proper for two main reasons: (1) to present a 
single, comprehensive review of the most important and most 
relevant material contained in the historical annexes, and (2) 
to provide in this self-contained report sufficient historical 
background for subsequent chapters, to obviate as far as pos¬ 
sible the necessity for frequent and time-consuming reference 
to the annexes. Those wishing to investigate facts or conclu¬ 
sions in further depth may turn to the annexes. 

** See Annex II-A for a review of pre-World War I 
treaty experience and for a comprehensive survey of the over¬ 
all treaty experience of the past half century. 










still strong in the minds of the Allied peoples, was a signifi¬ 
cant political factor to the statesmen preparing to arrange the 
peace. There was a popular demand for destruction of the German 
war machine in order to make it impossible for Germany again to 
become an aggressor and insistence on material reparation for 
the destruction and death which had been inflicted by German arms. 

The resulting treaty reflected this atmosphere. Many of 
its terms were unrealistic, particularly those relating to rep¬ 
arations and boundaries; moreover, they imputed to Germany an 
absolute war guilt that made her a veritable outcast among the 
family of nations. Finally, the treaty was presented to Germany 
for acceptance without negotiations, and the Germans were forced 
to sign in order to liave the Allies lift the v/artime blockade 
that was still strangling the nation and to end the still- 
existing state of war. Under the circumstances, a hostile Ger¬ 
man attitude toward the treaty v;as inevitable. 

The treaty^s objective of making Germany a minor military 
power was circumvented almost from the beginning. The German 
armed forces were to be strictly limited in men and weapons, and 
the General Staff was to be dissolved. The German government, 
however, employed a number of devices to evade the restrictions 
and to build the cadres of a large, well-trained army. Much of 
the evasion was covert, but long before Hitler announced con¬ 
scription in March 1935, the Allied Control Commission (dis¬ 
banded in 1928) had reported treaty violations, and it was 
generally known that the limitations imposed by the Versailles 
Treaty were not being observed. Very little effort was made to 
enforce them. 

On the other hand, German failure to comply fully v;ith the 
reparations provisions of the Versailles Treaty elicited re¬ 
sponse from some signatories. After the Reparations Commission 
voted, in December-January 1922-1923, that Germany was in de¬ 
fault on deliveries of timber and coal, France and Belgium re¬ 
sponded to this treaty violation by moving troops into the Ruhr 
to administer the production and delivery of those materials. 

The British neither approved nor supported this employment of 
force, thereby weakening its effectiveness. Ultimately a new 
system of payments, the Dawes Plan, emerged. Meanvjhile, growing 
German popular aversion to the occupation had aggravated an 
already-chaotic economic situation, precipitating uncontrolled 
inflation. Anti.-French sentiment in Germany reached a new high. 
Anglo-French policy disagreements were not lost upon the Ger¬ 
mans, who sought to exploit the differences between the former 
allies. 


32 


In March 1935, when Nazi Germany denounced the arms clauses 
of the Versailles Treaty, no penalty was forthcoming, Britain, 
in fact, was simultaneously helping to abrogate these provisions 
by negotiating and concluding an Anglo-German treaty authorizing 
German naval construction vjhich had been prohibited by the 
Treaty of Versailles. A year later Germany remilitarized the 
Rhineland, also forbidden by the treaty, and again there was no 
firm response. In both instances collective measures could have 
been taken under several treaties, either by the League of 
Nations or by its leading members acting independently. Both 
Britain and France v/ere so preoccupied with domestic problems 
and so fearful of risking war in Europe that neither would act 
alone, and Britain v;ould not support France when the latter 
briefly contemplated action. It is nov; apparent that a French 
advance into the Rhineland would have caused a German with¬ 
drawal and the probable downfall of Hitler. 


The League of Nations 


From the Peace Conference at Versailles had also come the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. Influenced by the slov; but 
grinding effect of the comprehensive economic measures employed 
against the Central Powers during the First VJorld War, as v;ell 
as by the attractiveness of an essentially nonmilitary enforce¬ 
ment system and the difficulty in obtaining agreement on more 
than that, the Leaguers founders made the ^^economic v;eapon’^ the 
heart of its peace-enforcement pov;ers. A member resorting to 
war in disregard of its covenants v;as to be subjected immediately 
and automatically to the severance of all commercial, financial, 
and personal intercourse between it and the other members. The 
mere threat of such immediate, sweeping retaliation combined 
with the concomitant disapproval of the international community 
(world public opinion) were thought to be in themselves guaran¬ 
tees against need for frequent use of such measures. Further¬ 
more, the immediate, universal application of such stringent 
economic and financial sanctions, in the case where the Covenant 
vjas nonetheless violated would, it v;as hoped and expected, ef¬ 
fectively protect any victim of a violation and restore peace 
without spreading a war. While military measures were also 
referred to in Article 16 of the Covenant, they were not stressed 
in similar fashion. 

In theory then, international peace with justice was to 
be maintained by the League through the power of international 
disapproval, plus, if necessary, international sanctions, 
primarily by means of a rapid, automatic, and forceful use of 


33 







the economic weapon. This international structure was to re¬ 
place the old-style prewar system of secret and labyrinthine 
power politics and competitive alliances. 

Within tv;o years of its creation, the Leaguers enforcement 
system was weakened by interpretations greatly qualifying the 
provisions for immediate and automatic sanctions. This was in 
part a reflection of the postwar political situation and of the 
nonmembership in the League of important powers, particularly 
the United States, and also Soviet Russia and Germany. Even 
more, this weakening of the sanctions system emphasized the fact 
that the League could not be an international government or a 
fully satisfactory substitute for pov;er politics and classic 
diplomacy. An automatic obligation to undertake immediate and 
drastic action against any and all aggressors--even action by a 
member^s friends, neighbors, and allies--inevitably became an 
impossible constraint on the still-necessary tools of diplomacy. 

Of the many disputes involving treaty or Covenant violations 
brought before the League for discussion, the majority involved 
lesser povjers only and v;ere settled by arbitration, by diplomatic 
pressure, or by other means short of the collective imposition 
of substantial sanctions. Vlhen major powers v;ere involved or 
major conflicts broke out, public airing of the case had little 
or no deterring influence. As it became apparent that force 
alone would compel an aggressor to back down, no powerful League 
member felt sufficient concern to undertake measures involving 
risk of unprofitable or unpopular war. 

The Manchurian aggression of 1831-1935 v;as a Japanese vio¬ 
lation not only of the Covenant, but also of several multilateral 
treaties. The League Council did not even consider the imposi¬ 
tion of sanctions beyond the nonrecognition of the creation of 
the puppet-state of Manchukuo, a policy initiated by the United 
States. In very general terms it may be said that the situation 
in China did not seem significant enough to the major European 
powers to v;arrant the costs of economic sanctions which even the 
British fleet was probably not strong enough to enforce. Mili¬ 
tary sanctions, v;ith the tremendous logistical problems involved 
in maintaining armies on the other side of the world, seemed out 
of the question. And finally, with no established method for 
coordinating sanctions action and no guarantee of cooperation 
by either Russia or the United States--except for Japan, the 
most important nations in the Pacific area--it was doubtful if 
any collective action would have been effective. 

Like most other serious disputes brought before the League, 
the Chaco War between Bolivia and Paraguay was a clear breach of 


34 





the Covenant, The League Council in 1934 recommended the im¬ 
position of an arms embargo, a plausible move, since neither 
nation had its ovm arms industry and both imported all military 
equipment. While the embargo was never completely effective, 
since it v;as only recommended and the neighboring nations did" 
not cooperate fully, yet it still had some influence in short¬ 
ening the conflict. Peace was finally achieved, however, out¬ 
side the framework of the League. 

I 

The most crucial test of the League as an agency of collec¬ 
tive security came v/ith the Italo-Ethiopian War. The Council 
readily agreed that Italy was in fact violating its obligations 
under the League Covenant and that sanctions should be imposed. 
Imposing them, hov;ever, and in fact agreeing on which sanctions 
to employ, was less simple. The decision to impose limited 
economic-financial sanctions deliberately omitted the tv70 
measures that might have been decisive in forcing Italy to stop: 
an embargo on petroleum and closing of the Suez Canal to Italian 
ships. There were three major reasons for the omissions: first, 
Britain and France feared that Italy v/ould oppose these responses 
with armed force, thus initiating v;ar; second, and possibly more 
important, the need for markets during a major depression led 
Britain and other nations to hope to continue trade v;ith Italy 
in nonembargo goods; third, the democracies feared that stronger 
action would alienate Italian support against resurgent Germany. 

Nevertheless, the limited economic measures actually taken 
in the fall of 1935 were generally expected to prove adequate. 

The still-remembered Italian disaster at Adowa in 1896 caused 
Europeans to overestimate greatly Ethiopian capabilities. 
Furthermore, Italy not only depended on imports of essential 
raw materials, but also lacked both gold and foreign exchange. 

In anticipation of sanctions, hov/ever, Italy had stock¬ 
piled raw materials. In the face of foreign opposition her 
people rallied to give overwhelming support to the Fascist 
cause. Italy^s modern military machine smashed organized re¬ 
sistance in Ethiopia before the sanctions could cause an eco¬ 
nomic crisis in Italy. The inadequate sanctions effort then 
collapsed, and the Italians were left v/ith some impressions 
that were not helpful to peace in Europe, namely, that they had 
successfully defied France and Britain, and that these nations, 
and the League itself, were decadent. 

With a full av;areness of the political, economic, and 
emotional climate of the times, which explains without justi¬ 
fying, one may list the principal failures of the League in the 
Italo-Ethiopian case: (1) failure to consider seriously even 
the limited use of armed force; (2) failure to provide for an 


35 


immediate and more extensive economic boycott and to close the 
Suez Canal; (3). failure to obtain compliance from all League 
members; (4) failure to interfere with Italian imports from non¬ 
members, primarily the United States and Nazi Germany; and (5) 
failure to continue the limited economic sanctions to the point 
where Italy would be forced to concede the independence and 
territorial integrity of Ethiopia. 

Economic sanctions had caused Italy’s stocks of raw mater¬ 
ials to dwindle, though not to a dangerous level, and the possi¬ 
bility of their exhaustion perhaps caused Italy to quicken her 
war efforts. As Haile Selassie bitterly told the League on 
June 30, 1936, the only real effect of sanctions seemed to have 
been to cause Italy to use poison gas to hasten the conquest. 
Today, with nuclear weapons available to some nations at least, 
a similar hazard is implicit even in sanctions which are slowly 
succeeding--a point worth pondering when considering the useful¬ 
ness of any program of graduated deterrence. 

The League, functioning in a sense like the Concert of 
Europe, was able during its two decades of active existence to 
resolve a few incidents involving small powers through the im¬ 
plied threat of sanctioning measures. It was unable to resolve 
any major vio3-ations of the Covenant or other major treaties 
(i.e., Versailles, Nine Power, Kellogg-Briand) involving a major 
or a middle power. It was also unable to prevent or resolve 
issues involving minor powers when the interests of major powers 
were at all involved. And the League never undertook an armed 
response to any violation of the Covenant. 


The United States and Treaty Violations 


The United States never acted directly with the League, 
although some of its responses to treaty violations paralleled 
those of League members. As regards the Far East, American 
diplomatic action in the interwar period was based on two 
treaties: the Nine Power Treaty of 1922 and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of 1928. The former affirmed the territorial integrity of 
China and the principle of the Open Door and included nonaggres¬ 
sion pledges and a provision for consultation in the event of 
disputes between the parties, although there were no express 
provisions for imposing sanctions. The Kellogg-Briand Pact, or 
the Pact of Paris, formally known as the Treaty for the Renun¬ 
ciation of War, pledged its 63 adherents to refrain from using 
war "as an instrument of national policy" and to settle disputes 
"by pacific means." 


36 




As a signatory of both these treaties, the United States 
expressed concern over the Manchurian incident, and Secretary of 
State Stimson tried to enlist Britain, France, and the League of 
Nations to join in diplomatic pressure. These diplomatic efforts 
failing, the United States took no direct action to stop the 
aggression. When Japan^s intent to separate Manchuria from 
China became plain, however, the American Government did employ 
the sanction of nonrecognition, announcing that the United States 
would not recognize ’’any situation, treaty, or agreement which 
may be brought about by means contrary to the covenants and 
obligations of the Pact of Paris.” 

The Italo-Ethiopian War was also considered a violation of 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The United States responded to the 
outbreak of hostilities by imposing an arms embargo in accordance 
with national legislation (the Neutrality Act) and by recommend¬ 
ing a moral embargo on private shipment of other strategic mate¬ 
rials. Neither of these embargoes was fully effective against 
Italy. VJhen Ethiopia was defeated and proclaimed by the Italians 
to be part of their Empire, the US Government again announced a 
policy of nonrecognition. 

The Japanese aggression in China that began in 1937 was 
denounced by the US Government as violating both the Nine Power 
Treaty and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The League of Nations, pre¬ 
occupied by the problem presented by Nazi Germany and with Japan 
no longer a member, did not respond, though it endorsed the 
meeting of the Nine Power Treaty signatories (less Japan) at 
Brussels in November. Nothing came of the conference. The 
Roosevelt administration did not invoke the Neutrality Act, not 
only because this was not a declared war, but also because such 
action v;ould have halted arms shipments both to agrarian China, 
which needed and sought to buy them, as well as to industrial 
Japan, which could arm herself. This decision not to restrict 
private arms trade with China was, perhaps, a first mild sanction 
against Japan. It was followed by a series of progressively 
more severe US sanctions. Refusal to renew the US-Japanese 
trade treaty in 1940 was followed by movement of the Pacific 
Fleet to Hawaii; in mid-1941 came the freezing of Japanese 
assets in the United States, which resulted, among other effects, 
in an oil embargo, a most effective and onerous sanction against 
oil-hungry Japan. Soon after this the US Government permitted 
the organization of a fighter group of American mercenary airmen 
to operate as part of the Chinese Air Force.* 


* This group later won fame as ’’the Flying Tigers. 


37 




Each of these actions was taken in response to a Japanese 
move in the Far East. These sanctions reflected not only in¬ 
creasing US concern over Japanese violations of treaties in 
general, but also the increasing av/areness of the US Government 
that the treaty violations by Japan were offering progressively 
graver threats to the national interests of the United States. 
Violations per se did not bring ever-stronger responses; viola¬ 
tions posing an apparent strategic .threat to vital US national 
interests did. 

It is significant, however, that this escalating series of 
sanctions imposed by the United States against Japan was not ac¬ 
companied by a strengthened US and Western position in the 
Orient. The Nine Power Treaty had been part of a package which 
was to stabilize the naval and political status quo in the af^- 
fected area. This regional balance was severely affected by 
Japanlegal denunciation of the Washington Treaty^ her inten¬ 
sive naval, air, and base construction programs, and uncertain¬ 
ties about American bases in the Western Pacific because of the 
1934 Tydings-McDuffie Act, which granted independence to the 
Philippines by 1946. It was proposed that responses to Japan^s 
specific violations of the Kellogg-Briand and Nine Power Pacts 
should have been paralleled by specific arms and base build-up 
measures to restore the 1922 power balance. The interconnections 
of the factors affecting the balance, hov;ever, v;ere not well 
understood by many sections of American opinion. Some sections 
opposed naval rearmament as provocative to Japan, as 'damaging 
to our chances of remaining aloof from a future world conflict, 
and, in the case of base contruction in the Western Pacific, 
as both provocative to Japan and as diverting attention from 
the still more important threats to the national interest from 
grov;ing German and Italian power in Europe. Despite some in¬ 
crease in US naval strength in the late 1930s, the net result 
v;as a dichotomy between sanctions and the power to support them 
which v;as , in fact, both provocative and enticing to Japan. 


Early Disarmament Efforts 


Following World V/ar I, universal horror at the cost of the 
conflict inspired ividespread sentiment for preventing another 
arms race such as had preceded the war and which many felt was 
among the causes of that dreadful holocaust. Complete, univer¬ 
sal disarmament became the dream of millions of people who 
dreaded war as a means of settling international disputes. 


38 








The first postwar effort to reduce armaments was the naval 
conference held in Washington in 1921-1922. The conference pro¬ 
duced a treaty specifying that the United States, Great Britain, 
and Japan should limit their capital ship tonnage to a ratio of 
5:5:3. This, in the light of practical military considerations, 
gave Japan naval predominance in the Western Pacific. This pre¬ 
dominance was further enhanced by the agreement that there would 
be no new construction of fortifications in Western Pacific 
islands--outside Singapore and the Japanese home islands. Though 
this prohibited the Japanese from improving fortifications on 
their Mandated Islands, more significantly, it prevented US 
modernization of the Philippine defenses and the fortification 
of Guam, and also the fortification of British, French, and 
Dutch island possessions in the Pacific. Though this treaty 
contained no sanctions clauses, Japanese violations, it was 
vaguely hoped, might be checked by economic means. Japan was 
then greatly dependent on both overseas raw materials and 
markets, and a large percentage of Japanese trade was v;ith the 
United States and the various parts of the British Commonwealth. 

A second naval conference was held in Geneva in 1927, with 
the objective of limiting cruisers and lesser craft, which had 
not been included in the Washington Treaty. It failed, however, 
for a number of reasons--one of which was that there had been 
no preliminary discussions which might have reduced the vast 
areas of disagreement. France and Italy refused to participate. 
Great Britain insisted on having considerably more cruisers than 
the United States was to be allov.>ed. And Japan refused to accept 
limitations in the same proportions as those applied to capital 
ships by the earlier treaty. 

One of the principal disarmament developments of the inter¬ 
war period was world-wide adherence to the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
in 1928.* While this did not require any of its 63 signatories 
to reduce arms, all of them, nonetheless, agreed to refrain from 
using war ”as an instrument of policy.’^ 

From the London Naval Conference of 1930 came a treaty 
which provided for equal strength in naval forces for the 
United States and Great Britain, with Japanese strength varying 
in ratios from 60% in 8-inch gun cruisers to parity in subma¬ 
rines. In order to approach cruiser ratios V7ith Japan and parity 
with the British as the treaty allov;ed, the United States would 
have been required to undertake a billion dollars^ worth of new 
construction. No such program was undertaken before the war. 


* See p.36, supra . 


39 




and the United States never reached authorized naval strength 
during the life of the treaty. 

The League Preparatory Commission'on Disarmament had been 
meeting during these years, and its efforts finally resulted, in 
1932, in the Geneva Conference for the Reduction and Limitation 
of Armaments, primarily concerned with land and air forces. For 
many reasons the conference failed to achieve anything. Japan 
had by then already initiated her successful invasion of Man¬ 
churia, casting doubts on the realism of disarmament. Germany, 
with Hitler rising to power, made unacceptable demands, while 
France, alarmed by German resurgence, was unv;illing to contem¬ 
plate abandoning her most powerful weapons. It thus became 
impossible to reach agreement on really significant reductions 
or proscriptions. Moreover, there existed a world-wide economic 
crisis which complicated the whole international situation by 
adding to domestic pressures on the policies of the great powers. 
The general spirit of contention, suspicion, and doubt was fur¬ 
ther aggravated by Germany’s announcement of withdrawal from the 
conference and from the League. The last session of the con¬ 
ference took place in mid-1934. 

The follov7ing year a naval conference in London resulted in 
a treaty signed by Britain, France, and the United States, 
limiting the size of certain vessels and the caliber of their 
guns but with an escalator clause permitting abandonment of the 
restrictions in the event of a new arms race. The treaty lasted 
for only two years. When it became apparent that Japan, which 
had walked out of the London conference, was accelerating naval 
construction, the United States and Great Britain resumed com¬ 
petitive building. 

Disarmament had failed completely. So, too, had the con¬ 
cept of collective action to enforce the peace--the cornerstone 
of the League of Nations. The victorious Allied Powers of World 
War I had refused to exercise the determination and will essen¬ 
tial to the enforcement of even the most controversial treaties 
and had lacked the v;isdom and'initiative to modify treaty terms 
which they v;ere unwilling to enforce. 



40 




Chapter 4 


TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 

AFTER WORLD WAR II 


After the close of World War II the great powers made 
another attempt to set up an organization of nations which 
might prevent the outbreak of still more wars. As a result 
at least in part of the League experience, the Charter of 
the United Nations provided for a collective security system 
in which the Security Council^ whose members controlled most 
of the v;orld^s armed forces, could, under appropriate circum¬ 
stances, take v;hatever action might be necessary for the main¬ 
tenance of international peace and security and legally re¬ 
quire that members (and perhaps nonmembers as well) participate 
in, or at least refrain from obstructing, the action ordered. 
Economic and financial sanctions hold a respectable place in 
the UN arsenal, but only as part of a sv;eeping plan of response 
to the problem of preserving peace. 

In practice, however, the requirement for unanimity among 
the great powers in the Security Council* has effectively pre¬ 
vented it from organizing decisive action in major crises in¬ 
volving violations of treaties or of the Charter, except during 
the crisis in Korea (and then only because the USSR was boy¬ 
cotting Security Council meetings).** Furthermore, the Military 
Staff Committee has never been able to reach any agreement on 
the organization, composition, or mission of international 
forces. With the Security Council thus limited by constant 
friction between East and West, the United States took the 


* China, France, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, and United 
States--all permanently represented on the Council. 

** The solution to the Suez crisis cannot be credited 
solely to the United Nations since it was due in major part to 
unilateral American pressures on Britain, France, and Israel; 
see pp. 44-45, infra . 






initiative in causing the General Assembly to assume more respon¬ 
sibility in matters of collective security, although its resolu¬ 
tions do not have the binding effect of those of the Security 
Council. But in recent years the General Assembly has been de¬ 
clining in effectiveness and has been frequently paralyzed by 
the ^Veto^’ of one or another bloc in precluding the tv 70 -thirds 
majority required for agreement on major substantive issues. 

The attitude of the United States toward the United Nations, 
hov;ever, has been very different from that it adopted toward 
the League of Nations." After World War I, the United States 
saw itself as a bystander relatively uninvolved in changes in 
Europe and Asia, World War II destroyed this concept of secur¬ 
ity by isolation; its aftermath, which saw the United States in 
the role of one superpower confronting another v;hose principles 
and objectives are diametrically opposed, has created a situa¬ 
tion in which there is little in the v;orld of pov7er relations 
which does not concern the strategic interests of the United 
States, whether or not a formal treaty relation or the UN 
Charter are involved. In fact, since the UN Charter bans 
^threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggres¬ 
sion,^^ almost any act of international violence by a member 
would at the least technically constitute a treaty violation. 

The first trial of the United Nations, the complaint by Iran 
of Soviet violation of agreements v/ith respect to Azerbaijan, 
found the Security Council playing the role of an umpire, taking 
no action but receiving periodic reports from the two nations 
involved. Ultimately, by mid-1946, the situation v;as resolved 
by Russian withdrawal from Persian Azerbaijan, v/ith no direct 
UN action, through negotiations in v;hich firm US support of Iran 
v;as probably decisive. 

In 1947 Greece complained to the United Nations about foreign 
aid, through Yugoslavia, Albania, and Bulgaria, to Communist 
guerrilla forces opposing government troops in northern Greece. 
Council action in response to this Charter violation was prevented 
by a Soviet veto, and the Assembly took' over the investigation 
of- the situation, appointing a special committee, which sent ob¬ 
servers to the area. The Assembly recommended the following 
year that members refrain from direct or indirect assistance to 
any group fighting the Greek government and further that no arms 
or other materials of war should be furnished to Albania or 
Bulgaria. Most ..of the members complied with the embargo, al¬ 
though there were no penalties provided for noncompliance. The 
principal reasons -for the collapse of the rebellion were Yugo¬ 
slavians break with Soviet Russia in 1948 (eliminating the 
principal sanctuary of the guerrillas) and US"military advisory 
assistance to Greece, 


42 


In Palestine in 1947-1948, after Britain made clear her 
determination to end her UN Trusteeship (former League Mandate) 
over Palestine, violent fighting ensued between Zionists and 
the Arabs, who were unalterably opposed to the establishment 
of the proposed new Jewish state of Israel. The Security 
Council vainly sought to bring about by negotiation some kind 
of basis for peace, but when Israel V7as established. May 15, 

1948, hostilities erupted between the new nation and her Arab 
neighbors. The Council called for a cease-fire; all govern¬ 
ments were asked to assist in implementing the resolution, 
v;hich was understood to mean an embargo on shipping war supplies 
into the area. It was not a formal embargo, however, and al¬ 
though its effect may have been felt, it was far from decisive. 

The war did not end until Israel had attained most of its objec¬ 
tives and had reached a military stalemate with Jordan at Jeru¬ 
salem. It should be noted, furthermore, that despite the con¬ 
tinuing presence of UN observers and mediators in the area, the 
fundamental issues between the combatants, including the very 
survival of Israel, remain unresolved. 

Embargoes have also been declared by the United Nations 
against South Africa and Portugal. In November 1962 the General 
Assembly called for economic sanctions and the breaking-off of 
diplomatic relations with South Africa over its policy of apart¬ 
heid. There was considerable resistance to this move, partly 
based on the question of whether apartheid was an exclusively 
domestic problem and therefore an issue not appropriately within 
the cognizance of the United Nations. In August 1963, neverthe¬ 
less, the Security Council voted an embargo on shipment of arms, 
ammunition, and military vehicles to South Africa. This was a 
substitute for the economic boycott some of the members favored; 
it is not likely to have much effect on the situation. An 
embargo on the shipment of arms to Lisbon in 1962 resulted from 
pressure by the Afro-Asian group in the General Assembly, con¬ 
demning the colonial policy of Portugal. With the United States, 
Britain, and France abstaining, the Security Council called upon 
the Secretary General to see that the resolution was enforced. 

The action of the United Nations in regard to the North 
Korean invasion of South Korea in 1950 shows that an international 
body can act only when, and to the extent that, its members are 
willing to cooperate. This was initially demonstrated when the 
United States called for collective assistance to South Korea. 
While the Soviet member was temporarily boycotting the Council, 
it was possible for that body to agree on resolutions calling for 
an immediate end to hostilities and for assistance to South 
Korea. In late 1950 the Chinese Communists openly entered 


43 


the war and in January 1951 the Assembly branded China an agg^^cs- 
sor and called for a study of economic sanctions. It was not 
until May that the Assembly adopted a resolution recommending 
an embargo on the shipment of war and strategic materials to 
North Korean- and Chinese-held areas. The Soviet bloc, however, 
refused to vote on the resolution, basing their objection in 
part on•the claim that the Assembly had no power to call for^an 
embargo. In fact, the embargo did not go beyond.measures which 
the major Western powers had already put in force. 

Although there v/as no adequate coordination of effort to 
enforce the embargo against China, it v/as fairly well observed 
for several years, partly because the United States threatened 
to refuse aid to nations supplying strategic materials to Com¬ 
munist nations. The latter, however, did not observe any re¬ 
striction on trade with China, thereby to a considerable extent 
nullifying the embargoes effects on the Chinese economy and on 
China^s ability to maintain the war in Korea. 

The embargo was gradually ended after the Korean armistice, 
under pressure from many of the nations which had been party to 
it. Its total effect on the Chinese economy was not decisive. 
Chinese development was slowed down, but not stopped. Without 
the embargo sanction, hov/ever, it is undoubtedly true that 
Chiracs economic development v/ould have been more rapid and 
more orderly. The embargo, in fact, may have been a factor in 
triggering China^s ultimately disastrous decision to try her 
"Great Leap Forv/ard." Further, her need for aid v/as the major 
nonideological factor in her dependence on Russia in this period. 
This dependence, in turn, was possibly a major source of strain 
in Sino-Soviet relations. 

Three other serious threats to the peace—and thus presum¬ 
ably breaches of the Charter--have evoked considerable discussion 
in the United Nations, although no sanction or force other than 
moral pressure was applied by that body. In the case of the 
conflict betv/een the Dutch and the nationalist forces in Indo¬ 
nesia, 1945-1950, the United Nations repeatedly called on the 
two parties to arbitrate their differences and to cease fighting. 
The United Nations finally set up a Good Offices Committee, which 
helped to v/ork out a settlement. Simultaneously, the United 
States applied economic pressure on the Netherlands. 

The Suez crisis of 1956 saw the United States, working 
through the United Nations, apply virtual sanctions against 
its allies, France and Britain, and against Israel, a state 
heavily dependent on American support. Israel was placed under 


44 



heavy unilateral economic 
France and Britain, faced 
and economic pressure, as 
Russian intervention--and 
withdrew their forces. 


pressure which proved effective, v;hile 
with American political opposition 
well as the blustering threat of 
with divided sentiment at homG--also 


The coincident Hungarian crisis evoked resolutions calling 
on the Russians to cease their illegal intervention in that 
country, but owing to American unwillingness to initiate mili¬ 
tary measures against Russia in eastern Europe and the insist¬ 
ence of the Soviets thal^the problem was entirely domestic, 
there v;as little that the United Nations could do beyond help¬ 
ing the thousands of refugees who fled Hungary. No event has 
more clearly demonstrated the overv7helming concentration of 
world pov;er in the two superpowers and the impotence of the 
United Nations to impose sanctions on either one. The United 
Nations did, however, appoint an investigatory commission which 
branded Russian intervention in Hungary as aggression; this 
condemnation has had no practical and little moral effect-- 
Russia has merely ignored it. 


In practice the Charter of the United Nations has not pro¬ 
vided an ideal organization in v/hich all the tensions and dis¬ 
putes among nations might be relieved amicably. It has, hov^ever, 
served in many instances to lessen stresses in various parts of 
the v7orld, as evidenced particularly by its peace-keeping mis¬ 
sions in Gaza and the Congo. It has had markedly more success 
than did its predecessor, the League of Nations, but this has 
been due in large measure to wholehearted American support of 
the United Nations and American v;illingness, usually, to take 
prompt action, if necessary, in rendering this support. 


The Organization of American States 


Among the currently effective regional treaties of collec¬ 
tive security, perhaps the most important to the United States 
are the Charter of the Organization of American States, adopted 
in 1948 by the republics of the VJestern Hemisphere, which pro¬ 
vided the institutional setting for the measures contained in 
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed at 
Rio de Janiero in 1947. These pacts provide that violations of 
status quo in the Western Hemisphere, by attacks or threats 
of attack on any signatories, are to be met with collective 
responses: first, consultation through a prescribed mechanism, 

and then v^hatever measures are deemed necessary. 


45 





In the 16 years since the signing of the Rio Treaty, ten 
cases brought before the Organization of American States under 
the Rio Treaty have resulted in sanctions or other measures of 
a collective nature.* They all concerned nations in the Carib¬ 
bean area and all to some extent involved conflicts between op¬ 
posing ideological forces: champions of democracy versus dicta¬ 
torships in the earlier cases; comiriunism versus the established 
government in later instances. In all but the case of Cuba, 
only the small pov;ers have been involved on either side, and in 
every case but Cuba and the Dominican crisis of 1960 diplomatic 
measures (fact-finding, conciliation, mediation) have been suf¬ 
ficient to bring about a solution of the case. When the Domini¬ 
can Republic interfered in the internal affairs of Venezuela in 
1960, however, the OAS did agree to break off diplomatic rela¬ 
tions and embargo arms shipments to the Dominican Republic. 

This unquestionably was partially responsible for the consequent 
overthrow of the Trujillo dictatorship. 

The problem of communism in Cuba has come before the OAS for 
discussion on three occasions. In 1961 the OAS Foreign Ministers 
condemned intervention or the threat of intervention by an extra¬ 
continental pov/er in the affairs of the American Republics. In 
1962 they firmly declared communism incompatible with the inter- 
American system, somewhat reluctantly excluded Cuba from the 
Inter-American Defense Board, and placed an embargo on the ship¬ 
ment of arms to Cuba. During the Russian missile crisis in 1962 
the members promptly supported US moves by approving, and assist¬ 
ing the United States in taking, measures necessary to prevent 
the receipt in Cuba of military supplies from the Communist 
pov7ers . 

From the experience under the Rio Treaty it is clear that 
the sentiment of the members favors using conciliation within 
the OAS f ramev7ork to settle disputes among the member states . 

Even the 1961 and 1962 resolutions condemning communism in Cuba 
did not meet with unanimous response from the Latin-American 
states, which jealously guard the policy of nonintervention 
V7hich the OAS is designed to support. Only in the face of a 
threat from outside the hemisphere, in the Russian missile crisis, 


* This report was in process of preparation in January and 
February 1964, when Panama brought charges of aggression against 
the United States' in the OAS and when the OAS was investigating 
Cuban responsibility for inciting revolt in Venezuela» 


46 





did the members act unanimously to sustain the status quo and 
the inviolability of the American system. 

In the case of the Soviet missiles, whether or not there 
vyas an actual breach of the UN Covenant or other treaty (v;hich 
is debatable), the United States enjoyed widespread support in 
the OAS for its firm, forceful response to the threat. The 
United States could prove the presence of Soviet missiles by 
photography and the OAS responded promptly to US leadership. 

Tbe status quo as regards v;eapon systems present in the hemis¬ 
phere was restored by the restrained use of force locally, in 
the form of a limited blockade, or quarantine, and by an un¬ 
equivocal strategic tr.reat to the Soviet Union, 

Although in the Organization of American States each member 
has an equal vote, thereby limiting the overbearing superiority 
of strength and resources of the United States, inevitably the 
fact of that superiority is always in the background in discus¬ 
sions of any problems that may arise; in the last analysis no 
coercive action by the OAS could be entirely effective without 
US support. The United States has, in fact, pursued a policy 
of conformance with the majority--to what extent she has in¬ 
fluenced the majority decision is debatable--and has acted 
within the f ramev;ork of the OAS on hemisphere problems . How¬ 
ever, should the United States decide on a return to earlier 
policies of intervention or other unilateral action V7ithin the 
hemisphere, no other military force available in the OAS could 
prevent it. 


Disarmament Since World War II 


The development of nuclear weapons has given deeper signifi¬ 
cance to the interwar sentiment favoring disarmament. Unlike 
the Covenant of the League, the Charter of the United Nations 
does not mention the possibility of universal disarmament, yet 
gives the Security Council specific responsibility to plan for 
the regulation of armaments, with the advice and assistance of 
the Military Staff Committee, and authorizes the General Assembly 
to consider the general problem of disarmament. Since 1946, 
when the United Nations established its Atomic Energy Commission, 
the control of nuclear power has been the subject of long and 
involved international conferences which have served frequently 
to underline the deeply rooted problems impeding agreement. 
Whenever agreement on V7eapons control or force reduction has 
begun to appear within the realm of possibility, it has foundered 


47 


■V 





on the method of enforcement. The United States has insisted 
on thorough inspection to confirm compliance with the draft 
agreements, while the Russians have insisted that inspection 
might impair their national sovereignty through exposure of 
military secrets. Furthermore, there are strong indications 
that--largely for different reasons--neither the United States 
nor the Soviet Union is yet fully v;illing to enter into far- 
reaching disarmament commitments. 

The first notable achievement of disarmament negotiations 
came in 1963, v;hen agreement was reached on the partial Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty, which banned tests of nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, and V7hich pro¬ 
hibited assistance to other nations in conducting such tests. 
Because of the basic US-Soviet difference on inspection, the 
treaty permits--because without inspection it cannot certainly 
prevent--underground explosions, as long as the radioactive 
debris does not leave the country in which the explosions occur. 
The treaty may be amended and is of unlimited duration, although 
any party may withdraw from it, under certain specified circum¬ 
stances, after giving three-months^ advance notice. While this 
does not affect the production or stockpiling of nuclear v/ar 
devices, it appears to be at least a step toward controlling 
the indiscriminate development of v;eapons and halting the re¬ 
cent alarming increase in atmospheric levels of radiation. In 
light of safeguards which were adopted, the risks of possible 
deception, or unverifiable violations, v/ere considered by the 
US Government to be slight, in comparison v/ith the benefits 
which v;ould accrue from a valuable arms control treaty experi¬ 
ment and which v;ould result both from limiting radiation hazard 
and from some curtailment of further development of nuclear 
vjeapons by the Soviet Union as well as by the United States. 

The treaty was promptly ratified by the US Senate after thorough 
debate. Time alone can tell whether the experiment vjill be 
successful and if this is, in fact, a real advance tov;ard more 
comprehensive arms control agreements. 





Chapter 5 


RECENT WESTERN-COMMUNIST AGREEMENT EXPERIENCE 


The Cold War 


The principal fact of international life since World War II 
has been the almost continuous hostility and friction v;hich has 
existed between the two superpowers--the United States and the 
Soviet Union--and which has manifested itself directly and in¬ 
directly around the globe. This hostility is partly ideological 
--the continuing struggle between communism, as represented by 
the Soviet Union, and Western concepts of democracy, as repre¬ 
sented by the United States--and partly strategic concern over 
the balance of power. 

In the many areas in which the interests of the two super¬ 
powers have met, hov;ever, agreement on solution of problems, 
while never easy, has not always been impossible. The remainder 
of this chapter considers, first, some of the major Cold War dis¬ 
putes v;hich have been unresolved and apparently still remain 
insoluble; then, some settlements that have been reached through 
negotiation and compromise. 


Major Unresolved Cold V\?ar Disputes 


Berlin Access Agreements 

As early as September 1944, long before the Allied armies 
of World War II were threatening the heart of Germany, American, 
British, and Russian representatives had agreed to divide Berlin 
into three sectors, or areas of occupation, just as Germany it¬ 
self was to be divided into three occupation zones. The later 
inclusion of France as an occupying power resulted in establish¬ 
ment of four sectors and zones. These written agreements, how¬ 
ever, lacked any specific affirmation of freedom of access by 
the Western Allies through the Soviet zone of Germany to their 
sectors of Berlin. Nor was freedom of access specifically 
obtained by bargaining at the close of the war, when the Russians 






held Berlin by right of conquest, and the Western Allies simi¬ 
larly held substantial portions of the Russian zone in eastern 
Germany, The Western negotiators seemed to feel, vjith some 
logic, that Russian acknowledgement of their right to have oc¬ 
cupation forces in Berlin automatically carried with it the 
right of access for those forces. There was, furthermore, ex¬ 
plicit oral agreement betv;een American General Clay, British 
General Weeks, and Russian Marshal Zhukov giving the Westerners 
the right to use one autobahn, one rail line, and one air cor¬ 
ridor (later augmented by other agreements to include two more 
autobahns, two more air corridors, and a canal route). But 
though Clay had reserved the matter for final official confir¬ 
mation by the four-power Allied Control Council, such formal 
agreement was never reached. 

Late in 1947, the Soviets began challenging the divided 
status of Berlin, Serious differences between East and West on 
German policy culminated in March 1948 in a Soviet walkout from 
the Allied Control Council, On June 16, *1948, the Soviet repre¬ 
sentative similarly walked out of the Berlin Kommandatura . 

Shortly thereafter, a total land blockade was imposed by the 
Russians. The Allies responded immediately by a massive airlift, 
which for a year successfully supplied both the Allied forces 
and the entire civilian population of West Berlin. (It is per¬ 
haps significant that there was no real Soviet•effort to inter¬ 
fere with Allied use of the air corridors to Berlin; these, 
unlike the surface access routes,, had been the subject of clear 
and specific written agreements.) Another response, also ef¬ 
fective, was an embargo on trade between West and East Germany. 
After lengthy East-West conversations the blockade was lifted in 
May 1949, and at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers 
in June the Soviets reaffirmed the right of Western access. 

Since 1948, the three Western powers have been operating 
the Allied Kommandatura in West Berlin without the Soviet mem¬ 
ber, and the East German government has been in control of 
East Berlin. In 1958 Khrushchev called for an end to what he 
termed the "illegal occupation" of Berlin and threatened to 
make a separate peace treaty with East Germany, in violation 
of the 1944 occupation agreements. 

The Russians have permitted numerous other treaty viola¬ 
tions by the East Germans, notably the ignoring of the Potsdam 
Protocol (which guaranteed to the German' people the political 
right of self-determination) and the denial of free movement 
within the city of Berlin, culminating in the erection of the 
wall dividing the city. Crises, such as a dramatic showdown of 
armored units at Checkpoint Charlie in October 1961, have 


so 




occurred on several occasions. Overt provocations have been 
met v;ith resistance and have then been eased by negotiation; but 
no action has been taken to remedy the fundamental political 
situation or to have the Berlin Wall removed. Russian or East 
German moves have usually been gradual, passing virtually un¬ 
noticed. This, combined with Allied mistakes or forbearance, 
has resulted in some substantial erosion of Western access 
rights. 


The Korean Armistice 


In several parts of Asia, where Free World military forces 
have confronted Communist-supported forces since V\/orld War II 
and where negotiations for formal and lasting treaties of peace 
have proved impossible, the West has sought to establish some 
kind of equilibrium by means of less formal agreements requiring 
no ratification. 

Negotiation of a truce in the Korean War began in the sum¬ 
mer of 1951 when the Chinese Communist forces were threatened 
with defeat in Korea and so were v;illing to negotiate to lessen 
the military pressure on them. The Chinese Communist-North 
Korean pattern of negotiation v/as typical of historic Communist 
techniques, alternating periods of fighting with periods of 
talking during v;hich they rebuilt their depleted military 
strength. Typically, they sought to break deadlocks by applying 
pressure on the battlefield. But eventually they, like the UN 
Command, found truce preferable to the military attrition and 
stalemate. Since neither all-out war nor continuing attrition 
was desirable to either side, after tv;o years of frustrating 
talks, an armistice agreement became acceptable and v;ent into 
effect on July 27, 1953. 

Among other provisions, the Korean Truce called for: (1) 
a demilitarized zone between the opposing armies, (2) prohibi¬ 
tion of reinforcement of armed forces already in Korea, and (3) 
no forcible repatriation of prisoners of v;ar. Responsibility 
for carrying out the terms was vested in a Military Armistice 
Commission, composed of representatives from both sides. To 
assist in enforcing the second aim listed above, the belliger¬ 
ents appointed a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission vjhich, 
by means of Neutral Nations Inspection Teams, was to observe 
and report on the compliance of both sides. The UN Command 
(UNO nominated Sweden and Switzerland to provide representa¬ 
tives on the neutral bodies, while the Communists named Poland 
and Czechoslovakia. 


51 



From the beginning, the Swedes and the Swiss found it im¬ 
possible to reach agreement with the supposedly neutral Czechs 
and Poles. The operation of the neutral bodies was further com¬ 
plicated by the refusal of the North Korean Command to facili¬ 
tate inspections north of the demilitarized zone. Far from 
being neutral, the Czechs and Poles consistently found nothing 
V7rong with Communist behavior and nothing right with UNC activi¬ 
ties. Thus the Swedes and Swiss, who honestly attempted to be 
neutral, v^ere forced into the position of supporting the UN 
Command in order to redress an unfair situation. 

Subject as it was to the Military Armistice Commission, 
the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) could only 
make reports. It had no authority to force compliance with the 
terms of the armistice, no freedom of movement except as 
authorized by the Military Armistice Commission, no access to 
points of entry or exit other than those specified in the armi¬ 
stice agreement, and rarely obtained approval to inspect else¬ 
where. It was easily possible for the Communists to strengthen 
their forces without the knov;ledge of the NNSC. The Communist 
Command submitted false and incomplete reports of movements of 
personnel and materiel, bypassed designated ports of entry, and 
prevented effective observation and inspection, all v;ith the 
complete sympathy and tacit connivance of the Polish and Czech 
members of the NNSC. The major Communist violation was the 
introduction of airplanes into North Korea. 

So ineffective were the neutral teams and so futile the 
attempts to get action on obvious violations of the armistice 
agreement, that in June 1956 the UN Command requested withdrawal 
of the inspection teams from South Korea. They were withdrawn 
from both areas soon thereafter. A year later the UNC reported 
to the Secretary General of the United Nations that, because of 
specific violations by the Communists of the armistice agree¬ 
ment, it considered itself free to redress the military equilib¬ 
rium by introducing new v;eapons into South Korea. 

The NNSC still'remains in Korea, keeping open a channel of 
communications between the belligerents and publishing figures 
on personnel arrivals and departures. Following the UNC denun¬ 
ciation, both sides have disregarded the armistice provision 
prohibiting military reinforcement; the other provisions are 
still- in effect, and as far as is known an approximate balance 
of military power is being maintained. This apparently keeps 
the peace. 


52 






Geneva Accords on Indochina 


Much as inspection failed in Korea because of the lack of 
good faith and cooperation of the Communist belligerents, com¬ 
pounded by the hypocrisy of Communist pseudo-neutrals in a 
peace-keeping role, it failed also in Southeast Asia for the 
same reasons and in much the same way. 

An attempt to settle the fighting that had been going on 
in Indochina since the end of World War II was made at a con¬ 
ference held at Geneva in 1954, with the United States, the 
Soviet Union, Communist China, France, Britain, Laos, Cambodia, 
South Vietnam, and the Communist Viet Minh participating. The 
result was a series of agreements and a final declaration. 

France and the Viet Minh signed the Vietnam and Laos Accords; 
representatives of King Norodom Sihanouk and the Viet Minh 
signed the Cambodian Accord. The Final Declaration was signed 
by all participants except South Vietnam and the United States, 

The latter declared, however, that it would not disturb the 
settlements but would ”view with grave concern” (i.e., would re¬ 
consider its implicit compliance) any renewed Communist aggression. 


Vietnam Accord . The Vietnamese Accord called for a cease¬ 
fire and the removal of foreign military forces, temporary 
division of Vietnam near the 17th parallel, and a plebiscite to 
be held two years later, under international control, to deter¬ 
mine the political regime of a reunited Vietnam. A Joint Com¬ 
mission of the French and Viet Minh was to be responsible for 
implementing the agreements, with an International Control 
Commission (India, Canada, and Poland) to supervise and control 
the execution. 

The settlement was not really popular with anyone; it 
seemed, however, a means of putting an end to a colonial war, 
and it might have worked had there been willingness on all 
sides to cooperate fully and honestly. Some of the signatories 
probably never expected it to last, while others were apparently 
determined that it would not. The International Control Com¬ 
mission was neither equipped nor organized to be effective in 
maintaining the settlement, with the Polish and Canadian repre¬ 
sentatives always at odds and the neutral Indian member^s 
indecision constantly exploited by the Communist Pole. The in¬ 
spection teams encountered the same problems as in Korea. 

It is impossible to determine precisely who first breached 
the agreements in Vietnam or how. It should be noted, however, 
that even in 1954, Ho Chi Minh vowed that he would unify the 


53 






country under his control* There is ample evidence that the 
Viet Minh never withdrew all its forces from South Vietnam, 
but left behind an underground organization that would come to 
its support in the event of renewed hostilities. This under¬ 
ground was active between 1954 and 1956. South Vietnam, which 
had signed neither the Accord nor the Final Declaration, and 
therefore could not violate them, refused in 1956 to consent 
even to discussion of the political referendum, by which the 
Viet Minh had hoped, through terrorism or through actual popular 
support, to gain peaceful control of the whole country. Frus¬ 
trated in this, the Viet Minh stepped up the dissident activity 
of its underground in the south. 

In 1958 open violation of the agreements began on a large 
scale with the infiltration of large numbers of Viet Minh per¬ 
sonnel into South Vietnam and the subsequent’ flare-up of fight¬ 
ing throughout the area. By 1961 the South Vietnamese had 
protested more than 1,200 violations, but little was ever done 
by the International Control Commission to investigate them. 

The United States, in the meantime, had increased the 
number of its military personnel in its Military Assistance 
Advisory Group in South Vietnam, for the direct purpose of 
assisting South Vietnam in repelling the Communist aggression. 
Since, like South Vietnam, the United States was not a signa¬ 
tory of the agreements, it could not violate them. It had, 
however, pledged itself unilaterally not to disrupt the settle¬ 
ment, and this has provided the basis for Communist-inspired 
charges of US violation of the spirit of the treaty. It is the 
US position, however, that its pledge was no longer binding in 
view of the Viet Minh aggression. 

The situation in Vietnam has been a tangled one. The 
Geneva Accords, which were supposed to have brought peace to 
the area, were inadequate, and the machinery for enforcing them 
v;as unrealistic. There was no provision for immediate and ef¬ 
fective action in the event of a treaty violation, nor for 
authority to act even if violations were detected. So minor 
violations becam.e more and more numerous, and increased guer¬ 
rilla activity by the North Vietnamese evoked increased mili¬ 
tary activity in the south, including substantial military sup¬ 
port from the United States. It cannot be said that sanctions 
were employed in this case. The issue and the events were never 
that clear-cut. , An unworkable agreement has proved itself to 
be exactly that and the solution of the problem of Vietnam must 
lie in other directions. 


54 






Cainbodian Accord . ThG Canibodian armisticG providsd for th© 
departure of all foreign troops within 90 days. Unlike the 
others, it also called for demobilization of the Cambodian 
allies of the Viet Minh: the Khmer Issaraks. Partly because 
of this, partly because Cambodia has no common border v/ith North 
Vietnam or with the Communist-heId areas of Laos, partly because 
of Cambodians consistent neutrality, and partly because the Viet 
Minh did not have the capability to support operations so far 
south, the settlement in Cambodia Vv?as effectively implemented. 


Laos Accord . In Laos, the story was much like that in 
Vietnam. The Pathet Lao, the Communist forces in Laos, were, 
by the terms of the cease-fire, supposed to regroup in two 
northern provinces, retaining their arms and their freedom of 
movement for 120 days, by which time it v;as expected that a 
political settlement would have been reached with the Royal 
government of Laos. Negotiations began in early 1955, with the 
Pathets claiming virtually half of the country and refusing to 
give up their arms upon expiration of the 120 days. 

The following years saw a confusion of internal pacts 
aimed at creating a coalition government and integrating 
Pathet forces into the national army, frequent attacks by the 
Pathet Lao on government forces in the disputed areas of Laos, 
and support by the United States for non-Communist forces that 
opposed the Pathet Lao and a coalition government. Prince 
Souvanna Phouma again became Premier in 1956; in November 1957 
he reached an agreement with his half-brother. Prince Souvannou- 
vong, the Pathet Lao leader, to include representatives of the 
Pathet Lao in a coalition government. Upon the recommendation 
of Souvanna Phouma, with the agreement of his brother, in July 
1958 the International Control Commission v;as adjourned, sine 
die . Later that year, however, Souvanna Phouma was replaced by 
the more strongly anti-Communist Phoumi Sananikone who, in 
February 1959, proposed that the ICC withdraw permanently. He 
put an end to the coalition government, and by summer of 1959 
fighting with the Pathet Lao, no longer represented in the 
government, broke out again. The Pathet Lao were clearly being 
supported militarily by the Chinese and Viet Minh. 

The new government in effect renounced the 1954 Accords by 
declaring its intent to rely upon the United Nations for assist¬ 
ance in maintaining peace. With the Accord no longer operative 
in Laos and with its own conditions for adherence ended by Com¬ 
munist aggression, the United States provided substantial mili¬ 
tary assistance to the Laotian government. In 1960 a briefly 
successful coup was staged by military neutralists, leading to 


55 






I 


protracted, sporadic, but occasionally intensive fighting oe- 
tv;een the government forces (aided logistically by the United 
States) end the combined neutralist and Communist-supported 
Pathet Lao forces. 

By mid-1961 the Pathets and the neutralists established 
military control over much of the strategically important areas 
of the country. Thereafter a new coalition government v;as 
established with Royal, neutralist, and Communist participation. 
It agreed upon a policy of peace and external neutrality. No 
new foreign military forces were to be brought into Laos and 
the Laotian government would neither join nor seek the protec¬ 
tion of any military alliance. This latter provision was 
aimed at the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, which had been 
set up as a means of enforcing the Geneva Accords and v;hich had 
specifically extended its mutual security provisions to include 
Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, with their knowledge if not with 
their participation. 

Meanwhile the nations involved directly or indirectly in 
Laos met again in Geneva seeking a new settlement. In July 
1962 the conference produced a neutrality statement which in¬ 
corporated the Laotian government's statement on neutrality and 
pledged the non-Laotian signatories--China, Russia, the United 
States, Britain, North and South Vietnam, India, Poland, Canada, 
France, Thailand, Burma, and Cambodia--to respect Laotian sov¬ 
ereignty, independence, neutrality, unity, and territorial 
integrity in every way. In particular, they were not to use or 
threaten force against Laos, not to use Laotian territory to 
interfere in the internal affairs of other states (or their own 
territory to interfere in the internal affairs of Laos), and 
not to introduce troops into the country or seek to establish 
bases. In the case of violation or threat of violation, the 
parties v;ould consult jointly with the Laotian government and 
among themselves to consider ways to ensure observance of the 
agreement. 

Actual responsibility for execution of the 1962 agreement 
lay v;ith the Laotian government; the re-established International 
Control Commission was responsible for supervising the execution. 

Again, this was not an ideal settlement of the problem, 
and the country was almost immediately involved in civil war. 

The United States and its allies had secured a postponement of 
the imminent Communist military take-over of Laos without its 
becoming necessary for the anti-Communist nations to intervene 
with force. But the Communists called off their military effort 


56 




in Laos only temporarily and the other nations had agreed to a 
major diminution of their influence in the country. 


Settlements Reached through Mutual Agreement 


Because of the practical necessity of reaching agreement 
on problems of international urgency, the Western world and the 
Communist have been able to make effective settlements in some 
areas and to sign treaties or less formal agreements that have 
thus far stood without violation. Negotiating the agreements 
has always been slow and tedious. 


The Statute of the International 

Atomic Energy Agency 

The Statute for the International Atomic Energy Agency was 
approved on October 26, 1956. The Agency came into existence on 
July 29, 1957. Its purpose is to further peaceful uses of 
atomic energy for health and prosperity. Negotiation of the 
treaty within the United Nations took almost three years, in¬ 
volving a large working group, and ultimately a conference of 
representatives of 81 nations, sitting for over a month. The 
main problem in drafting the treaty was hov; to ensure that in¬ 
ternational transfers of fissionable materials for peaceful use 
would not be diverted to weapons. As the treaty was finally 
resolved, that danger is considered less than would be the risk 
of uncontrolled uses of atomic materials. Violators of the 
treaty v;ould lose their membership in the IAEA and, if a vio¬ 
lation constitutes a threat to the peace, would be subject to 
action under the UN Charter. There have been no known viola¬ 
tions of the treaty provisions. 


The Antarctic Treaty 

The Antarctic Treaty was drawn up in 1959 by 12 nations 
who have claims or interest in the Antarctic area. It does not 
establish any sort of government for the area, nor does it 
alter any territorial claims. It does, however, provide for 
demilitarization of the Antarctic area to permit scientific 
cooperation and for a ban on nuclear explosions and the dumping 
there of radioactive waste. A conference mechanism for consul¬ 
tation among the parties is provided. An important provision is 
that which permits unilateral inspection of other national in¬ 
stallations in the Antarctic, to give reasonable assurance of 


57 






compliance v;ith the terms of the agreement. This right has been 
exercised by the United States and, as far as is known, the 
treaty has not been violated. 


T he Austrian State Treaty 

”The State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independ¬ 
ent and Democratic Austria,” of May 1955, like the treaties 
described just above, is an agreement involving the Western 
pov;ers and the Soviet Union, reached through mutual cooperation. 
Unlike the two previous examples, it is essentially a political 
treaty. 

When World War II ended, an agreement between the Soviet 
Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France provided 
for a combined, nation-wide Austrian administration centered in ' 
Vienna. This provisional government was recognized by the four 
pov;ers in October 1945. A month later, national elections gave 
the Communists only 5% of the vote. The Soviets thus were 
forced to deal V7ith a resolutely anti-Communist government, 
v;hile Western troops were at hand in the three Western occupa¬ 
tion zones. Further, in June 1946, the four occupying powers 
agreed that a unanimous vote of the controlling Allied Council 
was required to disapprove Austrian legislation. 

Because of this situation, the Soviets attempted to in¬ 
crease their influence in Austria through various economic 
pressures, demanding, for example, unrealistic reparations pay¬ 
ments. But after nearly a decade of pressure and obstructionism 
had failed to subvert the staunchly pro-V'Jestern Austrians, early 
in 1955 Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov suggested to the Western 
Allies that the Soviet Union would accept a peace treaty if 
Austria were effectively neutralized. Negotiations went so 
smoothly that a treaty was signed May 15, 1955. 

Technically not. a peace treaty, the agreement assumes 
Austria to have been a liberated rather than a defeated nation. 
The state must remain neutral, and her otherwise unlimited 
forces may not possess certain kinds of weapons. No repara¬ 
tions as such were exacted, but in lieu thereof the Soviets 
V7ere granted substantial ’’assets” and ’’occupation costs.” 
Occupation forces soon departed, and Austria became truly 
independent. 

The treaty has no formal provisions for sanctions for 
enforcement. Disputes that cannot be settled diplomatically 
are to be referred to arbitration commissions. Austria’s 


58 





desire not to offend her powerful Soviet neighbor, the tacit 
unwillingness of Great Britain, France, and the United States 
to see another Anschluss , and the constitutional and treaty 
requirement of neutrality accepted by Austria herself, all 
offer potent guarantees of the treaty, seemingly eliminating 
the need for formal sanctions. There have been no violations. 


The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 

Though this treaty has been briefly discussed earlier,* it 
deserves mention here as an accord on which agreement v;ith the 
Soviet Union v;as reached by the United States and Britain for 
reasons of mutual interest which are generally beyond the scope 
of this report. One of the most interesting aspects of the 
treaty is the pragmatism displayed by both sides in finessing, 
rather than compromising, their still-unresolved differences on 
the issue of inspection of underground testing. 


* See page 48, supra . 


59 











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Part Three 


ANALYSIS OF MODERM 
TREATY EXPERIENCE 


61 









Chapter 


6 


PUBLIC OPINION AND TREATY EXPERIENCE* 


Having surveyed treaty experience in modern history, we nov; 
turn to an analysis of that experience. The study first examines 
the role which has been played in the negotiation and enforcement 
of treaties by the anomalous, many-faceted force of public opinion. 


Some Characteristics of Public Opinion 


Public opinion, in the broad sense, encompasses all nongov¬ 
ernmental opinion. It is made up of numerous different elements, 
V7ith the relationship and strength of these diverse elements 
varying greatly from one country to another and--within any one 
country--from time to time and from issue to issue. It is always 
difficult to estimate the ”public^s” opinion of anything, even 
if an honest attempt is made. What v;e are concerned with is per¬ 
haps not so much V7hat the public, national or international, be¬ 
lieves, but what decision-makers think is the public ^s viev; in 
a matter and hov; this assessment serves to influence action. 

In general, it appears that traditional society--peasant, 
tribal, nomadic, etc.—does not generate much politically sig¬ 
nificant opinion outside capital cities, court circles, and 
ruling elites. This characteristic may be observed today in 
tightly controlled police states v/here all elements of society 
outside the government are isolated from free access to informa¬ 
tion and are discouraged from criticizing government actions. 

On the other hand, more complex modern societies--urban, 
industrial, bureaucratic--contain richer segments outside the 
government itself, V7hich are at once more knowledgeable, more 
curious, and possess a more highly developed sense of responsi¬ 
bility to the society as a whole than will generally be found 
in the less developed or more tightly controlled societies. 


* This chapter is based upon Annex III-A, together V7ith 
its three enclosures. 







Specialization of function within these segments of society gives 
rise to private elites V7ho have the incentive and opportunity for 
self-expression. It becomes harder for rulers to monopolize po¬ 
litical discussion, though clearly some democratic leaders have 
been masters at influencing public opinion. 

The de-Stalinization era in Russia may have been marked by 
growth of such nongovernmental segments of society, and while 
the USSR will continue to be able to isolate even its intellec¬ 
tual classes to a remarkable degree and to manipulate their 
thoughts to a considerable extent,' it is possible that the abil- 
• ity to do so will decrease rather than increase in the years 
ahead, and that the USSR will therefore probably have to pay 
more rather than less attention to the reactions of its own in¬ 
telligentsia in considering whether to violate or to honor an 
arms control or other agreement. It should be noted, however, 
that the present Soviet leadership has rather recently proven 
itself capable of ruthless repression of individual expression 
of views by members of its intelligentsia. 

Nongovernmental opinion V7ill continue to play a much more 
important role, hov/ever, in relatively open societies such as 
those of the West—particularly in the United States and Britain. 
But here, too, certain distinctions are essential; (1) Vlhose 
opinion is involved? (2) Wfiat is the nature of the issue? (3) 

What is the government's position? 

Nongovernmental or public opinion in the Free World has 
/ been divided into three major components: (a) views of private 
elites, e.g. , nev/spaper editors and commentators; ex-public 
officials; business, farm, and labor leaders; university profes¬ 
sors; and intellectual professionals; (b) a middle sector of 
reasonably interested and well-educated nev/spaper readers, etc.; 
(c) the apathetic man in the street v/ho cannot even identify the 
Secretary of State, In all of these components, views influence, 
and are influenced by, press coverage and editorial opinion. 

Different public issues cut into these strata to varying 
degrees. Iran in 1946 interested only a fraction of the private 
elites; Cuba in 1962 v;as a salient issue for almost all Americans. 
It also happens to be a fact that the lov;est stratum—the often 
apathetic mass—also happens to be the most ethnocentric and 
trigger-happy when finally aroused. This stratum is most respon¬ 
sive to pressure group propaganda. It can also be counted on, 
if stimulated emotionally, to support drastic, punitive responses 
to violations. 


64 



Above all, democratic governments can never forget that elec¬ 
tion time will come again and that most of their people are both 
peace-loving and economy-minded. A democratic government, then, 
usually heeds v/hat it believes to be vox populi, with the result 
that the latter has been more influential in preventing the use 
of sanctions against an aggressor or violator than in causing 
the use of such sanctions. In general, public opinion (either 
through conviction or apathy) will naturally be in favor of 
laissez faire . This V7as well illustrated by President Roose¬ 
velt ^s long efforts to arouse the American people in favor of 
stronger actions against Japan and also of help to the Allies 
between 1937 and 1941. 


Public Opinion and Treaties 


Public opinion, hov;ever defined, is not a simple factor in 
the area of international agreements. 

First, public opinion may lead to or prevent a particular 
agreement from being made or help shape its form. The Kellogg- 
Briand Pact, for instance, was in large part the result of popular 
reaction against v;ar in the Western democracies, and its wide¬ 
spread adoption was equally inspired by public opinion pressures 
on governments. More recently, pressure for test ban agreements 
has also been generated from outside "official circles" and the 
recent av^ard of a Nobel Peace Prize to Dr. Pauling is taken as 
evidence of this factor. On the other side, the failure of the 
United States to adhere to the League Covenant v;as probably in 
part due to the failure of the American public to react favorably 
to what it thought an international "entanglement." At least the 
great mass of apathy or antipathy v/as there, to be played upon by 
those who disapproved of the League for that and other reasons. 

Second, public opinion may be a key factor at the time an 
agreement is violated. In the Italo-Ethiopian case in 1935, for 
example, British public opinion, to the occasional dismay of the 
government, strongly supported sanctions. With elections coming 
up in the fall, the government took a strong stand with the League. 
French opinion, on the other hand, v/as largely pro-Italian and 
anti-sanctions, thus helping to assure that no truly drastic mea¬ 
sures would be taken. Similarly, British pacifist opinion helped 
delay rearming as a response when German treaty violations began. 

Governments contemplating violations usually try to rally 
both foreign and domestic opinion to their side, indicating that 


65 









leaders are to some extent concerned vjith the reaction which will 
be caused. In such cases the other side is accused of previous 
violations, or the changes rung on such allegations as unilater¬ 
ally oppressive terms, a need for alteration, or the like. 

This does not imply that public opinion is normally a de¬ 
cisive factor when important national interests are concerned. 

The Soviet resumption of testing in view of at least an implicit 
moratorium and the Soviet crushing of the Hungarian rebellion 
both outraged opinion in much of the v/orld, but no sanctions 
v/ere imposed on Russia. Indeed the US response to the former, 
by renewal of its ovm testing, served to focus some of the onus 
of the same world opinion on the United States as being the 
more rational, more lav7-abiding, and hence more culpable party. 

In addition to this muddying effect, there is the general prob¬ 
lem of clear verification--one of the factors helping rally 
support for the US position in the Cuban quarantine v;as doubt¬ 
less the visual proof of missiles in Cuba, giving the lie to 
Russian denials. 

Third, there is the question of public opinion in the treaty¬ 
breaking state after sanctions have been imposed. In general, in 
most of the cases studied, international sanctions and opprobrium 
seem to have served to unify public opinion in the sanctioned 
state and to cause the populace to close ranks behind the govern¬ 
ment. This tendency is particularly true in dictatorships, where 
the government can quite easily use the foreign interference and 
menace for its ovm ends. 

This was demonstrably so with Italy in 1935-1936; it probably 
helped the Communist regime strengthen its grip on China in 1950- 
1953; it probably helped strengthen the position of the war party 
in Japan, at least after the United States began to increase its 
pressures in 1940 and 1941; it may have helped unify anti-US 
sentiment in Cuba in recent years. 

It may be that the Dominican case is an exception and that 
general external disapproval eventually, after many years, 
strengthened the opposition to Trujillo. It is also likely that 
a deep split in Britain itself over the validity of the Suez en¬ 
terprise in 1956, for example, made compliance with external 
pressure more likely. 

On the whole, at least where dealing with modern military 
dictatorships, it is quite certain that reliance on the force of 
world opinion V7ill normally prove to be an error. In any event, 
moral suasion is useful only where there is a real commitment to 


66 


lav; and orderly processes 
state of world relations, 
only with our friends and 
distrust. 


in general and this, in the current 
means that it is useful, if at all, 
allies, not with those we fear or 


Interaction of Leadership and Public Opinion 


As already noted, public opinion as a force exerts pressures 
that must be heeded in successful policy-making, particularly in 
a democracy. The policy-maker either bases his proposed course 
of action upon opinion trends as he visualizes them, or he cre¬ 
ates the basis for public support--usually by dynamic leadership 
in a crisis. In either case, the viability of a specific policy 
depends upon the final approbation of the majority of the people 
--at least in a free society. 

In considering the role of public opinion in connection v;ith 
treaty violations and v;ith responses to treaty violations, one 
fact stands out above all others: potentially explosive public 
opinion is frequently effectively defused by a fait accompli --a 
sudden and quickly completed act of force or diplomacy ivhich 
terminates or resolves a dilemma, controversy, or disputed 
situation. 

There is evidence, however, that the numbing effect of the 
fait accompli on public opinion can sometimes be offset by 
prompt and effective counteraction by the leadership of the op¬ 
posing side, v;hereby the situation is returned to its previous 
unresolved balance or a nev; balance is established. There are, 
of course, several dangers inherent in such prompt counteraction. 
There is the danger of escalation of the dispute, with a crisis 
flaring into conflict, or a clash of arms becoming full-scale 
war. There is also the possibility that public opinion may be 
so stimulated by the initial success of the counteraction that 
it v/ill bring pressure to bear on the leadership to take further 
and more drastic action. Such a course of events can also lead 
to escalation if leadership does not continue to assert itself 
to guide, rather than follow, public opinion. 

The private elites and the middle stratum (attentive audi¬ 
ence), previously mentioned, tend to follow the leadership of 
government on most current issues--though perhaps less so in 
England than in the United States. Where a government retali¬ 
ates for a violation (Berlin 1943, Korea 1950), the private 
elites and attentive audiences are likely to fall in line, al¬ 
though in an open society there V7ill always be a few politically 

67 





or ideologically motivated deviants who are critical of the 
official position. Where the government does nothing (reaction 
to Ethiopia 1935, Rhineland 1936), the indignation of the public 
v;ill eventually evaporate. How rapidly it evaporates will be a 
function of the evident saliency of the issue to US interests 
(less rapidly in the United States for the Berlin Wall, more 
rapidly for more distant Laos). The more salient the issue, the 
likelier that the public will be a little ahead of the govern¬ 
ment and actually prod it to take a stronger stand. 

There is another type of situation in which the government 
takes a strong hand and the public does not fall in line. When 
this occurs it is likely that the governmental elite is itself 
divided over the issue and that quite deep-seated popular values 
are involved.’ Thus, President Roosevelt^s plea to quarantine 
the aggressor in 1937 was not acceptable to all members of his 
administration or to a public brought up in an isolationist at¬ 
mosphere. Similarly, in England, Eden^s 1956 decision to seize 
the Suez Canal confused and divided his own supporters as well 
as a nation brought up to believe that aggressive war is wicked.* 
In short, there are limits to the ability of leaders to control 
public opinion—limits which arise not only over compunctions 
about propagandizing others but over deeply rooted comm.unity be¬ 
liefs. The fact that these limits are so rarely passed or even 
approached is an indication that a democratic system tends to 
select leaders who automatically share the fundamental values of 
their society. 

There are obviously many complicating factors in this mutual 
interaction between governmental leadership and public opinion. 

One is the fact that public opinion can offer only ends, not means, 
to policy-makers. It cannot tell leaders how to stand firm in 
Berlin or how to end the war in Korea; this they must devise them¬ 
selves, and at times it may not be humanly possible to fulfill all 
the urgent concurrent goals of public opinion. Another obstacle 
to understanding public opinion's impact on public policy, and 


* Chamberlain’s decision not to respond at Munich is another 
case in which public opinion soon failed to follow the govern¬ 
ment’s lead. The government was itself divided at the time and 
the potential aggressors followed this up with new shocks to 
those v;ho believed that Munich meant ’’peace in our time." The 
agreement was signed on September 29, and German troops took over 
by October 10. By that point, Polish forces had taken over Tes- 
chen, and there were serious Slovak-Hungarian frontier clashes by 
October 9, the same day that Hitler denounced British politicians 
and announced further strengthening of the Westwall. And a nevj 
German government pogrom on November 9-10 was further evidence of 
the failure of appeasement. 


68 




vice versa, is the paucity of serious theoretical study of the 
public opinion process. Over the past 25 years, the sampling 
of public opinion on specific questions has been perfected into 
a valuable skill, but as yet comparatively little progress has 
been made in understanding how public opinion forms, what kinds 
of issues it centers on, how it reaches a climax, how and why 
it disappears , v;hy and how long it remains latent and ready to 
spring back in full force at the sound of a new crisis. 


Differing Relationships of Leadership 
and Public Opinion 


With these difficulties in mind, we can now proceed to con¬ 
sider in somev^hat miOre detail some of the v/ays in which public 
opinion and national leadership have interacted in the face of 
overt treaty violations. 


The Impact of the Fait Accompli 

A large number of examples of the overwhelming impact of 
the fait accompli on public opinion are available, hlien Hitler 
denounced the Locarno pacts and in violation of the Versailles 
Treaty reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936, there v;as a flurry of 
hostile world opinion; military action by France and Britain 
seemed a strong possibility to contemporary observers. For a 
variety of reasons, which generally added up to a distaste for 
incurring the risk of war in Europe, France and Britain took no 
military action. Public opinion had no opportunity to form un- 
til after a forceful violation had been accomplished. Since 
neither government felt prepared to counter the violation force¬ 
fully, opinion in opposition to it v/as manifestly futile and 
evaporated before it had fully formed. 

The Italian invasion of Ethiopia, which v;as in process at 
the same time, showed the impact of accomplished violations just 
as clearly. In this case there V7as ample v;arning of the viola¬ 
tion, and a great body of public opinion had been aroused against 
the Italian intentions. Labor organizations, veterans ^ groups, 
and the world press, as well as peace organizations, v;ere vigor¬ 
ous in demanding strong sanctions against Italy. The ”Peace 
Ballot” in Great Britain had just shown tremendous popular sup¬ 
port for the League of Nations. There was general condemnation 
of Italy and sympathy for Ethiopia in the United States. However, 


69 








once it became clear that no effective action V70uld be taken and 
that the conquest of Ethiopia was a foregone conclusion, this 
body of sentiment quickly disappeared/ 

The Manchurian episode vanished with equal speed as a matter 
of ostensible interest and concern to the American and Western 
publics. It was difficult for public opinion to form strongly 
and promptly because of the confusion as to v;ho was really respon¬ 
sible for the'original incident. US leadership at first hoped 
that the Japanese government could correct the situation. The 
bombing of Shanghai in 1932 shocked public opinion--the bombing 
of cities v;as not yet generally acceptable, even in formally 
declared war. But before public opinion could have any effect, 
the Japanese had achieved their purposes and v;ithdrawn from 
Shanghai. Manchukuo likev/ise became an accomplished fact, and 
though American public opinion was vocal in indignation, it 
never demanded strong action and gradually subsided. 

The consolidation of Soviet pov^er in the East European 
satellites during 1945-1948 is a clear example of the frequent 
impotence of public opinion in the face of the fait accompli . 

Made apathetic by v;ar-v;eariness, with suspicions lulled by war¬ 
time propaganda treating the Soviets as democratic allies, and 
facing a massive, carefully planned violation carried out by a 
skillful combination of force and subversion, the US and Western 
publics produced no forceful opinion before the Eastern European 
nations were firmly under Soviet control. Except for brief 
surges of "liberation” feeling among the US nationality groups 
most closely involved, there was little strong public opinion 
after the fait accompli ; the plight of the captive nations was 
deplored, but they were nevertheless generally accepted as Soviet 
satellites. 

Unquestionably the press has contributed to popular accept¬ 
ance of the fait accompli in these instances. The news was no 
longer sensational and hence was not reported. Without stimula¬ 
tion, public interest disappeared. 


Leadership Countering the 

Fait Accompli 


In the case of Iran in 1946, a firm stand by the United 
Nations, followed by Iranian government action (largely inspired 
by the United States) successfully removed Soviet troops and 
much Soviet influence from northern Iran, avoiding the danger of 
Persian Azerbaijanis separating from Iran and becoming a Soviet 


70 







satellite. This was a clear case of reversing the fait accompli . 
Public opinion in the West, hov;ever, was apathetic, probably be- 
cause of war-weariness and the lack of cultural ties, especially 
in the United States, with Iran. 

The blockade of Berlin in 1948 v;as an accomplished violation 
that vjas corrected by firm action firmly backed by public opin¬ 
ion. No other issue in foreign affairs since World War II has 
evoked such consistently strong, unified opinion in the United 
States. With polls and press favoring a strong stand and no 
v;ithdrawal, US leadership instituted the airlift, and US opinion 
overv;helmingly approved it. In July, during the airlift, 79% of 
a national cross-section favored staying in Berlin, and 85% of 
these favored crashing the blockade on land by force. Thus the 
public V7as apparently v.dlling to endorse stronger and more risky 
measures than the leadership chose. In any case, the attempted 
fait accompli was thv^arted by firm counteraction, backed by pub¬ 
lic opinion. 

Korea in 1950 was a somewhat similar case. Here US leader¬ 
ship had to respond immediately to a violation. Though it can¬ 
not be said that public opinion influenced the counteraction, 
V7hich had to be made before that opinion could be evaluated, 
support was strong and vociferous. 


Leadership Countering the Fait Accompli, 

Pushed Further by Public Opinion 


One recent striking example of public opinion's influencing 
leadership to take a strong stand was the pursuit of the North 
Korean forces across the 38th parallel during the Korean War. 
After the Inchon landings and the successful UN offensive of 
1950, the unification of Korea--not an operational goal when the 
original aggression v;as responded to--had become an important 
one to the American people. Or perhaps it V7as complete victory 
in v;ar, an assumed American tradition, that was the goal. The 
momentum of events in Korea, combined v/ith popular pressures 
for an advance to the Yalu, became irresistible to the adminis¬ 
tration. It is interesting, however, that in the face of a 
defeat in North Korea and the prospect of a long, fruitless ivar 
on the Asian mainland, the American people accepted more limited 
goals, as established by the government. 

A 

At the time the Berlin Wall was erected, the American 
people also seemed to be pushing their leaders to take stronger 
action than the leaders were willing to risk. In this case, no 


71 






action was taken. Here the clear desire of most Americans to 
"do something" v;as frustrated by the fact that public opinion 
cannot offer means to its leadership, but only goals. There v;ere 
several days during v/hich some action could possibly have been 
taken, but only the leaders could have devised it and taken it. 

US leadership did, of course, remain firm in the face of the 
fait accompli and did bolster the position, or at least the 
morale, of West Berlin by sending delegations of leaders and 
some additional troops to the city. 


Opinion Undeterred by the 

Fait Accompli 

Public hostility to the Berlin Wall has remained extremely 
strong, even though the v/all has been a fact for over two years. 
The dramatic, ugly, tangible symbol--which has actually been 
seen by many American nev/smen, tourists, and labor, business, 
and government officials~-has undoubtedly done much to keep the 
feeling alive. So have the individual shootings committed there, 
in full viev; of many witnesses. Perhaps the more familiar 
European setting and European faces are factors in the feeling. 

By contrast, however, the seizure of Czechoslovakia, a European 
country for whose people the United States had consistently ex¬ 
pressed the V7armest sympathy, v;as a fait accompli that dispersed 
adverse public opinion, partly because no action was taken at 
the time or contemplated later. This Communist coup, however, 
did accelerate Western rearmament and increased solidarity in 
the face of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. 

The Hungarian revolution of 1956 also produced a long- 
lasting sympathetic public opinion in this country, although 
the repression of the revolt was accomplished in a week. In 
this case, the situation was made real and kept alive for the 
American people by the floods of refugees leaving Hungary, many 
of whom came to this country, and by the news coverage given to 
individual acts of heroism and human interest stories. The fact 
that Hungarian civilians actually took arms against the Russians 
dramatized their plight and demonstrated their courage. 

This brings up the point that, insofar as Western public 
opinion is concerned, reactions to treaty violation cum outrage 
have been much stronger than to violation per se. The German 
invasion of Belgium in 1914--accompanied as it v;as by the face¬ 
slapping "scrap of paper" dictum, the rape of Louvain, and the 
shooting of Belgian hostages, all dramatized by British propa¬ 
ganda—is a case in point. So, too, is the Russian crushing by 


72 







violence of the Hungarian revolt and the East Berlin uprising in 
1956. Here at home. Pearl Harbor in 1941 aroused the American 
mass mind far more than a simple Japanese declaration of war 
would have. 

It is worth consideration that, like the reoccupation of 
the Rhineland in 1936, future violations of arms treaties, un¬ 
accompanied by outrage, might produce only minor, and possibly 
temporary, inflammatory stimulation of American public opinion. 


Cases in Which Leadership Led 

Public OpiniorT"" 


In the chaos follov^ing collapse of French colonial rule in 
Indochina, it fell to US government leaders to form a policy and 
sell it to the American public. It is unlikely that, despite 
sporadic flurries of concern, American public opinion would ever 
have spontaneously pressed the Government to take action to halt 
communism in Southeast Asia. Although polls have shown that 
such action was favored, there is also evidence of little in¬ 
terest and considerable confusion v;ith regard to Laos and Viet¬ 
nam. Some of the confusion seems to stem from unclear and un¬ 
certain US policies. Distance and alien culture of the area 
have probably also played a part in the relative apathy of the 
American public, but so has the problem of verifying violations 
in the rugged and jungled terrain. 

In the case of the Soviet missiles in Cuba, the Government 
at first--and for some time--lagged behind public opinion, but 
eventually took responsibility for devising the means to meet 
the danger and for effectively presenting the evidence and its 
program to the American people as vjell as the Soviets and the 
world at large. This is a particularly interesting case of 
interaction betv;een public opinion and governmental leadership. 


Leadership Follov/ing Public 
Opinion 

It is difficult to distinguish cases in which government 
leaders were supported in their actions by the public, from those 
in which they were almost forced into an action, and from those 
others in v;hich the Government v/illingly followed the lead of 
public opinion. In this last category we can place the final 
truce agreement ending the Korean War in 1953. The American 
public, patient but increasingly restive, had tolerated two 


73 






years of frustrating peace negotiations. General Eisenhower 
statement that he would go to Korea, coming as it did from a 
respected military leader, was seized upon and became the focal 
point of an irresistible public opinion favoring an early end 
of the war by any decent means. Here again is an example of the 
complicated interaction of leadership and opinion. Until Eisen- 
hov7er spoke, all public opinion surveys showed the American pub¬ 
lic as favoring continuation of the peace talks, although in¬ 
creasingly pessimistic about the results. The future President's 
words almost immediately precipitated a consensus on getting the 
v/ar finished and on him as the leader to accomplish it. From 
that time, US leadership virtually had no choice but to obtain 
an honorable peace as soon as possible. 


Propriety and Methods of Influencing 

Public Opinion 


The examples noted above give evidence that public opinion 
in open societies is amorphous, unpredictable, and ephemeral. 

In some cases, the fait accompli thoroughly dispersed public 
opinion. In others, strong leadership, pushed or encouraged by 
public opinion, was able to overcome the fait accompli . In some 
cases, public opinion pushed leaders to stronger action than 
they probably wished to take. There v/ere also cases in which 
public opinion remained strong long after the fait accompli , 
even though no significant counteraction v^as taken. Sometimes 
national leaders have led public opinion; sometimes they have 
followed. 

The US Government has long been av7are that public opinion 
can be influenced, for good or bad, in a variety of ways. But 
Americans inherently distrust all propaganda that smacks of 
officialdom and will not stand for anything resembling censor¬ 
ship, ^^thought control," or interference v;ith freedom of the 
press. (In this there is a tendency to ignore the distinction 
V7hich should be made between invidious propaganda and the proper 
distribution of information on US policy.) The concept of manip¬ 
ulating minds is distasteful to most Americans; this is the 
principal reason v;hy we have never been able to set up in peace¬ 
time an official US public opinion molding apparatus. 

Meanwhile the gap between public opinion, on the one hand, 
and the complex facts and controversies of current foreign affairs, 
on the other, becomes increasingly ominous. Arms control matters, 


74 







in particular, involve for most citizens such a tangle of esoteric 
scientific knowledge, personal emotions, and deeply held concepts 
of morality that even members of the educational elite feel help¬ 
less in forming sound opinions. Yet a national consensus must 
be formed on these matters, as during the national Test Ban Treaty 
debate of 1963. 

There is evidence that a future consensus could be seriously 
affected by small, dissident pressure groups using skillful 
propaganda.* This could be very dangerous, since a democratic 
government is precariously dependent on public confidence in its 
policies , even in--perhaps especially in--such highly technical 
areas as defense strategy and arms control. 

As the need for bridging this public opinion gap becomes 
more acute, the tools to do so seem fortunately to become more 
dependable. Great advances in techniques for measuring public 
opinion have been made in the past decade.** Research in how 
public opinion is formed has developed more slowly. Consider¬ 
able v;ork is nov; being done but much more is needed. Recent 
research in how public opinion is consciously influenced suggests 
that the most effective means of influencing public opinion are 
not necessarily so alien to traditional American concepts of 
democracy and freedom of thought as is commonly believed. 

An important school of thought contends that giving needed 
and desired information to groups of people who are already in¬ 
terested and concerned about a given matter exerts far more in¬ 
fluence than do attempts to persuade a mass of opposed or apa¬ 
thetic people. This theory, however, may underrate the historic 
effectiveness of simple propagandist reiterations--true or 
false--of such successful persuaders as Cato the Elder and 
Adolf Hitler.*** 

The nub of the public opinion question is that none of 
these advances in public opinion research is likely to have a 
significant effect on the state of US public opinion about 
international affairs, and arms control in particular, v;ithout 
the existence of some kind of responsible, and acceptable. 


* See Enclosure 3 to Annex III-A. 

** Ibid , 

*** For more on this topic, and relevant documentation, see 
Annex III-A. 


75 




^\h 

organization that.can coordinate and direct research in these 
matters, and--without the taint of official propaganda--dissemi- 
nate information in a soundly planned program of public education. 
The government‘of a'democracy has an obligation to keep its 
people informed of all aspects of major issues (save in the rela¬ 
tively fev; cases v;here vital national security requires secrecy). 
All pertinent facts, untinged by propaganda, should be available 
to help permit a popular, nonpartisan (or bipartisan) consensus. 

It is beyond the scope of this study to investigate how this can 
or should be done. This report will recommend, however, that 
study be initiated immediately on the possibilities of public 
opinion research for building an informed US public opinion on 
foreign policy and, specifically, arms control policy. An im¬ 
portant purpose of this study should be to determine the auspices 
under vvhich such research activity should be undertaken and v;hat 
kind of organization would be required. 


76 









Chapter 7 


QBSERV?\TIONS ON COLD VJAR NEGOTIATING EXPERIENCE 


Western-Communist negotiating experience goes back nearly 
half a century to Brest-Litovsk in 1917-1918. This experience 
has been^marked by alternating periods of hostility and of re¬ 
lative detente. Both the Communist nations (primarily the USSR) 
and those of the West have been represented by individuals of 
widely differing personal characteristics and ability. The 
Westerners 5 furthermore, have come from several countries with 
differing national cultural and political characteristics. Yet 
throughout this fairly extensive period of modern history, 
VJestern negotiating objectives and techniques, on the one hand, 
and Communist objectives and techniques, on the other, have 
fallen into rather distinct, consistent patterns. 

That these patterns exist is undoubtedly due more than any¬ 
thing else to the impact of Communist ideology, v;hich has largely 
dictated the Communist methods of negotiating and has, in turn, 
limited the scope of V\/estern responses. At the risk of oversim¬ 
plification, and recognizing that generalizations can be contra¬ 
dicted by numerous specific instances, it appears useful to 
examine these contrasting patterns.* 


VJestern Negotiating Objectives 

and Techniques 


Nations undertake international negotiations for the pur¬ 
pose of advancing their national interests. How the national 
interest is interpreted by governments determines much of the 


'' A caveat is in order. As VJesterners have become more 
av7are of the nature and impact of Communist ideology on negotia¬ 
tions, they have become increasingly wary and increasingly 
skilled in coping with it; nothing in the subsequent comparison 
is intended to suggest either that VJestern negotiators today 
are less competent than the Communists or that Communist nego¬ 
tiators have not made at least as many blunders as Westerners. 









negotiating behavior of a particular state. Aside from immediate 
specific aims, the national interest assumes a particular under¬ 
standing of the world and certain broad hopes for its future. 

In the contemporary VJestern--essentially democratic--out¬ 
look, a stable and peaceful world order is generally the desired 
goal. Though means may be influenced by conflicting national 
interests. Western diplomats generally, and within certain limits 
of national interest, seek to preserve and protect—or to re- 
store--conditions of peace and order. 

With the coming of thermonuclear v^7eapons, the status quo , 
whatever its failings, has seemed all the more desirable as an 
alternative to confusion and conflict which could trigger in¬ 
calculable global horror. VJhen Western nations move toward 
change in the status quo , it is usually assumed the change 
should be orderly and that it should bring closer international 
cooperation. The nations and peoples of the West have generally 
flourished in an orderly world, and the pragmatic, humane out¬ 
look of VJestern democratic leaders demands that they work for 
its continuance. 

Moreover, VJestern negotiators share with each other a great 
many values, attitudes, ideals, manners, literature, religions, 
and languages. V\/ords generally mean the same thing to them, and 
they cherish values jointly inherited from Greek reason, Roman 
law, and Hebrew ethics. Diplomats of the Communist states are 
from nations which either have never shared in these common 
values or have consciously rejected them. This makes communica¬ 
tion difficult. 

When dealing with each other. Western negotiators usually 
come to the conference table with emotional and intellectual 
commitments to an orderly world. They are also accustomed to 
negotiating in an atmosphere of relative safety and prestige. 

The conference room is home ground to them through training and 
experience, and the nations they represent still possess a pre¬ 
ponderance of industrial and military power. The Western diplo¬ 
mat usually begins negotiations hoping and intending to reach 
agreement, if possible. While each naturally will do his best 
to obtain the best agreement he can, he generally realizes the 
necessity for accommodation and compromise. And even if he has 
instructions to stall and to avoid commitment, at the least he 
hopes to feel out the limits of current agreement, the areas of 
disagreement, and the areas v^here further probing, study, and 
readjustment of positions may eventually yield agreement. West¬ 
ern negotiating techniques reflect these attitudes; they are 
generally conciliatory in manner, cooperative in method, and 


78 




aimed at reaching the goal of agreement as quickly and easily 
as possible. 

Problems that cannot be solved at the negotiating level are 
dealt with variously. They can be referred one step up, or a 
working party of experts from the nations involved can try to 
hammer out a solution for the negotiators^ or their superiors^ 
approval. Conciliatory techniques are thus used to further 
international conciliation. National interest is always upper¬ 
most, of course, but there is increasingly the unspoken assump¬ 
tion that national interest is ultimately best served by pre¬ 
serving and strengthening world stability. 

Among the Western democracies, the United States is prob¬ 
ably the most handicapped by its own traditions and values when 
it enters into negotiations with Communist nations. That these 
American traditions and values are sometimes contradictory is 
due mainly to divergent roots in the Protestant Ethic, in our 
pragmatic frontier origins, in the differing national and racial 
backgrounds of our citizens, in our inherently (though not con¬ 
sistently) egalitarian political and social systems, and in the 
record of our history. 

Still prevalent among Americans, at least in abstract 
theory, is the Calvinist tendency to think in terms of absolute 
Good and absolute Evil. In actual practical human relations, 
however, our initial tendency toward total theoretical condem¬ 
nation of an opponent is more often than not supplanted by a 
spirit and practice of compromise, which is a reflection of 
the American tradition of equality: all persons have an equal 
right to exist, to be treated fairly, to formulate their own 
opinions, and to be right in their opinions and ideas. Because 
of this, the average American is usually v;illing to believe 
that there is at least some right or some good in the persons 
with whom he is dealing and in their positions. 

A somewhat contradictory notion--but one which also encour¬ 
ages us to follov; the path of compromise in international deal¬ 
ings--is the belief that God v/ill alv^ays preserve the United 
States; this, of course, is fully consistent with our certainty 
that we, the Good, are bound to prevail ultimately in any con¬ 
test with the forces of Evil. Bolstered by the popular histor¬ 
ical record of our invariable success in war, combined v;ith the 
amazing bounty of our natural resources and our equally amazing 
success in exploiting these resources, most Americans have an 
inherent, smug confidence in the triumph of our natural destiny. 


79 


Reluctance to recognize fundamental incompatibility of 
another ideology with our own democratically liberal national 
objectives, coupled with reluctance to accept the possibility 
of sharp setback from any source, has greatly retarded American 
understanding of the ideological motivation, aims, or methods 
of the Communists with whom we are negotiating. Misunderstanding 
their attitude tovjard treaties and negotiations as elements of 
Communist strategy, we have often been confused, or frustrated, 
by tactics very different from our own. Furthermore, our con¬ 
cepts of fair play give us a possibly unjustified confidence 
that we need not fear any opponent with whom we are negotiating 
peacefully. 

Certainly these handicaps are not insuperable, as evidenced 
by numerous demonstrations of competence by American negotiators 
dealing with Communists. But it does mean that if Americans do 
not exercise a strict disciplinary control over natural, national 
characteristics, they are likely to be at a particular disadvan¬ 
tage in negotiating v;ith Communists. 


Communist Negotiating Objectives and Techniques . 

In the doctrinaire Communist world view, by contrast, al¬ 
though peace is a final goal, there can be no peace without the 
destruction of capitalism, and conflict and confusion are in¬ 
evitable in the current world. Communists see "war as bloody 
politics and politics as bloodless v;ar"; if the West feels that 
Clausewitz^s statement that war is the continuation of politics 
by violent means has been made obsolete by thermonuclear weapons, 
most Communists do not. This does not mean that Communist lead¬ 
ers would necessarily be quicker than other leaders to press an 
ultimate button, for violence and destruction are not necessarily 
desirable for their ov;n sakes in the Communist world view. It 
does mean that diplomacy and various types of organized violence 
are regarded as subordinate v;eapons of an inescapable historical 
destiny, guided by the hands of authorized Communist leaders.* 


* We must note here that the recent easing of Cold War ten¬ 
sions has been accompanied by changes in Soviet attitudes which, 
if sincere and lasting, v;ill require a reassessment of the com¬ 
ments in this and the subsequent section of this chapter. Some 
reliable authorities on Soviet Russia and communism believe that 
the more cooperative Russian attitudes, probably resulting from 
their growing av;areness of the deadliness of nuclear weapons, re¬ 
flect more fundamental convictions than would be the case if this 
were merely part of traditional zig-zag Communist tactics. There 


80 






Numerous examples of Soviet negotiating techniques appear 
in the "Riposte^^ papers.* * Thus, in 1939, the USSR negotiated 
simultaneously v\;ith France and Britain on the one hand, and 
Nazi Germany on the other, though there is reason to believe 
that Stalin had already decided not to reach agreement with the 
Western Allies, but rather with Hitler. The contrasting patterns 
of behavior are now clearly evident, the nonagreement pattern 
being that which is still most often met in dealing with the 
Soviets. Similar techniques had been used by Japan early in 
the century, but the Communists have carried them further. 

Communist negotiators seldom come to the conference table 
to reach agreement, save on terms essentially favorable to them. 
Any kind of negotiated agreement is a goal only when conflict 
(hot or cold) can no longer profitably be sustained at that 
specific time, or if a particular agreement fits vyell into the 
long-run strategy of Communist-capitalist conflict. In such 
cases, agreement is quickly reached. Far more often. Communist 
negotiators arrive with rigid instructions, and frequently they 
have obviously been directed to use the conference only as a 
propaganda medium. Before World War II, v;hen they met Western 
diplomats, they sav; themselves as facing an alien and hostile 
world, where they v;ere constantly threatened by the assumed 
deceitfulness and imperialist aims of their bargaining antago¬ 
nists, by their ov;n possible weakness, and, in most cases, by 
close surveillance of agents of their own government. Some of 
this attitude persists, but in more recent years they have 
endeavored to enter negotiations in the guise of equal and power¬ 
ful contenders v;ho need not yield on issues. These feelings 
can only reinforce the rigidity of their instructions. Their 
negotiating techniques are thus still generally different from 
those of Westerners. 

The Western approach is to set aside impossible problems, 
settle minor matters on which disagreement may be more apparent 
than real, and then get to work on the difficult but hopefully 
solvable. Communist negotiators, on the other hand, usually 
attempt to multiply each difference and to reiterate each objec¬ 
tion almost indefinitely. Speed of settlement is generally not 
a goal, and the speed with which V7estern nations can come to 


is no conclusive evidence, however, that Communist ideology is 
changing. Only time V7ill tell if this presages a fundamental 
change in historical Communist negotiating patterns. 

* See Annex Volume II and particularly Enclosure 2 to 
Annex II-D. 


81 



agreement among themselves is viewed with suspicion. The Com¬ 
munists take advantage of press coverage to set forth a propa¬ 
ganda position through proposals or objections for the benefit 
of an international audience. 

The factor that has made the Communists^ approach to nego¬ 
tiations radically different from other approaches is not essen¬ 
tially their stubborness, their effort to gain more than is 
reasonable, their misreading of Western motives, or their rigid 
adherence to specific original instructions. All these could be 
different only in degree from factors affecting negotiations 
with any people somewhat isolated from the mainstream of Western 
history and diplomacy. In the case of the Communists, these 
bargaining attributes have been merely outward manifestations of 
an ideology that sees the v7orld in inevitable conflict until the 
capitalist part of it disappears; an ideology that feels any 
permanent settlement is impossible to gain and wrong to ask. 

They have actually seen not one world but two and have been con¬ 
fident that one of these is doomed. Even if the Western nego¬ 
tiator has known precisely what behavior to expect from his Com¬ 
munist bargaining partner, he has still been operating in a type 
of negotiation quite different from those with any non-Communist 
nation. There is certainly no reason, yet, to think that this 
ideological basis of Communist negotiating techniques has been 
fundamentally modified either by the rift betv;een Russia and 
China, or by the current--but by no means assuredly permanent-- 
detente between Russia and the West. 

Negotiating successfully v;ith Communist nations requires an 
understanding that we do not share one world politically, that 
there is no sound basis for mutual trust in a divided world, any 
more than there is any invisible hand to keep nations honest, 
unless it be the fear of total disaster. Soviet and other Com¬ 
munist negotiators start with tv^o basic objectives: enhancement 
of the national interest and the spread of communism.* The two 
are intertwined and reciprocally reinforcing, although, as is 
noted later, they can sometimes diverge. In the case of Russia, 
however, there is no clear primacy of national (or state) interest 
or Communist ideology. 


* Some authorities suggest that for the’ Soviet Union there 
are three, rather than tv/o, sets of objectives and interests. 
They point out that the USSR.is not really a nation, but is a 
multinational state, and that the Soviet government is the advo¬ 
cate: (1) of its state (rather than national) interests; (2) 
of the wider multinational interests of the Communist bloc-- 
V7ith the possible current exception of the Chinese Communist 
sub-bloc; and (3) of the Communist ideology. 


82 



In viGw of trhG fundGnfiGntral idGological conflict bGtwGcn 
conamunism and othGr systGms, thG Communist cannot yield on any 
point which would appear to lead to a world of law and order 
other than a totally Communist one. Consequently Western nego¬ 
tiators seeking agreements with Communist countries must stress 
mutual self-interest, because those countries will, far more 
readily than the West, find the proper support in history and in 
law for evading commitments once made when their own interests 
and ideology seem so to dictate. But no nation has in history 
permitted a treaty to stand in the way of its own survival or 
vital interests. 


Negotiating with the Communists 


Negotiators of agreements with Communist countries normally 
face an arduous task, as the endless Geneva disarmament talks 
themselves have shown. Once the Soviet leaders decide to con¬ 
clude a treaty, however, the process seems to move quite rapidly. 
Carrying through an arrangement not inherently to the Communists^ 
best interests, as the Korean truce arrangements show, will also 
prove a frustrating and even dangerous experience. Presumably, 
this type of experience with inspection by international control 
commissions and the like (as in the Indochina settlements) 
caused the United States to favor unilateral inspection under 
the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. 

In general, therefore, it does seem that living together 
under a treaty in a security-suffused field is somewhat more 
difficult for the United States and the Soviet Union than it 
would be, or has been, for any other pair of major powers. How¬ 
ever, there has been some cautious rapprochement in the past 
between apparently irreconcilable ideologies. To the extent 
that mutual self-interest and the need for self-preservation 
can be made to coincide, to the extent that potential gains from 
agreement violations can be made to seem illusory, and to the 
extent that the antagonistic parties have more reason to credit 
the penalties for failure to perform honorably than to fear the 
dangers of complying with obligations, a treaty regime involving 
both their security interests has a chance to last even in the 
present world. 

Thus, in spite of the special difficulty in dealing with 
Communists, the Western cause of world stability would not be 
served by blanket refusal to negotiate. In cases where there 
is reason to think the Soviets wish to use negotiations entirely 
as a delaying tactic or propaganda forum, it would seem most 
desirable to avoid such negotiations if possible. Possible 


83 






world public opinion in favor of negotiations, as this study 
suggests elsewhere, should not necessarily be a determinant in 
such a case. In other cases, as long as expectations are limited, 
something may be gained through negotiation. 

In this respect it is pertinent to note that the Communist 
nations--like all others, regardless of governing structure, 
ideology, or aims--have seemed to be unwilling to do anything 
overtly to violate formal treaties, and, when they do, have been 
meticulous to assert legal justification for noncompliance or 
denunciation. They obviously wish to be regarded as a nation 
formally dedicated to supporting a relevant existing interna¬ 
tional system. It is perhaps ironical to recall how, in 1945, 
the US Government helped Soviet Russia to find logical bases for 
denouncing Stalinas 1941 nonaggression treaty with Japan, when 
we wished to encourage Russia to enter the Pacific War. 

This Communist reluctance to violate openly any specific 
provisions of formal treaties has undoubtedly contributed, at 
least in part, to the pattern of dealings which have taken place 
between Communist and Western nations since World War II. In 
most of the instances where agreements have been reached between 
the two sides, they have seldom been in the form of definitive 
treaties in the classic sense. Instead they are usually agree¬ 
ments, as in the numerous Cold War discussions relating to 
Germany and Berlin, or armistices or cease-fires, as in Korea 
and Indochina. They were, in other words, rather general 
accords which provided for numerous future actions and final 
adjustments and contained legal and practical loopholes and 
ambiguities which permitted perpetration of violations with 
relative impunity and without the likelihood of stigma of overt 
treaty violation. 

A rare instance of a formal treaty between the Western and 
Communist nations since World War II is the Austrian State Treaty. 
Soviet leaders delayed the conclusion of this treaty for some 
ten years, until they decided that they could accept the fact of 
a truly neutralized Austria, even if not completely on their 
own terms. They then promptly sought an agreement, with which 
they have since abided. This, of course, has an encouraging 
implication so far as the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is concerned. 

In dealing with some Communist nations, we must, as sug¬ 
gested above, be careful not to assume too quickly that their 
negotiating objectives will necessarily be in their national 
interest. In some cases national interest may have to be sacri¬ 
ficed to the over-all ends of the international ideological sys¬ 
tem. The East European satellite nations, for instance, have 
often had to think and act in terms of Soviet state interests 


84 


and ideological position rather than their immediate national 
interests; this is equally likely to be true of the North 
Vietnamese or North Korean governments nov; under Peking^s 
influence.* 

The Communists have also on several occasions entered into 
treaties obviously for purposes of subterfuge or entrapment. 

By this is meant negotiating and concluding a treaty on terms 
which they believe will permit them (probably by trickery or 
deceit) to gain an advantage unanticipated by other unwary 
signatories. This is not a unique Communist technique and has 
been attempted by many v;ily diplomats since the dawn of history. 
It is a technique, however, that the Communists have made their 
own and have used successfully from the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk 
through their nonaggression treaty with Poland to the Yalta 
Agreement regarding East European nations. 

Thus, not only must expectations be limited in negotiating 
with Communist nations, it is also necessary to observe special 
approaches to Communist negotiators, v^hile being aware of the 
danger of generalized or stereotyped images. 

These special approaches include, first, a thorough knowl¬ 
edge of Communist doctrine, past and present. This, in turn, 
entails an equally thorough knov;ledge not only of the Communist 
staters language, but particularly of its Communist terminology, 
with its special meanings. This is especially important in dis¬ 
covering whether the negotiators have instructions (beyond a 
mandate to agree to nothing) and what they are. One^s own 
position must be clear, and one must be prepared to defend it 
almost indefinitely. It is not generally advisable to try out 
variant drafts or to give way on small points early in nego- 
tiations--this may be confusing; to the Communist it could 
suggest weakness. Arguments based on broad principles should 
be buttressed by particular propositions. In any case. Com¬ 
munist negotiators, trained to deal with ideology and practical¬ 
ities , tend to suspect mere statements of principle or to counter 
these v;ith reiteration of their own principle. Finally, one 
must always be particularly cautious and clearly understand 
possible implications when the Communists do appear ready or 
eager to reach agreement. 


* One must, hov;ever, note the apparent loosening of the 
rigid control Soviet Russia is exercising over the East European 
nations--while also recalling that there was a comparable 
loosening just before the Hungarian revolt of 1956. 


85 



We should not hesitate to negotiate; in entering such nego¬ 
tiations, however, we must be absolutely certain not to deceive 
ourselves by thinking that a few agreements on relatively minor 
details can be stretched like wallpaper to cover basic and fun-^ 
damental differences, or, conversely, to assume that an occa¬ 
sional willingness to subscribe to the reasonable generalities 
embedded in documents such as the League Covenant, the Yalta 
Agreement, or the UN Charter, represents a genuine Communist 
ideological commitment. 


86 


Chapter 8 


PATTERNS OF TREATY VIOLATIONS* 


General Observations 


In seeking to classify and analyze violations of treaties 
and agreements, this study uses a list of 51 specific treaty 
violations that have occurred since World War I.** (See Table 
of Selected Agreement Violations, pp. 92-95.) This has been 
done to keep the treatment of violations from being purely 
abstract and to prevent distortion by the use of only a few 
examples. At the same time, the analysis recognizes the dangers 
of (a) becoming immersed in detail, (b) giving equal weight to 
all violations, (c) playing statistical games with selected 
samples of violations, and (d) forgetting that the really fun¬ 
damental patterns of treaty violations are functions of drives 
for power involving extreme, unilateral, and violent changes 
in the international status quo . In this sense, broken treaties 
are only minor symptoms of international disorder, a trail of 
litter left by pov;er-seeking men and groups. 

In order to provide both detailed consideration of viola¬ 
tions and a broader context for understanding the phenomenon of 
treaty violation, violations are here analyzed in two ways. 
First, the background for the violations of one agreement, the 
Versailles Treaty, is discussed. Then, the 51 specific viola¬ 
tions chosen for analysis are classified and grouped into ten¬ 
tative patterns. 


Violations of the Treaty of Versailles 


The Treaty of Versailles merits special attention, since it 
was probably breached more times than any other treaty in the 


* This chapter is largely based on Annex III-C and its 
Enclosure. 

** A brief description of each of these violations, and the 
responses thereto, will be found in Annex III-D. 








v/hole period since World VJar I, with the possible exception of 
the very general multilateral treaties--the League Covenant, the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, and possibly the UN Charter. In a sense, 
the course taken by Germany between the wars, and its culmina¬ 
tion in World War II, constituted one great violation of the^ 
treaty. An investigation of the treaty and its enforcement in¬ 
dicates the relationship of the violations to the treaty and 
shov 7 s why the treaty itself can be considered one of the causes 
of World VJar II. 

Although, in retrospect, most of the Versailles provisions 
V7ere reasonable terms for a peace treaty, there V7ere four types 
of stipulations V7hich were basically unworkable, at least if the 
Allies were not prepared to enforce them. Because they were not 
expeditiously abrogated or modified, they had disastrous conse¬ 
quences all over the world. These stipulations were (a) some 
of those dealing with German boundaries; (b) those placing eco¬ 
nomic obligations on Germany, especially the reparations require¬ 
ments; (c) the various military and disarmament clauses; and 
(d) the ”war guiltclause. 

Some of the territorial stipulations of the Versailles 
Treaty were innocuous. Unlike the Austrian treaties V7hich ac¬ 
cepted the revolutions that had destroyed the Hapsburg monarchy,* 
the Versailles Treaty did not destroy Germany as a national state. 
The provisions about the Saar included provisions for peaceful 
change. The German-Polish frontier established by the treaty, 
hov7ever, and the loss of Prussian-Polish provinces restored to 
newly independent Poland--particularly the ^^Polish Corridor’^ and 
a part of Upper Silesia--were unacceptable to Germany, though 
certainly were equitable in terms of historical and ethnic 
facts. It is arguable also that the provisions forbidding the 
merging of Germany and Austria, which were later invoked to pre¬ 
vent the formation of a customs union, may have been unwise; 
they left Austria, which had been the heart of a large trade 
area, in an almost untenable economic position. And the bound¬ 
aries of Czechoslovakia, which included 3.5 million German- 
speaking persons, were historically and strategically (at least 
geographically) sound, but proved to be politically provocative 
when exploited by an aggressive and unscrupulous dictator. 

There is an enormous literature•showing that the German ob¬ 
ligation to pay reparations--in amounts initially unspecified, 


* Revolutions which were in large part inspired by Wilson^s 
’Tourteen Points.” 


88 



later several times exceeding the German annual gross national 
product--was completely unrealistic. Despite several modifica¬ 
tions of the reparations clauses in favor of Germany, the repara¬ 
tions issue haunted the international scene for more than ten 
years. Tne Ruhr occupation of 1923, imposed by the French and 
Belgians as a sanction for nonpayment, although it seemed tem¬ 
porarily successful, created one of the political preconditions 
for Hitler ^s rise to pov;er. The German government adopted a 
policy of passive resistance, but the French imposed a blockade 
which dislocated the nation^s economy, creating the massive 
inflation that alienated the bulk of Germany's population from 
the Weimar Republic, and at the same time intensified German 
bitterness against the Versailles Treaty. This economic catas¬ 
trophe was one of those that paved the way for Nazism. Another 
was the peculiar severity with which the world-wide depression 
of the early 1930s hit Germany, to some extent because its 
government had incurred considerable short-term indebtedness, 
partly to make reparations payments. 

In 1931, in order to get out of an impossible political and 
economic situation, the Germans proclaimed a customs union with 
Austria. France imposed severe economic sanctions against this 
innocuous but clear violation. Despite the Hoover moratorium, 
the resulting heightening of existing economic chaos in Germany 
was also instrumental in bringing Hitler to power and in length¬ 
ening the world-wide depression. 

The military clauses of the treaty proved unacceptable to 
the Germans because of the generally menacing international 
situation, because they did not accept the new frontiers in 
the East, and because no compensatory security arrangements 
were offered Germany. These were all pressures on the Versailles 
Treaty, and (since the Allies did not show determination to en¬ 
force it) it was violated from the beginning. The members of 
the Allied Control Commission did not enjoy the support of their 
governments, whose attitudes in turn reflected the apathetic, 
appeasing attitudes of their peoples. The resulting situation 
involved an inflammatory combination of temptation and weakness. 
The same laxity also permitted an atmosphere of civil war between 
the paramilitary organizations of the several German political 
parties. This was an important precondition of Hitler^s rise, 
and his opportunity to seize dictatorial power. 

Emotional resentments were embodied in the treaty^s text— 
the ’^war guilt’’ clause in particular, which forced Germany to 
accept responsibility for World War I. German repugnance was 
reinforced before long by that postwar scholarship which called 
new attention to the roles of Serbia and Austria. The ’’war 


89 


guilt” clause came to seem both false and hurtful, and also 
affected their attitude on those parts of Versailles which bore 
directly on the security of France and Britain. German feelings 
of indignation and righteous anger were thus ready to be mar¬ 
shalled against the Versailles settlement. 

Because certain provisions of the Versailles Treaty came 
to seem obviously unjust to Germany the attitude also grew among 
some of her former enemies, especially in Great Britain, that 
somehow all of the arrangements associated with Versailles V7ere 
invalid. Consequently, when Hitler made his various demands, 
each of them for a carefully calculated strategic purpose, there 
were many non-Germans sufficiently sympathetic to say that jus¬ 
tice is not less justice because it is demanded by a dictator. 

This attitude served to confuse public opinion and for many yeax-R 
helped to prevent effective response to Nazi aggressions. 

The abolition of the monarchy and the creation of the Weimar 
Republic--both implicit in the peace settlement--had also de¬ 
prived powerful elements within German society of the traditional 
focus of their loyalties. Observing this, during World War II 
Sir Winston Churchill wrote that the Hitlerite monster had 
crawled out of the sewer and onto the vacant throne. 

The reparations and military clauses of the treaty also led 
to the rapprochement between Germany and the Soviet Union, a 
nearby state uncommitted to the Versailles Treaty. In particular, 
this led to covert violations of the disarmament clauses, the 
Red Army (ultimately to its own benefit) providing training 
facilities to the Germans. This association eventually--though 
not directly--paved the way for the treaty violations that in¬ 
augurated World War II. 

In all, the Versailles Treaty was from the outset repugnant 
to the Germans. It was signed under protest and only after the 
German chief representative had denounced the Allies for the 
hatred which the treaty represented and for continuing the block¬ 
ade of starving Germany v/hile the. treaty v;as being drafted. This 
was in somber, foreboding contrast to the urbanity and good will 
at that Congress of Vienna which 100 years before had ended the 
Napoleonic wars and restored a fairly stable Europe. 

The experience with the Versailles Treaty suggests, there¬ 
fore, that the violation of a few stipulations is in itself 
relatively unimportant. The really serious violations are those' 
of attitude and intent, and they are at the very core of the in¬ 
ternational conflict. If the original treaty provisions are.un¬ 
reasonable and unworkable, they can only lead to their own 
”mirror” violation and encourage the other, more serious kind of 
violation. 


90 


Establishing Criteria for Violations Analysis 


Having explored with some care the historical context of 
one important group of major and minor violations, we now turn 
to the investigation of a number of specific treaty breaches, 
listed in the Table on the following tv70 pages. It is clear, 
especially after viewing the Versailles experience, that clas¬ 
sifying and analyzing such historical data yields results quite 
different from scientific findings in the physical sciences. 

'In this case, the data are the treaty violations since World 
War I which are dealt with, or mentioned, in the Historical 
Annexes of this report.* All of these cannot be treated equally; 
the objectives of the study give special v;eight to the cases in¬ 
volving agreements with Communist nations since World War II, 
since these are of particular relevance to possible future arms 
control treaties. The other cases also vary greatly in impor¬ 
tance, although only serious violations have been considered. 

Just as it is impossible to establish precise weights to 
be given various violations, even the actual number of viola¬ 
tions is not entirely clear. Although 51 violations are listed, 
some of these, including the German violations of the Versailles 
disarmament provisions, were repeated many times; there is thus 
no possible scientific basis for deciding exactly how many vio¬ 
lations they constitute, either in absolute or relative terms. 
Furthermore, selection of specific examples of violations of 
political treaties was arbitrary; others could have been in¬ 
cluded, some of those on the list could well have been omitted. 

It would have been possible, of course, to list every known vio¬ 
lation that occurred during the period; hov; many undetected vio¬ 
lations took place cannot even be estimated. However, the care¬ 
ful legal study necessary to determine that each known incident 
was an actual breach of a treaty or agreement would have dissi¬ 
pated the time and effort vjhich, in this study, were intended for 
historical study and analysis. Accordingly, a study in depth 
was undertaken in preference to a sterile listing. 

The violations chosen were thus a manageable group of 
breaches of a number of international political treaties or 
agreements, each violation being one which posed a threat to 
peace. In short, these violations offer meaningful material 
for study, but not for statistical analysis, and no such analy¬ 
sis has been attempted. Neither has an attempt been made to 
find patterns in these violations alone, in the sense of 


* Annex Volume II. 


91 





Table 


S^RLRCTED AGREEMENT V IOLATIONS SINCE VJORLD VJAR_I 


1. Gexiaan violations of disarmament provisions of Versailles 
Treaty, 1919-1934 

2. German sending of troops into demilitarized Ruhr to put 
down uprising, 1920 

3. Polish seizure of Vilna from Lithuania, 1920 

4. Yugoslavians violation of Albanian frontiers, 1921 

5. German violations of the reparations o 1 aus.r'n of iies 

Treaty (met by Ruhr occupations of 1921, 1923) 

6. The Corfu incident (Greece and Italy), 1923 

7. Iraqi-Turkish border dispute involving Britain, 1924 

8. Greek invasion of Bulgaria, 1925 

9. The Chaco War (Bolivia and Paraguay), 1928-1938 

10. Proclamation of German-Austrian customs union, 1931 

11. Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1931 

12. Japanese attack on Shanghai, 1932 i 

13. German rearmament, 1935 

14. Italo-Ethiopian War, 1935-1936 

15. German remilitarization of Rhineland, 1936 

16. Intervention of Germany, Italy, and USSR in Spanish Civil 
War, 1936-1939 

17. Renewal of Sino-Japanese conflict, 1937 

18. German annexation of Austria, 1938 : 

19. German annexation of Sudetenland, 1938 

20. German annexation of remainder of Czechoslovakia, 1939 

21. Italian invasion of Albania, 1939 

22. German invasion of Poland, 1939 

23. Russo-Finnish War, 1939-1940 

24. Soviet coercion of Baltic States, 1940 

25. Italy^s entrance into war against France and Great Britain, 
1940 

26. German attack on the Soviet Union, 1941 

27. Japanese occupation of southern Indochina, 1941 

28. Japanese aggression against the United States, 1941 

29. Soviet declaration of war against Japan, 1945 

30. Soviet expansion in eastern Europe in violation of wartime 
agreements, 1945-1948 

31. Soviet occupation of northern Iran, 1946 

32. Foreign aid to Greek Communist guerrilla forces, 1947 

33. Israeli-Arab War in Palestine, 1948 

34. The Indonesian case, 1947-1948 

35. The Berlin blockade, 1948-1949 

36. Costa Rica-Nicaragua dispute, 1948-1949 


92 




37. The Caribbean situation (Haiti, Dominican Republic, Cuba, 
Guatemala), 1950 

38. North Korean invasion of South Korea, 1950 

39. Korean Armistice Violation, 1953- 

40. Violations of the 1954 Geneva Accords on Indochina, 
1955-1962 

41. Nicaraguan action against Costa Rica, 1955 

42. Soviet intervention in Hungary, 1956 

43. Anglo-French and Israeli action against Egypt (the Suez 
crisis), 1956 

44. Boundary dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua, 1957 

45. Invasion claim by Panama, 1959 

46. Dominican Republic intervention in Venezuela, 1960 

47. The Berlin wall, 1961 

48. The USSR’s unilateral termination of the nuclear test 
moratorium, 1961 

49. Violations of the 1962 Geneva Accords, 1962- 

50. Soviet missiles in Cuba, 1962 

51. Haitian-Dominican Republic dispute, 1963 


93 


characteristics v/hich would be true of all or almost all the 
violations, or characteristics vjhich v;ould be true of all vio¬ 
lations sharing some other specific characteristic. Possible 
meaningful patterns will emerge from considering responses along 
with violations ^ as is done in Annex of this report, and 

summarized in Chapter 9, infra . 

A kind of preliminary pattern has been established by 
grouping them for analysis according to various characteristics 
--a classification permitting them to be readily considered 
v;ith responses, so that the essential pattern, the effective 
response, could be seen. For this purpose, the violations under 
consideration have been analyzed under the headings ^ Vho was in¬ 
volved in the violation of the treaty?^’; ^^ What v^ere the charac¬ 
teristics of the treaties violated?”; ” VJhen v/ere they violated?”; 
”How v;ere they violated?”; ”Why did the violations occur?” 


V7ho Vv?as Involved? 

Here are simply noted the countries that committed most of . 
the violations. Germany was the most frequent violator in the 
period between the viavs . The Soviet Union and its Communist 
satellites, however, have been responsible tov even more total 
violations, spread over the entire period from the later 1930s 
to the present. Italy and Japan v;ere each responsible for four 
or five of the breaches under consideration during the interv;ar 
period. Communist states in Asia committed three of the listed 
violations after World War II. Other violations, or alleged vio¬ 
lations , were committed by a scattering of Latin American nations, 
prewar Poland, Yugoslavia, Great Britain, France, Israel, and the 
Netherlands. The United States was not purposely omitted from 
the list; although some accusations of violations have been made 
against this country in the United Nations during this period, 
few of these warrant serious consideration.* 

The pattern of nations violating treaties corresponds to 
the international power drives of the period. Those nations 
embarking on programs of expansion broke treaties as they went. 


'' One possible exception--alleged American complicity in the 
abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961--is still too 
shrouded in secrecy to permit truly objective "evaluation. Another 
is alleged American support of the successful anti-Communist re¬ 
volt in Guatemala in 1954. The United States, like other democ¬ 
racies, can also be considered to have committed a number of 
”violations by omission” when it has failed to respond effectively 
to overt violations (see p. 100). 


94 














other facts emerge about the nations involved in major 
treaty violations. In most cases, they v/ere stronger than the 
injured party, but in the German breaches of the Versailles 
Treaty, the violator was the weaker power. There were a number 
of cases, most of them involving Latin American countries , in 
which two or more small powers of approximately equal strength 
were involved. There were also several cases involving tv;o 
great powers fairly evenly matched in military strength, i.e., 
the German attack on the USSR in 1941 and the Japanese Pearl 
Harbor attack. Since World War II there have been in reality 
only tv;c great pov;ers, with the Soviet Union--admittedly the 
weaker of these--having violated agreements with the United 
States in Berlin, elsewhere in Germany, and throughout eastern 
Europe. Thusj although the majority of violations has been 
committed by pov/ers of acknov7ledged strength against weaker vic¬ 
tims, this is by no means always the case. 

There is some indication that v;eak or unstable regimes are 
more likely to violate treaties than those of more substance and 
stability. For instance, Latin American regimes, often precari¬ 
ously in control, have been involved in a number of breaches 
aimed at gaining territory or overthrov;ing neighboring govern¬ 
ments . Similarly, the German government in the 1920s and early 
1930s, and the Japanese government at the time of the Manchurian 
incident, V7ere in uncertain control of nations torn by violent 
internal political conflict. This V7as not true, hov;ever, of the 
German, Japanese, and Italian governments of the late 1930s, nor 
of the Soviet government in recent decades--all strong dictator¬ 
ships with tight control over their peoples and all guilty of 
numerous treaty violations. It has been suggested that such to¬ 
talitarian regimes are of necessity in a state of imbalance, 
always seeking foreign victories against scapegoat enemies to 
distract attention from the lack of freedom at home. It is dif¬ 
ficult, hov 7 ever, to visualize the aggressive violations committed 
by these totalitarian regimes as being motivated for reasons 
other than the obvious ones of national aggrandizement. The con¬ 
clusion emerges that violations are as likely to be committed by 
nations governed by weak or precarious regimes as by strong 
totalitarian states professing aggressive nationalistic or ideo¬ 
logical tendencies. More positively, it can be asserted that 
there are very fev; treaty violations by stable, democratic 
governments. 


VJhat Were the Characteristics 

of the TreatiesT 

Most frequently violated vjere the important multilateral 
collective security and antiwar treaties of the period--the 


95 




Treaty of Versailles, the Covenant of the League, the Kellogg- ■ 

Briand Pact, the Nine Power Treaty, the Locarno Pact, and the 
UN Charter. (Of course, many violations broke several treaties M 

at the- same time.) When a bilateral nonaggression pact was 
breached, one of the great multilateral treaties usually was m 

also violated. I 

Most of the broken treaties vjere entered into voluntarily. 

The outstanding exception, Versailles, was very deliberately a I 

dictated treaty, v;ith no German participation in the negotiations M 
with punitive provisions included in the agreement, and with the ■ 
defeated nation given no choice but to sign. It was also a I 

treaty-repeatedly broken, at first quietly and then blatantly. 

About one-third of the violations considered here that occurred I 

before 1945 were of the Versailles Treaty. VJhatever else may be M 
said of treaty breaches, it seems clear that a dictated treaty I 

is likely to be violated if it is not rigorously enforced. I 

Provisions for enforcement were included in several of the 1 

multilateral treaties--the League Covenant, the Versailles I 

Treaty, and the UN Charter. Sometimes these sanctions were ap- I 

plied, sometimes they were not. At times, they were applied so 1 

halfheartedly as to be completely ineffective, v;hile sometimes -J 

they were effective in achieving the removal of the violation, 1 

as V7as French occupation of the Ruhr, but fostered conditions 4 

that led to later, more serious violations. The significant I 

factor seems to be not V7hether the treaty includes enforcement J 

provisions, but v/hether and how the sanctions are imposed by J 

other signatories. Many sanctions are legally available, of I 

course, v;hether or not they are written into any given treaty. I 

There has been considerable discussion of the matter of A 

writing provisions for amendment into treaties. Treaties can | 

alv/ays be revised with the mutual consent of all the parties to .IB 

them, but this fact is not helpful in the important cases when ' 

one country feels aggrieved at the effects of a treaty which the 
other parties v;ish to maintain intact. It has been suggested 
that treaties should include provisions vjhereby a party desiring 
change may, of right, refer the issue to an impartial international 
body for decision, even if one or more other parties oppose such 
change. Such provisions, for instance, could also provide oppor¬ 
tunity to the other party to resist the referral, in v;hich case 
the nation desiring change could legally terminate the treaty. 

It has also been .proposed that treaties be made terminable at 
any time, after notice has been given; or that they be reviev;ed 

periodically; or that they last for a set period of a few years 

and thereafter until notice is given. 


96 




There seems to be real merit in formal provisions for treaty 
change. The possibility of change could strengthen the hand of 
moderate statesmen v/ishing to abide by a given treaty. Limiting 
the duration of a treaty could serve to reaffirm periodically 
the parties^ adherence to and satisfaction V 7 ith the treaty. In 
the case of arms control treaties, dependent as they must be on 

technological developments, adequate provisions for possible 

change v;ould seem especially important. 


When VJere the Violations? 


In relation to the time the treaty v;as signed, most vioD^a- 
tions during the interv/ar period took place some years later. 
Since World War II, hov^ever, there have been repeated breaches 
soon after agreement v;as reached. This seems an indication that, 
in these instances, there was from the beginning little intention 
to observe the treaty. The same intent to violate was evident 
in the early post-VJorld VJar I actions by the Germans . 

Another ansv^er to the ^^Vhen?^^ of violations can be found 
by considering other, concurrent events that facilitated the 
breach. Soviet intervention in Hungary--though not directly re¬ 
lated—was made much easier since world attention v/as focused 
on the Anglo-French-Israeli attacks on Egypt at that time; more 
recently, the Chinese invasion of India may have been facilitated 
by the dramatic Cuban missiles crisis. 

Given the existence of grave dissatisfaction by one party, 
then the timing of the violation seems to be a function of the 
length of time necessary to prepare the way for it. A knovjledge 
of the circumstances might permit prediction, and this in turn 
would help contingency planning. For example, clandestine German 
rearmament after 1918 began as soon as a conspiracy could be 
organized and payments made. Such arrangements are not time- 
consuming. Open German violation of the Versailles Treaty re¬ 
quired diplomatic and propaganda preparations, the accession to 
power of an openly aggressive and nationalistic regime, and the 
recognition by Germany that Allied public opinion was not only 
pacifistic and apathetic, but largely concerned with other mat¬ 
ters. Some years V7ere obviously required before any German gov¬ 
ernment would be ready to confront the Allies on an issue so 
serious and potentially so injurious to them. In the case of 
the Yalta agreements on Eastern Europe the interval betv/een the 
signing of the agreement and its violation probably reflects the 
time necessary for subversion to permit installation of Communist 
regimes in the various countries; this was quick in Rumania and 
Bulgaria, slower in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Solving such 


97 









organizational problems under pressure thus can take time meas¬ 
urable in months. The same months also provided indications of ^. 
the extent of American postwar demobilization and^American public 
interest in, and knov/ledge of, political affairs in Eastern 
Europe. 

It is also noteworthy that the violator enjoys all the ad¬ 
vantages that go with possession of the initiative. He can 
choose the time most advantageous to him. His preparations 
have been made and he has considered and planned for the re¬ 
actions of the injured party, and as a result can often present 
the victim and the world V7ith a fait accompli . The injured 
party, on the other hand, may be taken by surprise or may, as 
very often happens, have simply been unv^illing to credit the 
reports which reached him, e .g. , Norv/ay in April 1940. When 
the evidence becomes overwhelmingly clear, then the victim must 
improvise a response in frantic haste unless, as rarely happens, 
his contingency plans are ready. 


Hov; VJere the Treaties Violated? 


Before World War II--except in the case of early postwar 
German reaction to Versailles and the Spanish Civil VJar inter¬ 
ventions --violations v;ere usually overt, and often blatant and 
prideful. Since VJorld VJar II, most violations by Co.mmunist na¬ 
tions have been indirect or covert, and thus, more difficult to 
deal with. The Soviets apparently seek to avoid offering unen¬ 
durable provocations, and concentrate on slov;ly amassing minor 
gains, no one of v;hich is thought v;orth a ivar by the victims, 
yet v;hose cumulative total may ultimately be decisive. (Their 
one obvious departure from this practice, the attack on South 
Korea, seems to have been recognized as a mistake, for as yet 
it has not been repeated.) 

It is important to stress the significance of violation by 
many small breaches, chipping avjay at the letter and spirit of 
agreements. This study has noted (Annex II-G) that the slov; 
erosion of Western rights under continuous Communist pressure 
has done more to v/eaken the Western position in Berlin than such 
direct and dramatic Communist assaults as the 1948 blockade and 
the border sealing of 1961. Many of these small violations v/ould 
be classified as procedural, rather than substantive; sometimes 
they were no more% than delays in complying with agreements. 

Their cumulative effect, however, has been serious. 

Much Communist activity in Southeast Asia in violation of 
the various Geneva Accords, including the failure to withdraw 


98 





troops and the surreptitious supplying of guerrilla forces, are 
comparable accumulations of small violations. The existence of 
one or tvjo German Free Corps units after World War I, in viola¬ 
tion of the Versailles Treaty, seemed insignificant under the 
circumstances existing in that uneasy nation at the time; the 
large number of such units that did exist, however, not only con¬ 
stituted a serious breach of the treaty but also provided the 
means and atmosphere for the rise of Nazism. The Soviet tech¬ 
nique in taking control of the Baltic countries in 1940, and the 
East European satellites after the war, was made up of individual 
steps that led to conquest before most outside observers could 
realize V7hat v/as happening. The expansion of Japanese influence 
on the Asian mainland between 1932 and 1937, and the Communist 
violations after the Korean Armistice, are additional examples 
of creeping violation. This kind of breach has obvious implica¬ 
tions for arms control agreements, v/ith their many technical 
provisions and the necessity for long, consistent vigilance to 
ensure observance. 

In cases where the violation must be open, as in an armed 
attack on a neighboring country, there is a standard procedure 
for announcing and justifying the breach. The usual aggressor^s 
charge has been that the action v/as provoked by a previous vio¬ 
lation by the other nation involved. A manufactured violation 
may be set up to influence public opinion and justify the vio¬ 
lation.* In the cases of the many surreptitious violations 
since World War II, to justify the action vjould be to admit it 
or its illegality. In these cases, the standard Communist pro¬ 
cedure has been rather to make countercharges of violations 
against the other side. 


Why Were the Treaties Violated? 

Two basic approaches are involved here: motive for viola¬ 
tion and ability to violate. 

The ansv 7 er to the motivation question is that in every case 
nations commit violations because they feel it serves the na¬ 
tional interest, in terms of security, pov;er, prestige, or eco¬ 
nomic advantage. Sometimes, as in the current thrust of the 
Communist ideology, a powerful cause can produce a motivation 
as demanding as national interest. The national interest is as 


* For instance, the Gleiwitz incident of August 31, 1939, 
was set up to justify the German invasion of Poland the next 
day. 


99 






understood by the governing groups, of course, and is not nec¬ 
essarily identical with the national interest as viewed by an 
objective outsider, or as it would emerge from a hypothetical 
plebiscite. The governmental weighers of national interest--or 
cause interest--when considering a possible violation, vjill take 
into account the likely responses to the violation and decide 
v;hether the probable gains are worth the probable adverse 
consequences, 

These potential consequences are related to the second 
ansv;er to the why question--the matter of ability. In almost 
every case noted, the violating nation had reason to believe 
that it could violate the treaty V7ith impunity. Exceptions 
v;ere some of the German violations of the Versailles Treaty in 
the early 1930s, which v;ere probing in nature, gambles from v;hich 
gains might come, and which vjould in any case bring knowledge of 
the opponent's v;ill and strength. Though one can only surmise, 
this appears to be true also of some Communist violations. 

Cases of miscalculation of the consequences of a violation 
since World War I have been fev;. Some of these exceptions, of 
course, had extremely serious results. In most cases the mis¬ 
calculation was based on earlier experience in which a violation 
had met v/ith slight reaction. Another kind of exception was 
Hitler’s invasion of Russia; the response v/as inevitable and ex¬ 
pected, but the strength and resourcefulness of the victim, and 
the logistical problems of the aggressor, had been underesti¬ 
mated. Since World War IT, with the notable exception of the 
Greek, Iranian, Korean, and Cuban missiles crises, the Communist 
nations have gauged v;ell the amount of response they V'/ould meet. 

We should also note one other kind of violation, though it 
is not clear v;hether this should fall in the category of "why” 
or "how." This is a so-called "violation by omission" and occurs 
when a party to a treaty accepts without response--or with 
clearly inadequate response--an overt violation by another party 
to the treaty. By failing to meet its enforcement obligations, 
by accepting the violation and a possibly dangerous change in 
the status quo , the nonresponding nation is encouraging further 
violations and is indirectly contributing to instability and a 
threat to peace. 


Conclusions 


Although some generalizations have emerged from this analy¬ 
sis of treaty violations, their significance v^ill become clear 


100 




only through the analysis of responses to violations in the 
folloiving chapter. Any meaningful patterns must involve the re¬ 
lationship of the effective response to the violation. 


101 







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Chapter 9 


PATTERNS OF RESPONSES* 


Our search for patterns of responses has been a frankly 
utilitarian endeavor. The patterns sought are those which will 
show the characteristics of successful responses, i.e., those 
which have deterred or corrected violations without contributing 
to an escalation of the violation toward more serious conflict. 


Deterrent Responses 


As noted in Chapter 2, effective deterrent action, taken 
in anticipation of a treaty breach for the purpose of dissuading 
commission of such a breach, is clearly the most desirable way 
of dealing with violations, since such a response obviates all 
the adverse consequences of a violation and also generally con¬ 
tributes to an environment of world order that makes other vio¬ 
lations less likely. Potential, or "uncommitted,^^ violations 
are difficult to identify, however, and obviously cannot appear 
on the list of violations used in this study. Deterrent response 
are thus equally difficult to identify. The US Lebanese action 
of 1958 is one example of effective preventive, or deterrent, 
action. So, too, was US action in deterring the capture of the 
Quemoy and Matsu islands in 1955 and 1958. An earlier example 
is the massing of Italian and Yugoslav troops on the southern 
borders of Austria in 1934, which deterred Hitler from aiding 
the leaders of the attempted Nazi coup in Austria. 

Moreover, every successful corrective or punitive response 
to a violation acts also as a deterrent to possible future 
breaches, since it serves to limit the area within which aggres¬ 
sive probes can be made. There has been no blatant armed aggres¬ 
sion by any nation comparable to the Communist invasion of South 


* This chapter is based on material to be found in Annex 
III-D. See also Chapter 2, and Annex I-B, for brief or detailed 
discussion of the theory of sanctions and responses in treaty 
enforcement. 








Korea since that time, and every year that passes without such 
aggression adds evidence of the deterrent effectiveness of the 
UN-US response in Korea. 


Variations in Responses 


On balance, potential violations and the effectiveness of 
actions or responses intended to deter the commission of such 
violations, must obviously be subjects for speculation. We can 
be more precise, however, about the actions definitely taken by 
one or more nations in response to the actual commission of a 
treaty violation. These responses can take many forms. In some 
cases the victim alone has responded; in others, action has been 
taken by a group of outside nations; in still others by an inter¬ 
national peace-keeping organization--the League of Nations, the 
United Nations, or the Organization of American States, In many 
cases--such as the Yugoslavia-Albania question of 1921, the 
several Western Hemisphere cases settled since World War II, and 
the Korean invasion case--the firm intervention of an outside 
great power, working through an international or regional body, 
has been effective. Most of these violations were carefully 
planned actions based upon a calculation of cost versus advan¬ 
tage; the successful response v;as one v;hich increased the cost 
out of proportion to the advantage. Thus, the commitment of US 
armed forces to Korea--which must be termed a successful response 
regardless of what-one may feel about the possibility of ^Vic- 
tory^'--increased the cost of setting up a Communist regime over 
South Korea to a point beyond the possible returns of such to 
Communist China and the Soviet Union. 

In almost all violations, an appeal has been made by the 
victim, or by an indirectly affected power, to the League of 
Nations, or the United Nations, or the Organization of American 
States. In some cases, the organization either took no action 
or limited itself to passing futile resolutions or to imposing 
halfhearted economic sanctions whose results v;ere too long 
delayed to be effective. These characteristics of British, 
French, and League responses to Nazi and Fascist aggression in 
the 1930s finally resulted in the coining of the caustic de¬ 
scriptive phrase, ^^too little and too late.” In sharp contrast, 
successful patterns of response (Berlin Airlift in 1948, Korean 
intervention in 1950, and quarantine of Cuba in the 1962 missile 
crisis) are clearly adequate and timely, reflecting a unity of 
mind and will coupled with an appropriate reaction time--but in 
each instance the unity was sparked by American determination. 


104 



In trying to devise effective sanctions provisions one 
should perhaps bear in mind that the punishment devised should 
not only fit the crime--it should also be sufficiently flexible 
to permit modifications, if necessary, to fit the criminal. For 
even if a treaty contains elaborate sanctions provisions and 
they are dutifully carried out by enforcing countries, they may 
have a different effect on different countries. Such actions as 
freezing of assets, a blockade, or embargo, for example, may 
hurt some countries some of the time, but might not really hurt 
all those same countries all the time; there are some countries 
that would seldom be hurt seriously by such provisions. Further¬ 
more, if punitive measures are enacted, in a treaty or elsewhere, 
they could have different effects on different countries because 
of the culture of the people. For example, the disarmament 
clauses imposed on Germany were a particular blow to the German 
people because of historical German military traditions. 


Attitudes of Violators and Responders to 

International Organizations 


Whether a country aims at defending or upsetting the status 
quo seems to affect its attitude toward involving international 
organizations in a given international crisis or issue provoked 
by a treaty violation. In other words, defenders of the status 
quo usually appear anxious to involve the international body 
against apparent attempts to pursue aggressive aims; aggressors, 
naturally enough, prefer to be left alone. Thus, Nazi Germany 
and Imperial Japan both withdrew from the League of Nations 
shortly after embarking openly on their aggressive policies, on 
the pretext that the world organization was mistreating them. 
Weak and indecisive though the League was, the absence of the 
aggressors from its midst seems to have compounded further the 
dilemma of how and where to deal with them. 

The Communists, faced with possible action on the part of 
a somewhat stronger international body, the United Nations, have 
clearly shown their desire to avoid its involvement on several 
issues. The United States, in responding to Communist initia¬ 
tive in these same issues, has wished to involve it. This has 
sometimes, but not always, had some beneficial results. During 
the crisis over the Berlin Blockade, when the United States 
tried to refer the matter to the United Nations, the Soviets 
became more conciliatory. During the Hungarian crisis of 1956, 
while the Western pov;ers and even many usually "non-aligned” 
countries wished to involve the United Nations, the Soviets in¬ 
sisted that the whole matter vjas an internal problem in which 


105 










the United Nations had no right to interfere; they completely 
ignored the later censure voted by the General Assembly. 

It is obvious, of course, that the United Nations is per 
se militarily incapable of forcibly resolving treaty disputes^ 
between major powers, regardless of whether or not it can affix 
responsibility for the violation--as it did in the case of Com¬ 
munist China^s intervention in Korea and Russians intervention 
in Hungary. Furthermore, UN action by itself cannot resolve a 
treaty dispute between a powerful nation and a weak nation, in 
the absence of their mutual consent to comply with UN decisions. 
Finally, the United Nations is incapable of resolving treaty 
disputes between small powers, each of v;hich has been supported 
for ideological or other reasons by a great pov;er.* 


Responses to Violations by Small Powers 


There is one special kind of violation situation, however, 
in which an individual or collective response is clearly apt to 
be successful. If both nations involved are small nations, 
historical experience indicates that there is an excellent 
chance of peacefully correcting the violation by the interven¬ 
tion of uninvolved great powers, either directly or through an 
international organization. When two or more uninvolved great 
powers have united in pressing for correction of such a viola¬ 
tion, they have been uniformly successful. Diplomatic methods, 
such as commissions of inquiry, conciliation, and mediation, 
have usually sufficed, but in some cases economic sanctions or 
some form of a shov; of force have been used also. The ever¬ 
present implicit threat of forceful sanctions by pov;ers capable 
of imposing them has undoubtedly been an important factor in 
these successes. 

In considering possible future violations of arms control 
agreements, it vjould seem that the existence of nuclear and bio¬ 
chemical weapons, and their possible future possession by small 
nations, might change this picture. Although this is obviously 
an area vjhere sure judgments are impossible, it has been sug¬ 
gested that nuclear weapons in the hands of small powers, although 


* We recognize that some authorities will disagree with the 
statements of this paragraph, but we believe that they are accu¬ 
rate reflections of historical reality as it appears in Annex 
Volume II. 


106 




inevitably a destabilizing influence to some extent, would not 
necessarily change the pattern. 


Great Power Responsibility in Responses to Violations 


The role of great power leadership among nations in correct- 
ing violations should also be noted. It is true that a number 
of Western Hemisphere violations have been successfully settled 
by the Organization of American States and that the United 
Nations and OAS played important roles in settling the Korean 
invasion and Cuban missile cases, respectively. It is also true 
that in these two cases the non-Communist nations were reason¬ 
ably united in supporting the action taken. It is clear, how¬ 
ever, that without the leadership, decision-making, and risk¬ 
taking of the United States, and v;ithout the military power 
which supported that leadership, no effective action could have 
been taken in either of these instances. No great power played 
such a role in the period between the wars, except on scattered 
and relatively insignificant occasions, such as the Greek- 
Italian dispute (the Corfu incident), which was settled by the 
great powers acting in concert through the League in 1923, 

France could have played an effective role in leadership when 
Germany first began to rearm, and later when Hitler denounced 
the Versailles Treaty, and soon afterward reoccupied the Rhine¬ 
land. France on each occasion was overwhelmingly superior in 
strength, and a strong French reaction would have been decisive, 
but in each case, France failed to act. 


The Importance of Prompt Response 


Several separate factors that appear important in the ef¬ 
fectiveness of a response should not be overlooked. The speed 
of response has already been mentioned. One traditional view 
has held that delay in response--that is, the provision of a 
^^cooling off” period--is conducive to the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, and a similar concept was written into the League 
Covenant.* When violations are the result of a deliberate 


*Article 12 provided for a three-month waiting period 
after a decision was made by the League Council or by arbitra¬ 
tors. During this time no League member was to resort to war. 
This is one of several clearly viable concepts of domestic law 


107 





policy of territorial gain or other self-aggrandizement at the 
expense of the treaty rights of other nations, however, lengthy 
negotiations, council sessions, and investigations may let the 
violation become a fait accompli beyond the possibility of cor¬ 
rection. Contingency planning, perhaps stemming from the gaming 
of possible violations, would greatly ease the task of proposing 
or making a timely response. 

Obviously, the need for prompt action should not mean hasty 
or uninformed activity which creates the risk of major war 
through ignorance. In fact, conclusive verification of a vio¬ 
lation is one of the factors important for an effective response. 
It is doubtful that any of the actors in the Cuban missile 
crisis--the United States, the.United Nations, the Organization 
of American States, or the Soviet Union--would have behaved as 
they did without the clear photographic evidence of aggressive 
preparations before them.* * The difficulty of obtaining clear 
and incontrovertible evidence of violations in Southeast Asia 
has increased the difficulty of effective response there. Bet¬ 
ter techniques of conclusive verification, not for arms control 
alone, but for all treaty enforcement, are greatly needed. They 
would facilitate the promptness and firmness that are essential 
for effective response. 


Spheres of Influence 


The location of the violation is an additional factor in 
response. Now, as in the past, there are in reality spheres of 
influence. It is doubtful that there could have been really ef¬ 
fective responses to Soviet violations in Hungary in 1956, short 
of general nuclear war. On the other hand, in the Western Hemi¬ 
sphere several Communist violations have been met successfully. 
Berlin, a troubled no-man^s-land of the vjorld power struggle, is 
a hard place in which to settle a dispute. The whole of South¬ 
east Asia is similarly placed. Although geography cannot be 


(in this case increasingly written into labor-relations legisla¬ 
tion) v;hich may be positively harmful when analogies are applied 
to international relations. 

* This remark is not intended to prejudge the controver¬ 
sial question of v^hether earlier action might have prevented 
grave risks. 


108 





altered, it is largely the success, the failure, or the absence 
of response that finally determines the limits of the spheres. 
The failure of French and British action against Egypt in 1956 
showed that the eastern Mediterranean was no longer clearly 
within any French or British sphere. An effective response, 
on the other hand, expands or reinforces the boundaries of 
a nationsphere of interest and influence~-or, more real¬ 
istically, the sphere of its power. 


Time and Economic Sanctions 


The duration of the sanction, i.e., the length of time that 
it is applied, is relevant, especially in the case of economic 
sanctions. Generalized economic pressure in V7ar, whether by 
blockade or siege, is notably slow; one might expect it to be 
even slower in peace. Ultimately it can be overwhelming, as was 
seen in the American Civil War and in World War I. Yet in 1918, 
four years after the latter war began, Germany was still able to 
mount the great offensives that came close to Paris; neverthe¬ 
less, due to the blockade, conditions behind the lines were so 
bad that only a fev; months later, in October and November, the 
German Army was on the verge of complete collapse. 

In recent years, economic sanctions have been applied by 
the United States against China, beginning in 1951. They have 
often been criticized as ineffective. However, the United 
States has persevered in them. With the beginning of a profound 
debate between Soviet Russia and Communist China certain evi¬ 
dence about conditions v;ithin China has recently become public. 

The Chinese economy had been under severe strain from a vari¬ 
ety of causes. Because of this, the Chinese had made certain 
demands upon the Soviets for assistance. These demands may 
have been all the heavier because of the effects of the embargo 
initiated by the United States. The Soviets did not meet these 
demands, and this omission strained Sino-Soviet relations, being 
a factor leading to the apparent rupture. In the light of the 
subsequent broad ideological dispute, and its likely cause, it 
is hard to dismiss US economic sanctions on China as ineffective, 
though obviously this cannot yet really be assessed. The Soviets, 
who have had excellent opportunities for observing their effect, 
have paid them the compliment of imitation, by drastically cut¬ 
ting their own trade with and assistance to China. This is even 
more interesting because of the well-documented failure of the 
Soviet Union^s earlier belief that Nazi Germany would not attack 
in 1941 because of its stake in Soviet trade during the period 
of Nazi-Soviet collaboration. 


109 



t 


There is at least one instance in which sanctions directed 
against a known economic weakness were dramatically effective 5 
though the results v;ere not exactly what had been hoped for. 

This is the classic case of the oil embargo against Japan in 
the summer of 1941, imposed by the United States, the British 
Commonwealth, and the Netherlands in response to Japanese occu¬ 
pation of southern French Indochina, The three sanctioning 
powers knew that Japanese oil production vies minute, that Japa¬ 
nese stocks v;ould not last much beyond 12 months, and that 
Japan^s industry and her armed forces had to have oil. The 
joint embargo forced on Japan the necessity for prompt decisions 
for peace or war. In this case, war resulted, but this outcome 
was in large measure due to (a) a record of earlier inadequate 
sanctions--or no sanctions at all--which had encouraged Japan to 
advance to a point from which a great power cannot readily re¬ 
treat; (b) the fact that this powerful sanction was imposed from 
a position of basic Allied military weakness in the Far East; 
and (c) the most obvious Japanese remedy to the sanction was to 
seize tlie oil of the East Indies. 


Strategic Considerations in Response to 
Great Power Violations 


It is obvious from the earlier discussion in this chapter 
that when great powers are directly involved in a treaty dis¬ 
pute, the correction or prevention of a violation is extremely 
complicated, very delicate, and inherently dangerous. If a 
great pov;er commits a treaty violation while follov;ing a pur¬ 
poseful course tov;ard a national objective, it can be stopped, 
and the violation corrected, only by the united effort of other 
important powers, or by the firm, unequivocal, and prompt action 
of another great power. In such cases, diplomatic measures have 
not sufficed. In general, it has been necessary to use economic 
sanctions, a shov; of^ force, or force itself, including limited 
war. During the period between the vjorld wars this Vv/as seldom 
done, and even more seldom done with the necessary clarity, 
firmness, and speed. As a result, the best shield of the status 
quo during that period was vdiatever armed resistance the pro¬ 
spective victim of a violation was able to muster. Since VJorld 
Vlar II, active collective approaches to possible and actual vio¬ 
lations have been taken often, with relatively encouraging 
results. 

In the present world, it should be added, the reluctance 
of the great powers to place themselves in situations where they 


110 







may be driven quickly and uncontrollably from peace to v;ar has 
resulted in the employment of a variety of forms of aggression 
and response that are nicely calculated not to be immediately 
intolerable. This variety of forms has in turn required the 
skillful adaptation of familiar devices. Thus, the clandestine 
seaborne movement-of Soviet missiles to Cuba was blocked by a 
line of naval vessels even as in the brave old days of sail, 
but the line was called by the pacific name of ”quarantine^^ 
rather than the warlike one of ”blockade^^; it was announced well 
in advance so that the opponent had time to reflect, and its 
search procedures used distant inspection rather than boarding 
parties. All of v;hich made it palatable in this case. 

When great powers are involved in a treaty dispute, as in 
any other issue in which their national interests clash, the 
considerations prompting the violation, as well as those dicta¬ 
ting the response or responses, must be fundamentally strategic 
in nature. In this regard one must clearly recognize the dif¬ 
ference between choice of sanctions on a theoretical basis as 
law-enforcing devices and employment of sanctions as strategic 
measures. 

Obviously the tv;o overlap in theory and have overlapped in 
the specific cases cited in this and previous chapters. But 
the distinction is an important one, particularly in this study, 
which is concerned v;ith the possible application of treaty ex¬ 
perience to the enforcement of future arms control agreements. 
Because it must be obvious that in drawing up arms control 
agreements and in considering how sanctions can and should be 
applied for their enforcement, the US Government must primarily 
be concerned with measures that v;ill protect the nation^s 
security and only secondarily with theoretical aspects of the 
use of sanctions for treaty enforcement. 

Bearing this in mind, four important strategic considera¬ 
tions in sanctions employment emerging from the earlier portions 
of this chapter should be stressed. 

First, the threat by a powerful state, or by an interna¬ 
tional organization, to use force or to apply other sanctions 
in response to an alleged or established treaty breach by 
another powerful state, within the latter^s recognized sphere 
of influence, will be ineffective either as a deterrent or as a 
corrective measure. Any such threat would be, as a practical 
matter, a hollow one, impossible of accomplishment short of the 
risk of using nuclear weapons and precipitating general war. 

On the other hand, the limited use of force, or the threat to 
use force, or to apply other effective measures by one powerful 


111 


state to another powerful state in response to a violation within 
the former^s sphere of influence has proven to be effective. 

These facts were clearly demonstrated in Hungary in 1956 and off 
the coasts of Cuba in 1962. 

Second, a generally effective, though inherently defensive, 
response by individual states to breaches of treaties by other 
states, both large and small, has taken the form of reciprocal 
nonobservance, or selective refusal to comply with treaty pro¬ 
visions vjhich the offending state has breached or circumvented.^'^ 
This has permitted the salvation and continuance of those other 
provisions of agreements v^hich all parties continue to consider 
as being mutually advantageous. In effect, this constitutes re¬ 
negotiation by default and avoids the necessity for a showdovm 
confrontation on issues v;hich are less than vital to the nations 
involved. 

Thirdly, in this decentralized world, lacking a central im¬ 
partial enforcement authority, the collective response of the 
international community to the breach of its obligations by a 
major or middle power or by a minor power v;ith strong friends 
or many associates will normally be limited to what is expressly 
or tacitly acceptable to the sanctioned state without eliciting 
a more widespread military reaction. The determined strong 
state has been largely immune to the threat of effective sanc¬ 
tions for violation of treaty or otherv;ise imposed obligations 
and is perhaps even more immune in the nuclear age. Interna¬ 
tional practice, as contrasted with legal theory, does not to 
date subject even the moderately strong to the same possibility 
of strong response or sanctions as it does the weak. 

Finally, while there may be some question as to whether the 
limited employment of armed force in response to a violation 
has effectively deterred further breaches, in some instances 
such a response when applied judiciously, without directly 
threatening the vital security interests of a strong violator, 
has been successful in restoring a dangerously threatened in¬ 
ternational balance and in protecting the vital security 
interests of the offended party without provoking escalation. 


The Utility of Collective Nonmilitary Responses 

As we have seen, there has never been a clearly successful 
use of economic, financial, or other nonmilitary sanctions 


* See p. 22 , supra . 


112 





against an important, determined treaty violator. Yet it is 
perhaps premature to conclude from a relatively few instances 
that collective nonmilitary responses are therefore useless. 

The issue of the results to be expected from the use of non- 
^i^itary sanctions by the international community to redress 
breaches of obligations seems sufficiently important, and the 
price of possible failure of future experiments sufficiently 
high, to justify some attempt at additional, if tentative, con¬ 
clusions based on experience to date. 

First, the usefulness of economic and financial sanctions, 
used alone, even assuming the best possible political circum¬ 
stances, is inevitably dependent on the economic vulnerability 
of the treaty violator. Some nations, such as the United 
States and the Soviet Union, are relatively self-sufficient. 

In addition, most nations can be self-sufficient for a short 
period of time, as shown by the example of Italy in 1935-1936. 
Therefore, in evaluating the potential efficacy of nonmilitary 
sanctions alone, an analysis of the basic needs and reserves of 
the treaty-breaker is obviously of the first importance. 

If v;e conclude then that some nations, though not all, 
would, on analysis, probably be appropriate subjects for non¬ 
military sanctions, the experience of both the League and the 
United Nations appears to warrant the further conclusion that, 
to have a substantial chance of success, the measures would have 
to be (a) promptly applied, (b) all-inclusive, and (c) effec¬ 
tively administered; enforced so as to cut off all banned inter¬ 
course betv;een the disturber of the peace and all other nations; 
and maintained in force for whatever length of time was neces¬ 
sary to redress the vjrong. And though the effects of full-scale 
participation in such action on the over-all economies of large 
countries are apt to be relatively slight, collective sanctions 
must be accompanied by adequate programs of aid to weaker par¬ 
ticipants, to the extent necessary to avoid unfortunate economic 
and political results. 

Needless to say, realistic and comprehensive plans covering 
all of these requirements, including mutual help, would have to 
be prepared to make the threat of sanctions credible. Further, 
the international community must take measures to secure en¬ 
forcement of a decision once made--preferably not merely on a 
voluntary basis, but with some international policing added, 
perhaps of the blockade variety. Direct help to the aggressor 
by sympathetic powers, unless they too are effectively punished, 
can completely undo any serious effects v;hich might otherwise 
be caused. 


113 


Past experience indicates the significance of the length of 
time during which nonmilitary sanctions may have to be kept in 
force. Such measures can normally result only in a slow pinch, 
and the determination of the sanctionists may have to be kept 
firm over an extended period. Further if a state has been at¬ 
tacked, the victims may have to be sustained throughout what 
may be a comparatively long period, until sanctions hurt the 
aggressor. Prior to this, searching estimates will have to be 
made not only as to the length of time it will probably take 
for the contemplated measures to act on the treaty-breakers, but 
also of the time required by the violator under sanctions, to 
overwhelm a victim or achieve its other purposes. Obviously, 

■if comparison of these two estimates reveals, that the violator 
V7ill achieve its ends before nonmilitary sanctions can affect 
it, additional measures are essential. In a case of aggression 
where the victim is almost as strong militarily and economically 
as the aggressor, technical and economic aid alone might be suf¬ 
ficient. Where the aggressor is much stronger, the relatively 
weaker victim would probably require military aid as well. This 
might lead to a world war or perhaps only to a limited interna¬ 
tional war such as that in Korea, where international participa¬ 
tion would be largely confined to the battleground chosen by the 
aggressor--the territory of the victim. Less than this would 
probably have saved Ethiopia, separated by the sea from the main 
Italian forces. More than this, however, could not have spared 
Poland in 1939, caught between two attackers. Obviously, where 
the relative power gap between aggressor and victim is enormous, 
full military retaliation alone can sustain, or at least resur¬ 
rect, the victim, and this ideally implies the international 
community’s power and ability to require and enforce full and 
effective cooperation, probably including inspection machinery, 

.a fleet for blockade purposes, such military forces as are 
needed, either for police or combat work, etc. These possibili¬ 
ties exist in the UN Charter, as written, but remain an un¬ 
realized and, perhaps for the foreseeable future, an unrealizable 
goal. 


Putting aside the possible use of military measures but 
assuming that purely nonmilitary measures will, in a given case, 
be honestly and universally pursued, we may still have to con¬ 
clude, on the basis of the evidence at hand, that such sanctions, 
used alone, will only infrequently be sufficient to paralyze a 
treaty-breaker’s ability to achieve its ends.- Even in these 
instances where nonmilitary measures seem economically plausible, 
the question remains as to v;hether they are inevitably politi ¬ 
cally hopeless (at least until there is an effective world gov¬ 
ernment or a power monopoly in an international organization). 
While the drafters of the Charter sought to improve on the 


114 




Covenant by permitting the great powers, if in agreement, to 
create specific obligations for members in the field of preser¬ 
vation or restoration of peace, both the League and the United 
Nations, as it has developed, have been dependent on the volun¬ 
tary cooperation of sovereign members. A v;eak international 
organization cannot substitute general collective security for 
the more primitive reliance on alliance systems as the central 
pillar of each member^s foreign policy, and, this being so, 
insofar as general international obligations conflict with 

obligations, the former v;ill usually tend to be sacri¬ 
ficed to the immediate necessities of the preservation of the 
alliance. Nonmilitary sanctions then may be considered with 
some hope of success only in approximately the same political 
circumstances that would lead to other types of successful pre¬ 
ventive and enforcement programs, that is, if the holders of 
the world^s power collectively so agreed and were also vjilling 
to police the program to the extent necessary to assure adequate 
general participation. The solution of the Suez crisis, in 1956, 
would seem to corroborate this thought. 

In summary, it can be concluded that economic, and finan¬ 
cial sanctions, used alone, are a weak tool in a world where 
less than perfection is to be expected. In fact, from the 
psychological point of view, they are potentially dangerous for 
they tend to unify support in the violating nation and to divide 
the international community. Experience shows that publicity 
and the threat of international disapproval may be effective in 
preventing an international dispute from becoming a case of ag¬ 
gression, even in a v;orld of iron curtains and sophisticated 
propaganda machinery. But once other enforcement action is re¬ 
quired to counter active aggression or other important treaty 
violations, the threat of criticism has failed and, in failing, 
may well boomerang. International opprobrium, therefore, at 
least in dealing with modern military dictatorships, is a pre¬ 
ventive weapon only and should not be relied on as an important 
facet of international enforcement or punitive powers against a 
determined aggressor. Additionally, any action taken must be 
swift and powerful, for slow-acting nonmilitary measures, espec¬ 
ially if their effect is not soon apparent and/or the treaty- 
breaker accomplishes its purpose, may also have the disruptive 
effect of causing dissension and distrust within the economies 
of the cooperating sanctionists and among these nations as well. 
As experience has proven, nothing is more persuasive at the 
present stage of the development of international politics and 
international lav; than the fait accompli and attempts to resist 
it often tend to divide the sanctionists and to lead to disputes, 
mutual recrimination, and evasion. 


115 




Thus it is obvious that there remains only a very limited 
role for properly evaluated nonmilitary measures, used alone, 
though of course, political, economic, and financial sanctions 
V7ill doubtless be regularly utilized in conjunction with mili¬ 
tary and related collective measures. Nonmilitary sanctions 
alone cannot by their innate political nature normally be ex¬ 
pected successfully to control aggression or other serious 
moves by strong nations, and efforts to use them for such pur- 
- poses can be little more than weak compromises intended to 
express the community's disapproval without real cost or sacri¬ 
fice to its members. 


116 


Part Four 


THE RELEVANCE OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE 


117 








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I 


Chapter 10 


MODERN TREATY TRENDS 


Treaty Enforcement and Collective Security 


There is ample evidence to demonstrate the relevance of 
lilctorical experience to the general problem of treaty enforce¬ 
ment in the contemporary v/orld. Of all the historical continui¬ 
ties broken or stretched thin by the changes that have occurred 
in the structure and processes of international politics since 
World War II, this one seems to have suffered least modification. 
The essence of the problem of treaty enforcement in the modern 
world is still, as it was in the 16th Century and earlier, the 
absence of a supranational authority with either sufficient pov^er 
to deter or punish violations of legally binding international 
agreements or the right to modify treaties to conform to changes 
in the environment. This textbook truism has not prevented most 
nations, following another historical continuity, from negotiat¬ 
ing and concluding treaties in good faith and, in the vast 
majority of cases, from fulfilling their obligations under them. 

As in the past, most treaties that become outmoded by the 
passage of time and events are modified by orderly processes of 
negotiation or lapse by common consent of the signatories. 
Breaches of treaty obligations are relatively exceptional phe¬ 
nomena in international relations, because they involve the sac¬ 
rifice of compensating advantages for V7hich the obligations were 
undertaken in the first place, not to mention both the legal 
sanctions available to an injured party under international law 
and the public discredit visited upon a violator before the bar 
of world opinion. These deterrents can be, and sometimes are, 
overridden when nations find positive advantage in defaulting 
on their obligations. But this, even when real, is a net ad¬ 
vantage only; the violator alv;ays incurs some penalties which 
subtract something from his gain. Even the pov/erful violator 
still faces the fact of an increasingly interdependent world, 
in which the v/eaker injured party is unlikely to stand alone. 
Every violation of a treaty obligation touches the interests 
of parties other than the one directly injured, and mutual de¬ 
fense alliances, today as in the past, usually serve to defend 
the treaty rights along with other vital interests of their 
members. 





This whole traditional system has been remarkably little 
affected by the tv 7 o great experiments in world-v;ide collective 
security of our times. The general public has been prone to 
measure the achievements and failures of the League of Nations 
and of the United Nations against the ideal either of a general 
v;orld government or of a Utopian relationship of egually en¬ 
lightened sovereign nations. In fact, the relatively limited, 
if vital, purpose of these organizations has been to help pre¬ 
serve peace by curbing aggression and promoting peaceful settle¬ 
ment of disputes, a purpose which has at least to som.e degree 
helped in the enforcement of treaties v;hich have no longer re¬ 
mained solely dependent on the traditional mechanisms of inter¬ 
national politics. 

The League and the United Nations have, hov;ever, created a 
new arena of international politics by providing a forum for pub¬ 
lic debate and recrimination. In these assemblies, behind a 
solemn facade of parliamentarianism, a nev; style of pseudo¬ 
diplomacy has evolved--using the loudspeaker, the television 
screen, and the language of the streetcorner orator--in which 
the objective has been primarily to arouse popular emotions and 
V7in propaganda victories, rather than to compromise differences 
through negotiation. The new diplomacy has not, however, re¬ 
placed the old, since it serves none of the purposes of serious 
negotiation. To some extent the two exist side by side in the 
UN buildings, since some quiet, traditional negotiation is done 
in offices, in informal conferences, and the like. 

Yet even though diplomacy ^^by loudspeaker” or ”by insult,” 
as it has been called, may not be an effective instrument for 
negotiating agreements, nonetheless, it can help to enforce them. 
In the General Assembly of the United Nations any nation, in¬ 
cluding the weakest, that claims a violation of its treaty rights 
has a virtually assured means of exposing the violator, no matter 
how powerful, to the sanction of public censure merely by brand¬ 
ing the crime a threat to the peace. The weapon is tv;o-edged, 
of course. As the Panama crisis of 1964 showed, it can be used 
as readily and as effectively to denounce a treaty as to enforce 
it--perhaps more so, since the preponderance of numerical repre¬ 
sentation in the General Assembly, and similarly in the Organiza¬ 
tion of American States, rests with nations that often desire to 
change, rather than preserve, the status quo. 


120 



SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF A BIPOLAR VJORLD 


The problem of treaty enforcement at any given time must be 
viewed in the context of the existing system of international 
politics. The traditional methods of treaty enforcement de¬ 
scribed earlier belong to the pluralistic system of sovereign 
territorial states that grew up in the Western world on the 
ruins of decaying feudal localism and imperial and ecclesiasti¬ 
cal universalism. This system is bound to be affected by the 
marked changes that have occurred and are occurring in the tra¬ 
ditional structure of international politics. 


The most conspicuous features of the international scene 
today are (a) the bipolar distribution of ultimate military 
power--i.e .5 that inherent in possession of strategic nuclear 
weapons V7ith the necessary support systems; (b) the dominating 
influence upon international relations of the ideological con¬ 
flict between the Communist nations and the West; (c) the pro¬ 
liferation of small, nev7, formally but uneasily sovereign na¬ 
tions, chiefly in areas of the world formerly under colonial 
domination; (d) the emergence of a ’^third” v 7 orld of ^^uncom¬ 
mitted states, great and small, primarily in the areas men¬ 
tioned above, which derive from the rivalry of the superpowers 
a capacity to play an independent role and further their own 
interests out of proportion to their actual povjer; (e) a recent 
tendency tov;ard a loosening of political and ideological cohe¬ 
sion in both the Western and the Communist camps; (f) a trend 
tov7ard regional political and economic groupings within each of 
the two hostile blocs and the uncommitted areas; and (g) the 
emergence of the United Nations as a supranational authority 
V7ith the pov7er (albeit severely limited) to use armed force. 

The implications of these developments for the traditional 
system of international relations and current trends of treaty 
enforcement already described are at best uncertain and specu¬ 
lative. A polarization of power and influence among nations, 
with the superpov7ers effectively controlling their respective 
allies, might be expected to strengthen the enforcement of 
treaty obligations ivithin the major blocs,* while making it more 
precarious betv7een nations in opposing blocs. Any treaty vio¬ 
lation involving parties on both sides of the "frontier’* may 
theoretically precipitate a major confrontation betv7een the 
superpov7ers themselves, in V7hich the original issue is quickly 


* The Cyprus case might indicate that treaty enforcement 
within a bloc is not always too easy. 


121 





submerged in a dangerous contest of will and bluff. The latter 
supposition assumes^ however, a solidarity on both sides which 
Quite evidently does not exist today and is becoming less and 
less probable. The Suez crisis of 1956 provided a spectacle 
hardly considered possible before that time-“that of one super¬ 
power forcing its own allies to withdrav; from a test of strength 
with a member (at least temporarily) of the opposing camp under 
thinly veiled threats from the patron superpower of the latter. 
The Cuban crisis of 1962 was in some respects similar but with 
the roles of the superpov;ers reversed and with substantially 
the same results. 

Thus, fear of nuclear V7ar on both sides makes a showdown 
between the superpowers, on all but the most vital issues, in¬ 
creasingly unlikely. Yet the implications for treaty enforce¬ 
ment are ambiguous. In the Suez crisis, as it happened, France 
and Great Britain rather clearly violated their engagements 
under the UN Charter in taking military action against Egypt. 
Their rapid withdrawal, under pressure from the United States, 
the Soviet Union, and a huge majority in the General Assembly, 
might thus be regarded as a triumph of treaty enforcement. On 
the other hand, it is doubtful whether the outcome v/ould have 
been different had Egypt^s action in nationalizing the Suez 
Canal, v^hich prompted the Anglo-French intervention, been a 
clear-cut violation of their treaty rights, thus providing some¬ 
what more justification for their intervention in that case. 

In a power confrontation, the choice between standing fast 
and backing down is likely to be less influenced by the legal¬ 
ities of the dispute than by the interests involved. A nation^s 
evaluation of its interests, hov7ever, in pondering responses 
against a state resorting to aggression may be influenced by the 
tide of world opinion, as reflected in a General Assembly vote. 
The result may be the adoption of relatively mild measures, 
rather than more forceful procedures v;hich it might otherwise 
take to protect its interests. Such mildness may also stem from 
concern that the more drastic action might raise the spector of 
nuclear war. On the'other hand, as we have seen,* a state that 
violates and then stands firm often gains a psychological and 
physical advantage; the other side, facing a fait accompli , must 
decide whether to retaliate against an alert opponent or to back 
down as gracefully as possible. This is, of course, a classic 
dilemma v;hich can be profitably studied in dozens of historical 
examples, from Hitler^s occupation of Czechoslovakia, or the re¬ 
militarization of the Rhineland, back to ancient times. 


* See Chapter 6, supra . 


122 





Even in a polarized world of permeable states living in the 
shadow of nuclear catastrophe, international intercourse with 
its many frictions and tensions goes on much as before. Diplo¬ 
matic measures continue to be the most important and most gen¬ 
erally successful means for the resolution of international dis¬ 
putes. ^ Given the general desire to avoid a major confrontation 
that might lead to a general conflagration, the superpov;ers are 
not likely to permit a major crisis to be precipitated. Such 
contests, among the lesser powers, v;ill be played out under 
restrictions as to permitted levels of violence tacitly recog¬ 
nized by the superpowers and enforced upon their respective 
proteges. Treaties will thus be enforced, or violated, in much 
the same manner and to the same degree as they v/ere before the 
nuclear era, though mutual nuclear deterrence has perhaps led 
to a greater recourse to diplomatic measures (particularly 
through the United Nations) in the resolution of international 
disputes. V\/ith the stakes so high, hov/ever, it is necessary to 
ponder seriously the possible consequences of reliance upon 
instruments so historically fragile as treaties have been. 


New Weapons and the New Field of Arms Control 


If the problem of general treaty negotiation and enforce¬ 
ment is old, and relatively continuous, that of negotiation and 
enforcement of arms control agreements, at least in its special¬ 
ized aspects, is new. The persistent search by the major nations 
of the world since 1919 for a workable formula to eliminate or 
reduce armaments is without parallel in the long history of in- 
tersocietal relations.* Before World VJar I, disarmament v;as a 
penalty imposed upon a defeated enemy by its conquerors. At the 
end of that conflict, however, it became almost overnight a major 
goal of international negotiation, sustained by a universal sense 
of urgency and widely regarded as an essential step in averting 
another such bloodletting. 

The effort failed, of course, and the obvious fact of fail¬ 
ure, by the mid-1930s, brought widespread disillusionment. The 
democracies plunged reluctantly into rearmament and a second 
great war, and as this finally neared its end, their peoples and 
governments once more saw their best hope for future peace, as 
of old, in disarming the late aggressors and keeping their con¬ 
querors strong. 


* Despite the hopes induced by the earlier Hague Conferences, 
serious attempts at disarmament stem directly from reaction to 
World War I. 


123 




The blinding shock of the atomic bomb, in the summer of 
1945, revived in the V/estern world that fear of war itself-- 
as distinct from fear of specific aggressors--which had been 
such a feature of the 1920s and 1930s. Over the last two 
decades that fear has slov;ly spread from the United States and 
United Kingdom, through Western Europe and the Commonwealth na¬ 
tions , through many elements in the uncommitted nations, until 
it is today apparently shared by the Governirient of the Soviet 
Union. Certainly one of the causes of the tension between the 
USSR and China lies in their differing appreciations of the im¬ 
plications of nuclear warfare. Statesmen of all nations ex¬ 
ploit this fear, or seek to allay it, for their particular na¬ 
tional ends of the moment. Ordinary people shov; their concern 
in varying degrees at different times, sometimes succeeding in 
thrusting it into the background of consciousness. Given the 
pace and extent to v;hich this appreciation of nuclear V7arfare^s 
potential has spread since 1945, it seems likely that this fear 
of v;ar and weapons V 7 ill in time spread through Asia and Africa, 
influencing decisions by some groups and governments V7hich today 
like to describe the United States as a paper tiger, despite its 
nuclear v7eapons. 

It is this phenomenon of fear--fear of war and of weapons 
which seem to defy reasonable human control--rather than the 
techniques or issues of arms control negotiation and enforcement 
for which the historian can find roots extending farther back 
than VJorld VJar I. Nev; v7eapons have alv7ays inspired fear, horror 
and a search for means of defense or control. A number of rele¬ 
vant events and phenomena of the past merit re-examination: the 
attempts of the medieval church to ban such v7eapons as the cross 
bov7, and papal prohibitions against the use of edged v7eapons by 
warrior churchmen; ecclesiastical tolerance for using against 
the infidel those iveapons and practices prohibited in V7arfare 
among Christians; popular revulsion against certain kinds of 
modern v7eapons ( e.g. , early artillery, dum-dum bullets, poison 
gas, booby traps, etc.) and tolerance of others more lethal; 
Utopian schemes of world government and perpetual peace; the 
more recent Hague Conferences; artificial distinctions between 
^^defensive^' and ^'offensive^’ v/eapons. Such re-examination should 
pay particular attention to the interplay of ideas and emotions; 
avowed and tacit aims; religious, moral, and legal principles; 
popular sentiments, taboos, and misinformation. The widespread 
belief today that there is a distinction, in kind and in moral 
value, between nuclear and conventional weapons of comparable 
lethality is a psychological phenomenon for which many histor¬ 
ical analogies can be found, but which requires further exami¬ 
nation as to its validity and to the reasons V7hy it exists. 

The responses of leaders, governments, and peoples throughout 


124 



istory to prohibitions and controls against certain weapons 
and practices, and to violations of such prohibitions, have 
meaning for present-day experience in arms control. 


Despite many gaps and some internal contradictions, the 
richest, most directly relevant body of historical experience 
for present and future arms control negotiations undoubtedly is 
to be found in the record of the half-century since VJorld VJar I 
burst upon the v;orld. From that event dates the deep-seated 
feeling by civilized people that unless man can find ways to 
control his v;eapons, he stands in perpetual danger of relapsing 
into savagery, if not of extinction. This popular feeling, 
however much disputed, discounted, or qualified by individual 
statesmen and scholars, has been the main force impelling gov¬ 
ernments to persist in seeking a peaceful v;orld order and, as 
steps thereto, in as yet futile effort to reconcile reduction 
or control of armaments with the demands of security. 

Perhaps the most significant fact emerging from a study 
of this recent experience is the variety of forms the problem 
of arms control has assumed and the unending transformation of 
its context. Civilized man has not merely passed, in that short 
time, from the era of conventional to that of nuclear v/eapons, 
and pursued along parallel lines the search for effective con¬ 
trols over both. In the sphere of nuclear weapons alone, nego¬ 
tiators have grappled v>;ith the contrasting problems posed by: 
the American atomic monopoly; the transition from scarcity to 
abundance in bombs, warheads, and fissionable materials; a pro¬ 
cession of revolutionary technological advances (development of 
the H-bomb, small-yield v^arheads, manned and unmanned delivery 
systems, space penetration, detection and inspection systems, 
etc.); and the expansion of the nuclear '^club” from one to four 
nations. The political environment has also been successively 
altered by such developments as the changes in leadership and 
governmental organization in the Soviet Union, the desire of 
Communist China to be the torchbearer of the Communist v«7orld 
revolution (with the consequent appearance of leadership dis¬ 
putes in the Communist world), the economic recovery of Western 
Europe with attendant cleavages in the Norton Atlantic Alliance, 
the accelerating revolutions of modernization and decolonization 
in the underdeveloped world, and the recent--and possibly short¬ 
lived- -American-Soviet detente.* 


* There have been such detentes before, notably in the 
1930s, when Litvinov was Soviet Foreign Minister, and later 
during VJorld VJar II. 


125 



We can assume that change and revolution V7ill continue. 

The spread of nuclear technology will certainly create nev; 
stresses and strains both v^ithin and between alliances. But 
even the most revolutionary and unforeseen technological de¬ 
velopments are unlikely so to transform the fundamental issues 
facing arms control negotiators as to invalidate all of the 
richly varied experience of the past half-century. The issues 
are, after all, those arising from human reactions to startling 
and ominous v;eapons developments. A revolutionary technological 
breakthrough, by either side, can create nev; strategic, tacti¬ 
cal, and technical problems of fantastic complexity, but in 
terms of pov;er relationships they could, in the most extreme 
instance, only recreate a situation and problems reminiscent of 
those immediately following VJorld War II, when the United States 
enjoyed a monopoly of atomic weapons. VJhat is not clear, of 
course, is hov; such a monopoly would be utilized by an aggres¬ 
sive, totalitarian dictatorship, if the positions of the super¬ 
powers v;ere reversed. Some idea can be gained, perhaps, from 
the v;ay in v;hich Nazi Germany relentlessly exploited the super¬ 
iority of the Luftv;affe in the late 1930 s. Certainly the Com¬ 
munists would not be more restrained in taking advantage of a 
weapons superiority. 

VJhether or not we have future, monumental technological 
breakthroughs, negotiations of arms control agreements, not to 
mention their enforcement, will no doubt be increasingly dif¬ 
ficult as the nuclear ’^club^^ expands. But, with the possible 
exception of China, whose achievement of an effective, major 
nuclear capability does not appear imminent, it is probable that 
new members of the ^^club" will have no choice but to continue 
to live within the existing framev;ork of pov;er relationships 
in which the superpowers have the means, in the last resort, of 
curbing ^^irresponsibleaction by their proteges. 

But what of the situation if China does achieve an effective 
nuclear capability sooner than expected? And if not, what of the 
situation when she inevitably will someday achieve such a capa¬ 
bility? What, furthermore, if nuclear powers of medium strength 
do attempt to break dov;n the present international framework, 
breaching treaties v;hile threatening nuclear (or comparable) re¬ 
taliation if sanctions are used against them? These are un¬ 
answered (and perhaps unanswerable) questions v;hich have cap¬ 
tured the attention of modern theorists studying the concept of 
mutual nuclear deterrence, and in themselves are beyond the 
scope of this study. Certainly they cannot be answered by direct 
historical analogy. But history can point the way to a program 
of investigation of the problems and of their implications. We 
sl\all return to this in the final chapter of this report. 


126 



Chapter 11 


ARMS CONTROL SIGNIFICANCE OF TREATY EXPERIENCE 


The treaty experience of the past half-century, which has 
been thoroughly reviewed and analyzed in this report and its 
annexes, provides arms control specialists with four different 
kinds of valuable insights. First, attention has been drawn to 
mistakes which should be avoided in preparing for and negotia¬ 
ting all kinds of agreements and particularly those of security 
significance, the category which includes arms control treaties. 
Second, we are able to identify mistakes in treaty enforcement. 
Third, through analysis of the experience, it has been possible 
to highlight the major limitations which affect the variety of 
responses which can be chosen by one or more nations in replying 
to different kinds of treaty violations. Fourth, analysis in¬ 
dicates how Sino-Soviet behavior in the continuing—if episodic 
--Cold War, or ”two-camps” conflict, creates an important, 
though negative, condition in the arms control field of inter¬ 
national relations. 

In a report of limited length it would be impossible to 
collate with adequate brevity all of the conclusions of all of 
the preceding chapters and the annexes of this report. It will 
perhaps be useful to the reader, however, to summarize here a 
few of the most significant of the findings. This summarization 
within each category, is presented in brief, self-contained ob¬ 
servations or conclusions, whose sequence does not reflect any 
particular order of importance or priority. 


Guidance for Negotiating and Policy-Making 


Agreements should be realistic and moderate in their goals 
and in their content. It seems wise to aim at a political re¬ 
lationship sufficiently satisfactory to all parties to give each 
a major stake in its continuance--beyond mere glittering gen¬ 
eralities such as those of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. While 
change is a fact that must be reckoned with (see below), every 
possible effort should be made at the time of negotiation to 
provide terms that can be lived with both in the current and 





immediately foreseeable environment,;. This does not mean that 
nations should necessarily avoid making treaties in difficult, 
or controversial, or even in emotionally charged areas (though 
for the latter, see also below); it does mean that one should 
not press a temporarily favorable negotiating situation too far 
or impose solutions that are not likely to be clearly and real¬ 
istically acceptable to all contracting parties under antici¬ 
pated normal conditions in the proximate future. Otherwise the 
solutions may soon become meaningless and probably dangerous. 

In the light- of rapid changes in technology and in national 
political and economic interests, important security-suffused 
treaties, such as those dealing with arms control, should be 
flexible and responsive to developments in a dynamic world. Yet 
the problem of establishing procedures for orderly change in 
treaty provisions has thus far defied solution. Until truly 
flexible, realistic, and effective machinery for orderly agree¬ 
ment change can be devised, probably the best that can be done 
is to remain alert to the absolute necessity for sensing and 
adjusting promptly to change, employing all available procedures 
for adjudication, interpretation, and frequent, periodic review 
of agreements. 

Whenever the United States expects to face an unusual or 
new international situation, where American rights or interests 
may be appreciably affected by the interests or activities of 
other nations, there should be thorough, written understandings 
with all parties concerned, in advance, if possible. It is in¬ 
adequate- -with our friends and allies as well as with those that 
oppose us--to rely upon logic, precedent, or good will. There 
is a temptation to relax our guard when dealing with today^s 
friends, on the assumption that their national interests and 
ours are identical. Although blood is thicker than water,” and 
common heritages make for common goals, we must not forget that 
though nations may have eternal interests, they do not have 
eternal friendships, and that there must never be reliance upon 
”friendship,” as such, between governments.* The best that can 
be expected is mutual respect and mutual appreciation both of 
identities and divergences in national interests. 

It is frequently dangerous to attempt to reach a long-term 
definitive agreement on an emotionally charged issue soon after 
events which have contributed to raising the emotions. In such 


* Relevant is the statement attributed to Viscount H. J. T. 
Palmerston (1784-1865) : ”England has no permanent friends: she 
has only permanent interests.” 


128 



issues it is perhaps better to attempt only to solve the immedi¬ 
ate technical problems involved on a temporary--but thorough and 
specific--basisi The major issue itself can then be negotiated 
later, after tempers have cooled, permitting both the negotia¬ 
tors and the public opinions behind them to deal with each re¬ 
maining problem objectively and dispassionately. In the interim 
which may be long--a temporary agreement will serve reasonably 
well as a modus vivendi . 

It is desirable that treaties include specific enforcement 
provisions, unless the treaty is clearly self-enforcing or its 
violation would be unlikely to pose a major risk to national 
security. Effective machinery for enforcement must be sought 
which cannot be sabotaged by nations which may wish to violate. 

In the drafting of a major treaty it is essential to con¬ 
sider how its terms may affect other nations which are not par¬ 
ties to the treaty and also what can be done to preserve it 
should nonsignatories wish to ignore or subvert its provisions. 

Treaty negotiators must be well prepared for their tasks: 

First, there must be historical research in depth, both 
into antecedents in the particular area and in treaties de¬ 
signed to cope with similar situations, in order to identify 
solutions that have proven satisfactory, as well as those which 
have not. From this basis new proposals may be developed and 
analyzed. 

Second, there must be full and continuous coordination of 
the work of all interested government agencies in the policy¬ 
planning that precedes negotiation and during the actual nego¬ 
tiation process itself. Particularly important is the need for 
coordination between different—and sometimes competing--agencies 
within the ”intelligence community." 

Third, negotiators must be informed on the past records of 
the nations with v^hich they are negotiating as to treaty observ¬ 
ance and violation, bearing in mind that unstable regimes and 
aggressive dictatorial regimes are both more prone to violate 
treaties (largely for different reasons) than are stable, demo¬ 
cratic governments. 

Fourth, if possible, preliminary preparation for all major 
treaties should include some gaming exercises. The historical 
analysis suggested above can be helpful in providing scenarios 
and suggesting variants to be treated in the gaming process. 


129 



Fifth, there should be liaison with governmental and non¬ 
governmental research agencies, through the Department of State, 
so that ample resources for analysis and suggestion can support 
US missions. Necessary arrangements must be made in advance so 
that such research organizations will be prepared to undertake 
classified research on an urgent basis. Responsibility for such 
support should not fall on a few already overworked officials in 
the Department of State or in the Arms Control Agency. 

Sixth, negotiators should be thoroughly familiar with the 
negotiating techniques that are likely to be used by the parties 
v;ith whom they are negotiating. Formal instruction is needed so 
that each mission and each delegation will include senior people 
who understand fully what they will be likely to meet and are 
prepared to cope with it. There must be systematic and continu¬ 
ous research to identify, classify, and analyze opposing nego¬ 
tiating techniques for instructional purposes. From this it 
would appear that the special emissary who is not specially 
trained for diplomatic experience will be at a serious 
disadvantage. 


Guidance for Treaty Enforcement 

■ Experience shows that agreements between sovereign states 
have been unenforceable if powerful participants refuse to honor 
their treaty obligations. Nevertheless, experience also shows 
that various enforcement measures are available as responses to 
violations which, if applied with sufficient determination and 
skill, can redress, correct, or halt a violation. 

Verification of a treaty violation by inspection or other 
means is an essential prerequisite to adequate response. Veri¬ 
fication alone, however, is useless unless there is determina¬ 
tion on the part of the injured parties to proceed with adequate 
enforcement measures. 

The most effective and successful responses have been those 
which have clearly demonstrated a determination and a capability 
to carry through successfully and to meet force with force, if 
necessary. 

It is ess ential to maintain an up-to-^ate compilation of 

all agreements and understandings which are directly or in di- 
rectly relevant to each important international situation . This 
compilation, which should include all earlier interpretations of 


130 









the agreements, must be readily available to all policy-makers 
concerned with the issues and to all other officials whose 
actions may relate to the situation or issues. 

An essential element of successful treaty enforcement is 
speed in initiating a response. To assure promptness, adequacy, 
and full deliberation in responding to a treaty violation, prior 
detailed contingency planning should be undertaken for possible 

vi olations of all major treaties , with first priority given to 

those V7ith unstable or dictatorial regimes and to those v;hich 
appear to be particularly vulnerable in any important respect. 
This planning must be a combined strategic-legal-diplomatic 
effort of all branches of government concerned. 

VJhen the kind and degree of action required to respond to 
a violation has been determined, preferably by prior contingency 
planning, it is essential to implement such action with clear 
will and determination. 

Failure to respond to a violation could itself be considered 
a ^Wiolation by omission” and is an invitation to unilateral ab¬ 
rogation or modification of the treaty by a process of default 
and erosion. In the event of a violation that cannot be cor¬ 
rected by prompt and adequate response, and if continuance of the 
treaty seems more desirable than unilateral termination by the 
injured party, then consideration should be given to early re¬ 
negotiation or--if this is not feasible or desirable--to recip¬ 
rocal nonobservance.* 

As in the case of treaty planning and negotiation, the 
closest possible interdepartmental and interagency coordination 
is essential in responding to treaty violations. The require¬ 
ment for intelligence and policy-making coordination is perhaps 
even more vital. 

In multilateral responses to violations, there must be 
specific agreement at the outset among the various parties, not 
only as to the measures to be taken and the timing of the meas¬ 
ures, but also as to the joint resolve with which they will 
press the responses. Patience, determination, and community of 
purpose are essential to successful multilateral responses. 

To be adequate, a response should be tailored to the of¬ 
fender as well as to the offense. Nations relying heavily on 
foreign trade are particularly sensitive to nonmilitary 


*See p. 22, supra. 


131 









sanctions (though, as noted belov;, there are serious limitations 
in the effectiveness of such sanctions). Democratic states are 
more sensitive than dictatorships to the pressures of diplomacy 
and public opinion. The self-contained power possessing a con¬ 
trolled press can usually ignore the opinion of other states. 

Actual or anticipated disapprobation by v;orld public opin¬ 
ion or by the international community may deter a treaty viola¬ 
tion; it will almost never correct a breach once committed. In 
particular, widespread international disapproval will seldom, if 
ever, alienate the people of a violating nation from their gov¬ 
ernment; more often than not the reverse will occur, and the 
people of the offending nation will rally behind their government. 

Leadership should not wait for public opinion to coalesce 
in support of an intended response to a violation. In general, 
public opinion will be apathetic or will follow and endorse the 
action of strong leadership. In those instances in which the 
nation’s security interests are clearly and obviously threatened, 
on the other hand, leadership is likely to be faced with popular 
demands for hasty and ill-considered responses. 


Limitations on the Variety and Scope of Responses 


Responses to violations of important security-suffused 
treaties, such as arms control agreements, must of necessity be 
based primarily on national security and strategic considera¬ 
tions, which transcend, without displacing, legal principles 
and concepts of sanctions primarily as lav;-enforcing devices. 

To be effective, all sanctions—and particularly nonmili¬ 
tary sanctions--must be both enforceable and enforced. Without 
unanimity and coordination of responses, divergent national poli 
tical and economic interests V7ill almost certainly result in 
diffused and inadequate efforts. 

Collective responses by the international community will 
almost invariably be limited to measures expressly or tacitly 
believed to be acceptable to the sanctioned state without pro¬ 
voking it to further breaches or to escalation in a more wide¬ 
spread military reaction. 

VJithout adequate verification of a violation, collective 
responses (in particular) are likely to be halfhearted and inef¬ 
fective. The best possible verification of an ambiguous viola¬ 
tion is through clear and unimpeachable photographic evidence. 


132 



Nonmilitary sanctions, whether applied by several nations 
collectively or by one individually, v;ill rarely be effective 
responses to treaty violations, save perhaps when imposed against 
relatively V7eak states. They are almost certain to fail against 
major, self-contained powers, although they may be useful in con¬ 
junction V7ith military measures. The imposition of stringent 
nonmilitary sanctions is both dangerous and provocative, unless 
supported directly or indirectly by an adequate base of force. 

Responses to treaty violation V7ill, to a substantial degree, 
be shaped by the particular facts and circumstances of the 
breach and attendant factors, especially the comparative strength 
and capabilities of the parties, and also physical and economic 
considerations, dependability of allies, moral and psychological 
considerations, and the like. 

Although a major power may under certain circumstances uni¬ 
laterally employ limited force as a response against a violation 
by another major pov/er, it must carefully evaluate the possi¬ 
bilities of escalation. 

Strong and forceful sanctions applied against another power 
to correct a violation which that power has undertaken within 
its own sphere of influence are dangerous and provocative. A 
nation may, hov7ever, impose relatively strong corrective sanc¬ 
tions against another with less risk of provoking further reac¬ 
tion when the violation has clearly taken place within the 
sphere of influence of the injured party. 

Further discoveries and developments in nuclear weapons may 
provide lesser pov7ers with sufficient military capabilities to 
permit them considerable freedom of action in violation of trea¬ 
ties because of a retaliatory capability V7hich ivill inhibit in¬ 
dividual or collective responses. 


Conditions Affecting Arms Control Arising 


from Communist Behavior 


The possibly temporary existence of an atmosphere of detente 
must not lead to laxness or forgetfulness regarding the episodic 
nature of the ”two-camps^^ conflict since 1917, or to accept pre¬ 
maturely any thought of a substantial lessening of the basically 
hostile objectives of Communist ideology. 


133 




In dealing with Communist states, either in negotiation of 
treaties or in incidents arising from treaty breaches, it is 
essential to start v;ith the assumption that Communist repre¬ 
sentatives will have as their principal objectives the further¬ 
ance of the aims of international world communism, except when 
these aims may be tempered or modified by clear national inter¬ 
est. Similarly, it is essential to assume that on ideological 
grounds they will be suspicious of the motives of non-Communist 
representatives; no personal relationships and no painstaking 
efforts to build up individual or group good will can ever fully, 
or permanently, eliminate such suspicions. 

For the past tv;o decades the Communist states have given 
every indication that they will avoid clear and blatant viola¬ 
tions of agreements that are written, formal, and very specific 
in terminology. They have also shown v/ithout question that they 
will exploit all loopholes in formal or informal agreements 
which result from ambiguity, incompleteness, or lack of preci¬ 
sion in v;ording, v;hen such exploitation is in their national or 
international ideological interest. They have also shown that 
they v;ill have no compunction in violating the terms of less 
formal agreements, although they prefer to do this either in¬ 
directly or covertly. They will also exploit any lack of 
knowledge, or faulty understanding, of the precise terms of a 
previous treaty or agreement, when they detect this in a non- 
Communist representative. 

Thus the normal requirements for careful preparation of 
negotiating positions and objectives and for precision in the 
wording of treaty terms are doubly important in negotiation 
with Communist states. In addition to the normal analytic and 
gaming processes suggestea in an earlier section of this chap¬ 
ter, all drafts of treaties with Communist states should be 
submitted to the most exacting review by logically minded ana¬ 
lysts who have had previous personal experience of this kind of 
semantic exercise with Communists. Such scrutiny should par¬ 
ticularly consider the possibility of a Communist motive of 

entrapment. 

% 

The concepts of truth, logic, and precedent can be of 
little or no concern to Communists in their approach to treaty 
negotiation and compliance, if these are not consistent with 
their national or ideological objectives. When it is to their 
interests, they v;ill counter these concepts by deceit, by false 
propaganda, and by citing different (and often distorted or ir¬ 
relevant) precedents. 


134 


It can be expected that Communist states will invariably 
attempt to subvert neutral enforcement or inspection agencies 
in disputed treaty situations. No such neutral group has been 
acceptable to them unless it includes Communist representation. 
Thus some other enforcement mechanism should be employed v;hen 
a Communist state is a party to a treaty. 

It is unlikely that a treaty violation can be corrected 
satisfactorily through establishment or support of a coalition 
government which includes Communists. The Communist government 
officials V7ill invariably work either to take over the govern¬ 
ment completely or to immobilize it. 

In negotiations with Communists, it is generally desirable 
to deal in terms of clearly understandable major compromises on 
a tough quid pro quo basis. 


135 



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4. 


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4 











Chapter 12 


THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE 


Exploration Toward New Arms Control 

Concepts and Programs 


In the preceding chapter we have suggested that the prin¬ 
cipal findings of this review and analysis of historical ex¬ 
perience can be summed up into four major categories: mistakes 
to be avoided in preparing for and negotiating treaties; mis¬ 
takes to avoid in treaty enforcement; limitations on the variety 
of responses to treaty violations; and the conditions created by 
Communist behavior affecting arms control. Significant as these 
findings are^ they are essentially negative in nature. Avoid¬ 
ance of mistakes, or pitfalls, as Santayana has suggested, is an 
important contribution of history. Another value of history, 
however, is the projection forward of clear-cut trends which can 
be historically supported, and Vv;hich can open major vistas for 
the future. Yet clear-cut historical trends, particularly ap¬ 
plicable to this relatively new field of arms control, are at 
first hard to discern. 

This, however, has alv7ays been true in the evolution of all 
new fields of international relations. The United States began 
to learn to wage modern economic warfare, for instance, during 
World War I, largely by avoiding past mistakes. Through this 
and practical experience in l7orld War II v;e learned how to mobi¬ 
lize the full economic power of a nation and developed such 
tactics as pre-emptive buying and the broad-gauged attack on an 
enemy^s economic resources. This process of learning by trial 
and error has been even more true, perhaps, in such fields as 
counterinsurgency and long-range propaganda. Even after nearly 
a generation of experience we have not yet completely solved 
these problems--partly because the learning process did not give 
sufficient attention to historical experience and partly because 
we have been slow in attacking these problems. Nevertheless, 
it is relevant to note that after these topics became important 
aspects of foreign policy, more perceptive vision for the future 
did follow fairly closely after recognition of the parameters 
and special conditions affecting the new areas and of the painful 
mistakes of current experiences. 





It is equally true in arms control that it is as much the 
duty of the research scholar to suggest future avenues of approach 
as it is to point out the limitations which exist and specific 
mistakes to be avoided. It is to the development of positive new 
avenues of approach, therefore, that V7e now turn. 

Viewed historically, and by comparison with other high- 
priority international problems, the understanding of arms con¬ 
trol and of the machinery of international stabilization on v;hich 
any arms control program must rest may now be reaching the point 
where it should be making increasingly significant analytic and 
(where possible) programmatic contributions to the development 
of foreign and national security policy. Programmatic contribu¬ 
tions are dependent, however, upon dynamic, realistic forward 
thinking on the part of those responsible for taking the lead in 
arms control concepts. This, of course, is easier said than done. 
Nevertheless, the historical experience and the analyses contained 
in the annexes of this report include bases for more positive 
suggestions than merely negative advice about avoiding mistakes, 
noting limitations, and being aware of nev; conditions. There 
emerge at least seven areas which should be explored boldly for 
their arms control, strategic, and national policy implications. 

Vie suggest that each of these areas could become a topic for 
fruitful research and study. 


Nev; Motives for a Nev; Approach 

to World Order 


We must focus our attention on the motives which will move 
the United States, our allies, the underdeveloped countries, the 
neutrals, and the Communists toward that kind of orderly world 
for v;hich the United States is exerting a major effort in its 
international policies. Vie have noted the importance of fear as 
such a motive, and in the past this has been the principal one. 

But the experiences of the Congress of Vienna and of the Treaty 
of Versailles--and more recently, perhaps, of NATO—prove that 
fear is not only negative, but that it tends to be dulled or to 
v;ear off with the passage of time. It would appear, therefore, 
that a more positive approach is needed to the problems of v;orld 
order and of arms control to supplement--and if possible supplant-- 
the fears v;hich have heretofore been the main, but transitory, 
motivating forces in collective security and in arms races. From 
a study of this topic should emerge a more positive US approach 
to problems of v;orld order and of arms control. 


138 




Status and International 

Recognition 


At various points in annexes to this report we have noted 
that international recognition seems to be a powerful factor in 
tne search of new nations for status and in moderating the course 
of violent revolutionaries in still-emerging nations. Status 
is particularly important to the elites which these nev; nations 
must develop if they are to remain viable. Further exploration 
along these lines is relevant to arms control because it is a 
subject of significance to the kind of stable v;orld order which 
is a prerequisite for effective arms control. A study along 
these lines should be coordinated with that suggested below. 


Public Opinion and the Evolution 

of World Order 


It has been suggested in an earlier chapter of this report 
that there is an urgent need for some kind of responsible, and 
acceptable, organization that can coordinate and direct research 
leading toward a bridging of the existing public opinion gap in 
the United States, and v^hich can--v7ithout the taint of official 
propaganda--disseminate information in a soundly planned program 
of public education. Such an organization would, in particular, 
prove invaluable in interpreting arms control concepts and pro¬ 
posals. Almost equally important is research directed toward 
bridging the far greater public opinion gaps which exist else¬ 
where in the world and utilizing the results of this research 
in further efforts toward the evolution of an orderly world com¬ 
munity. Key questions which will need to be answered are: Can 
such an organization be established? What should be its composi¬ 
tion? Under what auspices should it operate? What would be the 
areas of its research and related activities? 


The Role of Elites in an 

Ordered Society 


Emerging from this study is an implicit suggestion that we 
need to ascertain attitudes of the industrial-scientific- 
administrative-military elites--on both sides of the ideological 
curtains--whose wholehearted participation may be essential to 
the evolution of the kind of ordered society represented thus 
far only by the United States and some of its allies. A study 
of this subject would investigate v;hat the implications of these 
attitudes are toward the short-term future, and toward possi¬ 
bilities of an emerging system of v;orld order. One question 


139 








for investigation is whether such elites pose internal threats 
to an ordered society, as has been suggested by former President 
Eisenhower. A related question is whether the rise^of.a modestly 
prosperous managerial class in Communist countries is resulting 
in a diminution of ideological-revolutionary ardor. 


The Prospects for International 

Economic Order 


Any technically advanced, productive economy depends on the 
creation of international economic order, because the scientific 
and industrial revolutions cannot proceed v7ithout markets wide 
enough, stable enough, and wealthy enough to absorb the output 
of mass production. Furthermore, such order depends on access 
to a wide range of techniques, goods, and capital. We perhaps 
sav; this dimly and naively in the 1920s, but turned our backs to 
it then. Now the West has again developed a powerful, advanced, 
productive economy. The Soviet Union is discovering that future 
progress in this direction is dependent on responsible trade. 

It is still hard to visualize the implications of this evolution. 
For instance, is there any special significance in the extraor¬ 
dinarily rapid consumption of rav; materials in highly developed 
economies? Does this mean that autarchy is less possible in the 
near future? A study of this topic would not only explore such 
questions, it would endeavor to provide suggestions as to how 
American policy objectives of v;orld order can be facilitated 
through understanding and exploitation of the grov;ing economic 
interdependence of all nations. 


Economic Pressures on Outlaw 
Nations 


In thus considering the future prospects for international 
economic order, one particular ramification appears worthy of 
special attention, and perhaps independent study development. 
Just as the Soviet Union may have in part responded to a need 
for Western goods by encouraging an atmosphere of detente, so 
may similar pressures yield comparable results with nations such 
as the Chinese People^s Republic and Indonesia, V7hich currently 
ignore the normal V7ays of the international world. Such pres¬ 
sures can, of course, as they have with other nations in past 
history, drive these outlaws to further violence and aggression. 
But if the violence can be deterred or contained, the only other 
alternative for these nations V70uld appear to be to learn hov7 
to live up to international obligations. This thought, and its 
relevance to arms control, deserves more serious attention than 
it has received. 


140 






Arms Control and a ’^Total" Effort 
Toward World Order ““ 


We have learned much in this century about waging total V7ar 
in terms or a new strategic concept transcending mere deployment 
or armies: by effectively using all weapons--political, mili- 
tary intellectual, economic, and propaganda--for the deliberate 
end of destroying our enemies^ capability to v;age war. This 
same kind of combination can be effectively used to secure world 
order if, as in World War II, we coordinate these instruments 
at the top, and if the various agencies of the government under¬ 
stand their respective roles in the over-all effort. Unquestion¬ 
ably arms control is a valid new instrument of US national policy 
in such an effort, taking its place with the political and 
military-strategic instruments to which it is so intimately re¬ 
lated. A study of this topic could be expected to indicate ways 
in which high-level and intelligent interagency coordination 
could assure proper employment of all of the resources of the 
West in an effort toward achieving international order. 


A Program of Prudence 


In our search for new vistas we must be careful not to lose 
sight of the largely negative--but important--!indings which have 
emerged from this analysis of recent treaty experience and v;hich 
were summarized in Chapter 11. These findings shov; clearly that 
the United States may never be able to embark on a bold explora¬ 
tion of the future if we are unable to solve--or at least better 
understand--a number of basic, current problems. Accordingly, 
it seems essential to investigate further some of the serious 
obstacles to the objective of world order, and the arms control 
route toward achieving such order. Further, some of Study 
^^Riposte^s^^ earlier findings need to be elaborated and additional 
historical investigation is required in some areas which it 
could not probe in depth. Thus V7e suggest seven additional 
topics for research and analysis, which need not necessarily 
precede the studies suggested earlier, but v;hich will be essen¬ 
tial elements of a balanced long-range arms control research 
program. 


Viability of Arms Control in a 
VJorld of Protracted Conflict 

Our efforts to find new and better ways toward world order 
should not obscure the fact that man has dreamed of Utopia for 


141 











centuries 5 and that it may not be achievable for centuries more. 
Thus V 7 e must face up to the possibility that arms control agree¬ 
ments may not be able to survive in a world of defined protracted 
conflict. Not only must this question be examined in the most 
searching possible manner, but the long-term implications of the 
possibility must be analyzed as objectively and as thoroughly as 
the more hopeful possibilities suggested above. The study v;ould 
include a systematic analysis of the strategic implications of 
specific arms control proposals, with particular attention to the 
possibility that such proposals could conceivably v;eaken the US 
deterrent posture by creating opportunities for strategic sur¬ 
prise by potential foes. It would evaluate possible counter¬ 
measures that might be necessary--within the terms of such pro- 
po$als--to guard against such risks. It would assure an essen¬ 
tial union of the study of arms control v;ith study of basic US 
strategy. 


Treat ies a n d Nonsiqnatories 

Related to the broad question of the viability of arms con¬ 
trol is that of nations remaining outside the fold and hence 
not even technically bound by the treaty. Tvjo recent modern 
treaties have recognized this problem; both the UN Charter and 
the Antarctic Treaty have provisions empowering the signatories 
to take whatever action is necessary to assure compliance of non¬ 
signatories. But this does not solve the problem, which is in¬ 
herent in any self-policed, decentralized system. Since no na¬ 
tion can afford to give up substantial advantages without un¬ 
challengeable assurances of external assistance (which do not 
exist) , even relatively ^^mild" treaties in security-suffused 
fields, such as the partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of 1963, 
can do no more than freeze the status quo . This may be very 
valuable to the world in general but in fact serves to freeze 
the superiority of the ”haves^^ as well. The ’^have-nots^' have 
been quick to point this out. France, for example, has insisted 
that a test ban, v;ithout a total elimination of nuclear devices 
at the same time, is not possible for a ’^have-not” V7ith expecta¬ 
tions of greatness. Hov; can France and Communist China (as soon 
as it is able), and eventually others, accept as binding a-.rule 
which seems to assure their permament military inferiority and 
permanent inability to react in similar fashion to a nuclear 
attack on them? The problem may be insoluble, but it must be 
examined and re-examined, and its implications must be fully 
clarified. 


■ 142 





Organization for Treaty 

Negotiations 


A study should be directed tov;ard specific suggestions in 
organization and procedures to prepare for, and to support, 
actual arms control treaty negotiations. As a minimum, the six 
requirements^in preparation for negotiations, listed earlier in 
this report,should be met automatically as a matter of course. 
But there should be further, detailed research in historical 
patterns of negotiation. Results of such a study v;ould include: 
suggestions for the actual coordination of strategy, foreign 
policy, and arms control aims among the government departments 
and agencies concerned; evaluation of the possibilities of gaming 
the potential ramifications of different versions of treaty 
drafts before and during negotiations; assessment of the possible 
use of various research organizations, in and out of Government, 
in supporting US treaty negotiators, and also in contributing 
to support of relevant gaming activities. 


Provision for Peaceful 

Treaty Changes 


There is need for further attention to the concept of 
peaceful change of treaties and agreements. A study of this 
subject would endeavor to provide positive suggestions in both 
policy and technique. It v;ould devote considerable attention 
to the technical language of diplomacy and to verbal formulae 
by v;hich such changes could be accomplished. It would suggest 
ways in which nonproductive, or counterproductive, clauses and 
concepts can be identified and avoided in the drafting of 
treaties, and can be modified as required in the revision 
process. 


Investigation of Nev; Treaty 

Forms and Concepts 


There has been much in Study "Riposte^- to suggest that 
treaties are not essentially enforceable, and thus that the 
customary treaty instruments may not be suitable vehicles for 
the arms control route to world order. It is beyond the scope 
of this study to suggest what can be done to devise new treaty 
forms and concepts to replace the ones that have been relatively 
unsatisfactory in the past. Possibly, as has been suggested 


* See pp. 129-30. 


143 










elsewhere in this report and its annexes, treaties between sov¬ 
ereign powers can never be sufficiently reliable for a nation 
to abandon, or even severely limit, its capabilities for protect¬ 
ing all of its vital interests. We see no reason, hov;ever, to 
becloud the future of arms control by tying it to existing, un¬ 
satisfactory forms of treaties. Possibly adequate machinery 
providing for peaceful change, as suggested above, may permit 
long strides tovjard v;orld order through arms limitations. In 
addition, however, vie believe that a thorough, uninhibited inves¬ 
tigation should be made of the possibility of making radical 
improvements in the art of treaty-making. In a dynamic world, 
stability can be achieved only through constant experimentation 
and modification. 


Totalitarian Reactions to Democratic 

Armaments Policies 


We believe that the 20th-Century experience, which V7e have 
evaluated in Study ^'Riposte,^^ can provide still more useful 
v;isdom for arms control policy-makers if subjected to further 
diversified review, incerpretation, and analysis. In particular, 
vie suggest an evaluation of this experience by focusing on the 
reactions of totalitarian regimes to specific armaments policies 
of democratic powers in the past half-century. This study would 
be based as much as possible upon examination of Russian, Chinese, 
Japanese, German, and Italian source material. 


Relationship of Intelligence to 

Policy-Making 


It is evident from our research that there has not alv;ays 
been adequate coordination in the US Government between the 
gatherers and appraisers of intelligence, on the one hand, and 
policy-makers, on the other. This seems to have been true not 
only in preparation for treaty negotiations, but also in re¬ 
sponses to violations. VJe are av;are that the Hoover Commission, 
and others, have looked into this matter, and that there have 
been many improvements in these respects over the past decade. 
Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the problem has not 
completely disappeared. It is not clear to what extent this 
problem in the past has reflected lapses in interagency coopera¬ 
tion, and how much may be due to inadequacies of coordination 
v;ithin departments and agencies. It v/ould appear likely that 
there has been some of both. In any event, a highly classified 
survey by impartial and qualified individuals will be a great 
contribution to US preparation for future treaty negotiations 


144 






and to our capability for enforcing such treaties and responding 
to violations. 


Envoi 


HEROES comprehensive historical surveys and analyses in 
Study "Riposte’' I'lave had two major results. First, through dis¬ 
tillation of historical experience, vie have provided arms con¬ 
trol specialists with guidance v/hich should prove valuable in 
planning and conducting future arms control negotiations and 
in enforcing arms control agreements. Second, v;hile suggesting 
a bold and imaginative research program to investigate several 
ways in v;hich arms control may help the United States achieve 
its objective of a stable world order, vie have stressed the 
need for prudent examination of some major obstacles still 
blocking the approach to that goal. 

We recognize that this suggested research program is an 
exceedingly ambitious one, possibly exceeding the capability or 
interests of any one research organization, or even any single 
government agency. We urge the US Arms Control and Disarmament 
Agency, however, to initiate action along these lines, possibly 
in collaboration V7ith other interested government departments 
and agencies. HERO stands ready to participate in such a pro¬ 
gram to the extent its resources v;ill permit. 


145 









1648 

1814 

1815 

1839 

1856 

1874 

1878 

1879 

1896 

1899 

1907 

1914 

1917 


Appendix A 


CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 


October 24 

Treaties of Westphalia, including 
Treaty of Munster 

September- 
June 1815 

Congress of Vienna 

June 9 

September 26 

Act of the Congress of Vienna 
Proclamation of the Holy Alliance 

April 19 

Belgian independence and neutrality 
guaranteed collectively by the 
major powers 

March 30 

Treaty of Paris ended Crimean War 

September 

Universal Postal Union established 

March 3 

Treaty of San Stefano settled con¬ 
flict between Russia and Turkey 

October 7 

Dual Alliance between Germany and 
Austria established 

March 1 

Italian force annihilated at 

Adowa in Ethiopia 

May 18-July 29 

First Hague Peace Conference 

June 15- 
October 18 

Second Hague Peace Conference 

June 28 

Assassination of Archduke Franz 

July 28 

Ferdinand at Sarajevo 
Austria-Hungary declared war on 
Serbia 

August 4 

President Wilson proclaimed 

American neutrality 

February 1 

Germany initiated unrestricted 
submarine warfare 

April 6 

November 

US Congress declared war on Germany 
Bolshevik Revolution in Russia 



1917 


1918 


1919 


1919 

1920 


1921 


December 15 

January 8 

March 3 
November 11 

June 28 
September 10 

November 27 


1920 

January 10 
March 19 
April 6-May 17 

May 31 

June 4 

August 20 

October 9 
March 8 


August 24-25 


Armistice concluded between Ger¬ 
many and Russia 

President Wilson outlined Fourteen 
Points for settlement with 
Germany 

Bolshevik Russia signed the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk with Germany 

Germany signed Armistice to end 
World War I 

Treaty of Versailles signed, im¬ 
posing peace terms on Germany 

Treaty of St. Germain signed by 
Austria; dismemberment of 
Hapsburg Empire 

Treaty of Neuilly signed by Bul-^ 
garia, in settlement of World 
War I 

Russo-Polish War 

Official birth of the League of 
Nations 

Invasion of Ruhr by German troops 
after Sparticist revolt 

French troops occupied Frankfurt 
am Main and Darmstadt in response 
to German invasion of Ruhr 

Persia requested League to con¬ 
sider acts of aggression by 
Soviet Russia on Persian 
territory 

Treaty of Trianon signed by 

Hungary in settlement of World 
War I 

Treaty of Sevres signed by Turkish 
Sultan in settlement of World 
War I 

Poles seized Vilna from Lithuania 

French troops occupied Dusseldorf, 
Duisburg and Ruhrort because of 
Germany’s failure to complete 
reparations payments and 
disarmament 

US signed peace treaties with 
Germany and Austria 


148 


1921 


1921 


1922 

1923 


1924 

1925 


September- League of Nations investigations of 
November Yugoslav violation of Albanian 

frontier 


1922 November 12- 
February 6 


Washington Conference on naval 

limitations attended by the United 
States, Great Britain, France, 
Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, China, 
Japan, and Portugal resulted in 
Naval Limitation Treaty, (Feb. 6), 
Four Power Treaty signed by the 
United States, Great Britain, 

France, and Japan (Dec.. 13) and Nine 
Power Treaty signed by all partici¬ 
pants (Feb. 6). 


April 16 


Rapallo Treaty of alliance between 
Germany and Russia 


January 11 


March 25- 
May 3 
July 24 


August 29 
September 27 


Belgian and French troops occupied 
the Ruhr after Germany declared in 
default on coal and lumber payments 
Fifth International Conference of 
American States, Santiago, Chile 
Treaty of Lausanne, final settlement 
of World VJar I signed by Allies and 
Turkey 

Corfu Incident. Italians occupied 
Corfu 

Italians withdrev; from Corfu under 
pressure from England and the 
League of Nations 


April 9 The Dav;es Plan for Payment of German 

reparations 

August 6 Turkey appealed to League over dis¬ 

pute with Great Britain over the 
border of Iraq 


October 16 Locarno Treaties signed, including 

Treaty of Mutual Guarantee signed 
by Great Britain, Belgium, France, 
Germany, and Italy, various arbitra¬ 
tion treaties between Germany and 
other states, and Franco-Polish and 
Franco-Czechoslovakian treaties for 
mutual assistance in case of attack 
by Germany 


149 


1925 

1926 

1927 


1928 


1929 

1930 


1931 


October 21 
September 8 


January 31 

June 20- 
August 4 


January 16- 
February 20 
August 27 

December 


July 24 


January 21- 
April 22 


March 21 
September 
September 18 
October 17 


Greek invasion of Bulgaria 

Germany admitted to League of 
Nations 

End of Inter-Allied Commission of 
Military Control in Germany 

Naval conference at Geneva attended 
by Great Britain, the United 
States, and Japan 

Sixth International Conference of 
American States, Havana, Cuba 

Pact of Paris (Kellogg-Briand Pact) 
signed 

Conflict between Paraguay and 

Bolivia over Chaco Boreal brought 
to Leaguers attention 

Kellogg-Briand Pact declared in 
effect 

London Naval Conference; Great 
Britain, the United States, 

France, Italy, and Japan reached 
agreement on some limitations on 
naval construction 

Proclamation of German-Austrian 
customs union 

Customs union renounced after strong 
protests from other states 

Japanese aggression in Manchuria 
started 

League invoked Kellogg-Briand Pact 
over Manchurian incident 


1932 


January 7 


January 28- 
March 4 
February- 
June 1934 
March 11 


Announcement by US Government of 
Stimson Doctrine of nonrecogni¬ 
tion as Japanese completed oc¬ 
cupation of Manchuria 

Japanese attack on Shanghai 

World Disarmament Conference at 
Geneva 

Assembly of League of Nations 
voted not to recognize Japanese- 
supported government in Manchuria 


150 



1933 


1934 


1935 


February 24 


May 10 
May 27 

October 23 
December 3-26 

March 24 

May 19 

November 24 

December 5 
December 29 

March 9 
March 16 
June 18 

October 3 
October 5 

October 7 
October 11 


League Assembly voted that Japan^s 
activities in Manchuria were in 
violation of the Charter and 
that Manchukuo would not be 
recognized 

Paraguay declared state of v;ar 
v;ith Bolivia over the Chaco 
Japan announced intention to with¬ 
draw from the League, effective 
in two years 

Germany withdrew from League of 
Nations 

Seventh International Conference 
of American States, Montevideo, 
Uruguay 

Tydings-McDuffie Act adopted, 
promising independence to the 
Philippines in 12 years 
League Council appealed to all 
arms-producing nations for an 
embargo on exports of war 
materials to Bolivia and Paraguay 
League Assembly adopted proposal 
for treaty of peace in Chaco 
war. Embargoes thereafter lifted 
Incident between Italian and 
Ethiopian forces at VJalWal 
Japan denounced Washington Treaty 
of 1922 and London Treaty of 1930 

Hitler announced establishment of 
German Air Force 
Compulsory military service 
initiated in Germany 
Anglo-German Naval Treaty signed, 
permitting German naval con¬ 
struction up to 35% of British 
strength 

Italian invasion of Ethiopia 
Arms embargo against Italy and 
Ethiopia declared by President 
Roosevelt 

League Council branded Italy an 
aggressor 

League vote of sanctions against 
I ta ly 


151 


1935 


193G 


1937 


1938 


1939 


December 


March 7 
March 25 


May 5 
July 17 
July 15 

October 25 
November 25 

December 1-23 


July 

November 


March 12 
March 13 
July 

September 29 


December 9-27 


March 10-16 

April 7 * 
August 23 
August 31 

September 1 

September 3 

September 23- 
October 3 


Second London Naval Conference on 
Disarmament 5 with France, Italy, 
Great Britain, the United States, 
and Japan participating 

German troops reoccupied the Rhine¬ 
land 

London Naval Agreement signed by 
England, France, and the United 
States 

Italian forces entered Addis Ababa 
Outbreak of Civil Vlar in Spain 
Termination date for sanctions 
against Italy 

Rome^'Berlin Axis established 
German-Japanese and Italian- 
Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact 
Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Peace, Buenos 
Aires, Argentina 

Renewal of Sino-Japanese conflict 
Brussels Conference of 18 nations 
over Sino-Japanese conflict 

German armies occupied Austria 
German annexation of Austria 
Peace treaty between Paraguay and 
Bolivia signed, ending Chaco War 
Munich Conference; France and 
Britain agreed to German annexa¬ 
tion of Sudetenland 
Eighth International Conference of 
American States, Lima, Peru 

Annexation of remainder of Czech¬ 
oslovakia by Germany 
Italian invasion of Albania 
German-Soviet Pact 
Gleiwitz Incident; Germans fabri¬ 
cated Polish ’Violation^^ of frontier 
German troops crossed the Polish 
border 

Great Britain and France declared 
war on Germany 

First Meeting of the Foreign Minis¬ 
ters of the American Republics, 
Panama 


152 


1939 


1940 


1941 


November 30 
December 14 

April 9 
May 10 

May 10 

June 10 

June 

July 21-30 

September 3 
September 23 
September 27 


Russian army invaded Finland 
League Council voted expulsion 
of the Soviet Union 

German forces invaded Norv;ay 
German forces invaded Belgium, 
the Netherlands and Luxemburg 
Churchill became British Prime 
Minister 

Italy declared v;ar on France and 
Great Britain 

Soviets occuDied and took over 

A. 

governments of the Baltic States 
Second Meeting of the Foreign 
Ministers of the American 
Republics, Havana 
United States and Britain ar¬ 
ranged destroyer-bases deal 
Japanese began occupation of 
Indochina 

Germany, Italy, and Japan con¬ 
cluded a Three-Power Pact 


March 11 

April 13 
June 22 
July 21 

July 26 


August 14 


December 7 
December 8 

December 11 


US Congress passed the Lend- 
Lease Act 

Russo-Japanese Neutrality Treaty 
German armies invaded Russia 
Japanese occupied southern 
Indochina 

United States froze Japanese 

assets, thereby imposing virtual 
oil embargo 

Argentia Conference; Atlantic 
Charter announced by President 
Roosevelt and Prime Minister 
Churchill 

Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
United Kingdom and the United 
States declared war on Japan 
Germany and Italy declared war on 
the United States 


1942 


January 1 Declaration by United Nations, 

endorsing the Atlantic Charter, 
signed by 26 nations 

January 15-28 Third Meeting of the Foreign 

Ministers of the American Re¬ 
publics, Rio de Janeiro 


153 


1943 


1944 


1945 


January 14-28 


August 17-24 


September 9 
October 19- 
November 1 
October 30 
November 23-26 


November 28- 
December 1 


September 11-16 


September 12 
October 9 


February 4-12 


February 21- 
March 8 

March 8 

April 5 

April 9- 
June 25 
May 7-8 
June 26 


Casablanca Conference of President 
Roosevelt, Prime Minister Church¬ 
ill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff 
First Quebec Conference of President 
Roosevelt, Prime Minister Church¬ 
ill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff 
Surrender of Italy 

Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers 

Moscov; Declaration 
Cairo Conference of President 
Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang 
Kai-shek, Prime Minister Church¬ 
ill, and Combined Chiefs of Staff 
Tehran Conference of President 

Roosevelt, Prime Minister Church¬ 
ill, Marshal Stalin, arid Combined 
Chiefs of Staff 

Second Quebec Conference of Presi¬ 
dent Roosevelt, Prime Minister 
Churchill, and Combined Chiefs of 
Staff 

Protocol on Zones of Occupation in 
Germany signed in London 
Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for es¬ 
tablishment of a United Nations 
organization 

Yalta Conference of President 

Roosevelt, Prime Minister Church¬ 
ill, Marshal Stalin, and Combined 
Chiefs of Staff 
Inter-American Conference on 
Problems of VJar and Peace, 

Mexico City 

Act of Chapultepec strengthening 
the Inter-American System 
Soviet Union denounced nonaggression 
pact with Japan 

San Francisco Conference on Inter¬ 
national Organization 
German surrender at Reims and Berlin 
Charter of the United Nations 
signed by representatives of 50 
nations 


154 


1945 


July 16- 
August 2 

August 6 

August 8 

August 9 

August 10 
August 17 

September 2 
October 24 

1946 January 

January 10- 
February 14 
January 17 

January 19 
January 21 
January 24 

March 19 

April 5 

April 8-18 
April 8 

1947 February 10 


Potsdam Conference of 

President Truman, Marshal 
Stalin, Prime Ministers 
Churchill and Attlee, and 
Combined Chiefs of Staff 
Atomic bomb dropped on 
Hiroshima 

Russia declared war on Japan; 

invaded Manchuria 
Atomic bomb dropped on 
Nagasaki 

Japan offered to surrender 
Nationalists proclaimed in¬ 
dependent Republic of 
Indonesia 

Japanese surrender signed in 
Tokyo Bay 

UN Charter came into force 

United States established 
Atomic Energy Commission 
First session of UN General 
Assembly 

First meeting of the 
Security Council 
First dispute brought before 
Security Council. Presence 
of USSR troops in Iran 
Ukraine protested to Security 
Council the presence of 
British troops in Indonesia 
UN Atomic Energy Commission 
established by General 
Assembly 

Iranian government protested 
to the United Nations the 
continuing presence of 
Soviet troops in Persian 
Azerbaijan 

USSR agrees to withdraw 
troops from Iran 
League of Nations dissolved 
Poland took question of 
Spain to Security Council 

Allied Powers signed Peace 
Treaties with Italy, Ru¬ 
mania, Hungary, Bulgaria, 
and Finland 


155 


1947 


1948 


February 13 


March 12 

April 28- 
May 15 
June 5 


August 1 

August 15- 
September 2 

September 2 

October 21 


January 17 


March 30- 
May 2 
May 2 

May 15 


May 29 
June 24 
July 18 
December 18 

December 24 


Commission for Conventional Arma¬ 
ments established by Security 
Council 

Truman Doctrine of resistance to 
the spread of communism announced 
General Assembly special session 
on Palestine 

Announcement of Marshall Plan for 
aid to European countries recov¬ 
ering from World War II 
Security Council called for cease¬ 
fire between Dutch and Indonesians 
Inter-American Conference for the 
Maintenance of Continental Peace 
and Security, Rio de Janeiro 
Inter-American Treaty of Recipro¬ 
cal Assistance (Rio Treaty) signed 
General Assembly established 

Special Committee on the Balkans 
to investigate guerrilla warfare 
in Greece 

Truce agreement between Nether¬ 
lands and Indonesia signed on 
USS Renville 

Ninth International Conference of 
American States, Bogota, Colombia 
Charter of the Organization of 
American States signed 
Independent Israel established as 
British Mandate ended. Armies 
of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria 
and Transjordan invaded Israeli 
territory 

Security Council called for cease¬ 
fire in Palestine 
Establishment of Berlin Blockade 
by Soviets 

Arab-Israeli truce ends principal 
hostilities in Palestine 
Dutch renewed hostilities in 

Indonesia following breakdown in 
negotiations 

Security Council called for cease¬ 
fire in Indonesia 


156 



1949 


1950 


1951 


1952 


April 4 

May 5 
May 12 

June.20 

October 7 
November 18 
December 27 

May 27 


June 25 
July 7 
November 3 

February 1 

March 26- 
April 7 

May 18 

July 10 
September 8 

January 11 


North Atlantic Treaty for 
mutual defense signed in 
Washington 

Nev7 York Agreement to end Berlin 
Blockade announced 
Lifting of Berlin Blockade 
Basic Law of the German Federal 
Republic approved by the United 
States, Great Britain, and France 
Communique of Sixth Session of 
Council of Foreign Ministers 
concerning access to Berlin 
Constitution of German Democratic 
Republic promulgated 
UN Assembly called for arms em¬ 
bargo on Albania and Bulgaria 
Netherlands transferred sovereignty 
to Indonesia of all East Indies 
territory except New Guinea 

Tripartite Declaration by Great 
Britain, France, and the United 
States pledged resistance to 
frontier violations in the 
Middle East 

North Korean forces invaded South 
Korea 

Security Council set up United 
Nations Command in Korea 
Uniting for Peace Resolution 
adopted by UN General Assembly 

China declared by UN Assembly an 
aggressor in Korea 
Fourth Meeting of Consultation of 
, Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Washington, D. C. 

UN General Assembly recommended 
embargo against North Korea and 
Communist China 

Truce negotiation opened in Korea 
Peace Treaty with Japan signed by 
all non-Communist Allied nations 
of World War II 

Disarmament Commission to replace 
Atomic Energy Commission and Com¬ 
mission on Conventional Armaments 
established by General Assembly 


157 


1952 

November 1 

First hydrogen bomb exploded by the 


■■ 

United States 

1953 

July 27 

Korean Armistice signed 


December 8 

President Eisenhower^s Atoms-For- 
Peace address to the General 



Assembly 

1954 

May 8 

Geneva Conference on Indochina 
convened 


July 20-21 

Geneva Accords on Indochina 
adopted 


September 8 

Southeast Asia Collective Defense 
Treaty established SEATO 


March 1-28 

Tenth International Conference of 
American States, Caracas, Venezuela 


December 4 

General Assembly approved proposal 
to create International Atomic 
Energy Agency 

1955 

May 15 

Austrian State Treaty signed by 

Allied powers 

1956 

July 19 

United States withdrev; offer to 
help Egypt construct High Dam 
at Aswan 


July 26 

Nasser announced nationalization 
of Suez Canal 


August 16 

Conference of 22 nations on seizure 
of Suez Canal convened in London 


September 23 

Suez Canal seizure issue taken to 



United Nations by Britain and 

France 


October 26 

Statute for the International 

Acomic Energy Agency approved 


October 27 

French, British? and US delegations 



called for UN investigation of 



uprisings in Hungary 


October 29 

Israeli invasion of Egypt 


October 31 

British and French air forces at¬ 
tacked Egypt 


November 1 

Premier Nagy of Hungary appealed 
to the United Nations for help 
against invasion of Soviet troops 


November 4 

Premier Nagy of Hungary sought 

• 


asylum in Yugoslav Embassy as 
Communists again took over the 
government 


158 


1956 

November 5 

UN Emergency Force established 
by General Assembly to maintain 
peace in Egypt 

1957 

July 20 

Statute for the International 

Atomic Energy Agency came into 
force 


October 1 

First session of General Con¬ 
ference of IAEA 

1958- 


Conference on Discontinuance of 

1962 


Nuclear Weapons Tests at Geneva 

1959 

August 12-18 

Fifth Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Santiago, Chile 


October 15 

Antarctic Treaty Conference con¬ 
vened in Washington 


December 1 

Antarctic Treaty signed 

1960 

May 

U-2 crisis 


July 14 

Security Council authorized 
Secretary General to provide 
military and technical assistance 
in Congo. Beginning of ONUC 


August 22-29 

Seventh Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
San Jose, Costa Rica 

1961- 

1962 

May 16-July 23 

Geneva Conference on Laos 

1961 

June 3-5 

Kennedy-Khrushchev meeting in 

Vienna 


August 13 

Closing of border between East 
Berlin and West Berlin 


August 20 

Berlin Wall built 

1962 

January 22-31 

Eighth Meeting of Consultation of 
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, 
Punta del Este, Uruguay 


October 

Russian missile crisis in Cuba 


November 6 

UN General Assembly called on 
members to impose economic 


sanctions and break off diplo¬ 
matic relations with South Africa 


159 


1963 


April 28- 
August 

June 20 

July 25 
July 26 
August 7 


Dispute between Dominican Republic 
and Haiti over aid given by for¬ 
mer to Haitian exiles 
United States and USSR signed Memo¬ 
randum of Understanding Regarding 
the Establishment of a Direct 
Communications Link (Hot Line 
Agreement) 

Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
Initialed in Moscow 
UN Security Council requested arms 
embargo against Portugal 
UN Security Council called for 
arms embargo against South Africa 


160 


Appendix B 


METHODOLOGY OF THE ’^RIPOSTE^' STUDY 


^^Riposte” has been prepared by a nev 7 type of research organ¬ 
ization. It comprises a group of scholars (the Associates of 
HERO) currently university faculty members or regularly engaged 
in other scholarly pursuits, who possess a v;ide range of skills 
in history and closely allied social science fields and V7ho 
collaborate through a small Permanent Staff resident in Washington 

At the outset of this study, those members of the HERO Asso¬ 
ciate and Permanent Staffs who were to contribute papers, or 
otherwise to participate in the study, assembled in Washington 
in March 1963 for a two-day planning conference. This meeting 
V7as devoted to detailed discussions of the terms of reference 
and of the outline and suggested v;ork plan for ^^Riposte.” It 
helped to establish common understanding of USACDA^s requirements 
and of HEROES concept and v/ork plan for meeting those requirements 

Under the v;ork plan, individuals or groups of individuals 
were assigned responsibility for completing study papers in 
three broad areas: the rationale and theory of treaties and 
sanctions; the entire group of basic historical studies; and 
the comprehensive analysis of experience under treaties and 
agreements. As noted above, these individual study papers, 
after editing and revision, have become the annexes of this re¬ 
port. (The final element of the terms of reference--applicability 
of the experience to current and future treaty and arms control 
issues--is dealt V7ith exclusively in the report proper.) 

In early September 1963, v;hen the first drafts of the study 
papers were substantially complete, a four-day critical reviev; 
conference was held. At this meeting the entire group of con¬ 
tributing scholars made a general survey of ^'Riposte” in order 
to consider the relation of the papers to each other and to the 
terms of reference. Then, the authors who had prepared each of 
the papers in the three main study areas gathered in smaller 
groups for detailed critiques. This v;as designed to foster the 
integration of the separately prepared papers into the over-all 
ACDA-HERO task and to further critical examination of each paper 
by a selected group of peers. 



The form and content of the "Riposte” report, as distinct 
from its many supporting papers, emerged from this stock-taking. 
Additional research questions, problems of revision, and other 
questions relating to the individual papers emerging from the 
conference were to be handled by subsequent correspondence or 
discussion between authors and members of the Permanent Staff. 

The Permanent Staff then began to edit the study papers, 
v;ith additional input or revision contributed by the authors 
and the Permanent Staff in accordance with conference suggestions. 
J^nmultaneoijisly, , members of the Permanent Staff also began prep¬ 
aration of this summary report. On completion of the first 
draft of the report proper, it V7as circulated for comment among 
the contributing Associates to ensure consistency v;ith the sup¬ 
porting study papers and to permit constructive comments to 
improve the quality of the report. "Riposte" is thus the product 
of the carefully organized cooperation of a diversified group of 
scholars, v/orking in collaboration for a period of approximately 
one year. 


162 


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Watt, ”The Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935; an interim 

judgment,” Journal of Modern History , v.28, 1956, pp. 155-75 

Welk, W. G., ”League sanctions and foreign trade restrictions in 
Italy,” American Economic Review , v.l27, 1937, p. 96. 

Wigmore, John H., ”The case of Italy and Greece under inter¬ 
national law and the Pact of Nations,” Illinois Law Review , 
V.18, pp, 131-45. 

Wild, Payson, Jr. , ”V7hat is the trouble with international law?” 
American Political Science Review , v.32, no.3, June 1938, 
pp. 478-94. 


204 
























"Sanctions under the Covenant," British Year 
book of International Lavj . 1936, p. 130. --- 

’^®"°^>:'ition in inter- 


national lav;. Harvard Law Reviev; . v.48, 1934, pp. 776-94. 

Woolsey, L. H., "The non-recognition of the Chamorro government 

^, ' American Journal of International Law. v.20 
1926, pp. 543-4t -- 

Work of the United Nations Good Offices Committee on Indonesia 
Dept, of State Bulletin . v.l8, no.454, Mar. 14, 1948, po. 


Wright, Quincy, ^^Some legal aspects of the Berlin crisis, 
America n Journal of International L aw, v.55, 1961, pp 
959-65. “■ --— ’ 


PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 


United States 


Congress 

US Congress. Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. Hearing . . . 

on US policy toward the IAEA , August 2, 1962 (87th Congress 
2d session), Washington: GPO, 1962. 

_. Joint Economic Committee. Subcommittee on Foreign 

Economic Policy, Foreign economic policy . Hearings, Dec. 
4-14, 1961, Washington: GPO, 1962. 

_. _. _, A new look at trade policy toward the 

Communist bloc (prepared for the subcommittee by /Mr_J/ 
Pisar). 

US Senate. Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear v;eapons 
tests (86th Congress, 2d session), Washington: GPO, 1960. 

_, Disarmament and security: a collection of documents, 

1919-1955 (84th Congress, 2d session), VJashington: 1956. 

_, Limitation of armament , Senate doc. 126 (67th Congress, 

2d session), Washington: GPO, 1923. 



























US Senate. United Nations action on disarmament (86th Congress, 
2d session), Washington: GPO, 1960. 

_. Committee on Foreign Relations, The Antarctic treaty . 

Hearings . . . on Ex. B, 14 June 1960 (86th Congress, 2d 
session), Washington; GPO, 1960. 

_. _, A decade of American foreign policy; basic docu ¬ 
ments, 1941-49 . Senate doc. no. 123 (81st Congress, 1st 
session), Washington: GPO, 1950. 

_. _, The executive branch and disarmament policy . 

Staff study no. 1 (84th Congress, 2d session), Washington: 
GPO, 1956. 

, London Naval Treaty. Hearings, Washington: GPO, 

1936. 


_. _, Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency . 

Hearings , . . May 10, 14, 15, and 20, 1957 (85th Congress, 
1st session), Washington: GPO, 1957. 

_. _. Subcommittee on Disarmament, Control and reduc ¬ 
tion of armaments . Senate report no. 2501 (85th Congress, 

2d session), Washington: GPO, 1958. 

US House of Representatives. Committee on Foreign Affairs, Lend - 
lease bill . Hearings (77th Congress, 1st session), Wash¬ 
ington: GPO, 1941. 

_. _, World War II international agreements and under ¬ 
standings entered into during secret conferences concerning 
other peoples . Staff study (83d Congress, 2d session), 
Washington: GPO, 1953. 

_. Committee on Government Operations, US aid operations in 

Laos . Seventh report of the Committee. House report no. 

546 (86th Congress, 2d session), Washington: GPO, 1959. 

_. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Foreign 

commerce study; trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc . Hearings, 
May 5 and 6, 1960 (87th Congress, 2d session), Washington: 
GPO, 1960. 


Department of State 


Ball, George W., Viet Nam, free-world challenge in Southeast 
Asia , Washington: GPO, 1962. (Dept, of State pub. 7388) 


206 









































on reciprocal a ssistance and cooperat ion for the 
^ f ense of the na t ions of the Americas . signed ^hp 
second meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs of the 
American republics, Havana, July 21-30, 1940. (Dept, of 
State pub. 1575) 


Hotter, Harley A., Postwar foreign policy preparation. 1939-45. 
Washington: GPO, 1949^] (Dept, of State pub. 3580) 

US Dept, of State, Berlin--1961 . Washington: GPO, 1961. 

-; The conf erence on Antarctica . Washington: GPO, 1960. 

(Dept, of State pub. 7060) 


Cooperative war effort . Washington: GPO, 1942. 

Disar mament; the intensified effort, 1955- 58, Washington: 
GPO, 1958. (Dept, of State pub. 6676) 

.? Disarmament at a glance . Washington: GPO, 1950. (Dept, 
of State pub. 7058) 


.j Documents on disarmament^ 1945-1959 , 2 vols., Washington: 
GPO, 1960. (Dept, of State pub. 7008) 

.5 Foreign relations of the US--Diplomatic papers, 1941 , 

Washington: GPO, 1958. 

.3 Foreign relations of the US; conference of Berlin 

(Potsdam), 1945 , 2 vols. Washington: GPO, 1960. 

.3 Foreign relations of the US--the conferences at Cairo 

and Tehran , Washington: GPO, 1961. 

.3 Foreign relations of the US--the conferences at Malta 

and Yalta, 1945 , Washington: GPO, 1955. (Dept, of State 
pub. 6199) 


, Germany, 1947-49; the story in documents , Washington: 
GPO, 1950. 

5 International control of atomic energy: growth of a 
’policy, VJashington: GPO. (Dept, of State pub. 2702) 

5 Nazi-Soviet relations 1939-1941 . Documents from the 
archives of the German Foreign Office. Washington: GPO, 
1948. 


207 




































US Dept, of State 5 Official report of the US Delegation to the 
International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian 

Question . Submitted to the Secretary of State, Sept. 21, 

1962. (Mimeographed) 

_, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the US, 1933 , 

Washington: GPO. 

_, Papers relating to the foreign-relations of the US; Japan , 

1931-1941 , Washington: GPO, 1943. 

_, Papers relating to the foreign relations of the US; the 

Peace Conference, 1919 , 13 vols., Washington: GPO, 1942-47. 

_, Peace and v;ar; US foreign policy, 1931-1941 , Washington: 

GPO, 1943. (Dept, of State pub. 1983) 

_, The record on Korean unification, 1943-1960 , Washington: 

GPO, 1960. (Dept, of State pub. 7084) 

_, Ninth International Conference of American States. Report 

of the delegation of the United States , Washington: GPO, 

1948. (Dept, of State pub. 3263) 

_, Tenth Inter-American Conference. Report of the delegation 

of the United States , Washington: GPO, 1955. (Dept, of 
State pub. 5692) 

_, The situation in Laos , Washington: Dept, of State, 1959. 

_, The Soviet note on Berlin; an analysis , Washington: GPO, 

1959. (Dept, of State pub. 6759) 

_ 5 A threat to the peace , Washington: GPO, 1961. (Dept, of 

State pub. 7308) 

_, Toward the peace; documents , Washington: GPO, 1945. 

_, Treaties of peace v;ith Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania 

and Finland , Washington: GPO, 1947. 

_. Historical Office, Documents on disarmament, 1945-59 , 2 

vols., Washington: GPO, 1960. 

_. US Disarmament Administration, Geneva conference on the 

discontinuance of nuclear v;eapons tests; history and analysis 

of negotiations , Washington: GPO, 1961. (Dept, of State 
pub. 7258) 


208 
















































Other Departments & Agencies 

US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Brief chronology on US 
gecision to resu me nuclear v;eapon testing, with s ubsequent 
developments, Oct. 10, 1962. (Mimeographed) 

-> ^ world without war; a summary of US disarmament 

e^fQrts--past and present . Washington: GPO, 1962. 

-? ^ nu clear test ban treaty ? Washington: GPO, 1963. 

(USACDA pub. 15)-- 

US Dept, of Commerce, Export control , 37th quarterly report of 
the Secretary of Commerce to the President, the Senate, 
and House of Representatives, 3d quarter, 1956. 

US Foreign Operations Administration and International Coopera¬ 
tion , Semi-annual reports to Congress under 

the /Battle/ Act. 


Other Nations 


Germany 


Berlin. Magistral, Berlin im Neuaufbau: das erste Jahr, Berlin: 
1946. 

Berlin. Senat, Berlin: Kampf urn Freiheit und Selbstverwaltung 

1945-46 , Berlin: Spitzing, 1961. 

» 

Germany (Federal Republic), Bundesministerium fur Gesamtdeutsche 
Fraqen. Die Flucht aus der Sowjetzone und die Sperrmass - 

nahmen des Kommunistischen Regimes vom 13 August 1961 in 

Berlin , Bonn & Berlin: Bundesdruckerei, 1961. 

_. Press and Information Office, Facts about Germany , 3d 

ed., Wiesbaden: 1960. 

_. _, Germany reports , Wiesbaden: 1953. 

Materialien zur Entwaffnungsnote , Berlin: Reichsdruckerei, 

1925. 


.Italy 


Italy. Banca d’Italia, L^Economia Italiana, 1931-36 , 1938. 


209 


































Poland 


Polskie Sily Zbrojne v; Drugiej Wojnie Swiatowej (The Polish Armed 
Forces in World War II), by the Historical Committee of the 
Polish General Staff in London. 

Poland. Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Polish White Book , 
London: Hutchinson. 


USSR 

USSR. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Soviet Union and the 
Berlin question , Moscow: 1948. 

_. _, Stalinas correspondence with Churchill, Attlee , 

Roosevelt and Truman 1941-45, London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1958. 


United Kingdom 


Canada, Documents relating to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict , 1936. 

Great Britain^ Ethiopia no. 1 , British White Paper, 1935. 

(Command paper 5044) 

_, The disarmament question, 1945-56 , London: HMSO, 1957. 

_, Documents concerning the discussions between representa¬ 
tives of Her Majesty^s Government and the Government of the 
USSR held in London in April and May 1956 , London: HMSO, 
May 1956. (Command paper 9763), 

_, Documents relating to the discussion of Korea and Indo ¬ 
china at the Geneva Conference, April 29-June 15, 1954 , 
London: HMSO, 1954. (Command paper 9186) 

_, Further documents relating to the discussion of Korea 

and Indochina at the Geneva Conference, June 16-July 21, 

1954 , London: HMSO, 1954. (Command paper 9239) 

Laos, London: Central Office of Information, 1958. 

Woodward, Ernest L., British foreign policy in the Second VJorld 
War , London: HMSO, 1962. 


210 
































Woodward, Ernest L. and Butler, Rohan, 
British foreign oolicv. 1919-19'?9 

1946, - 


eds., Documents on 
, 2d series, v.l, London: 


International 


Antarctic Treaty Conference of 1959, Conference of Antarctica 

dpcuments_ 8 (revision 1) and 15 (revision 1) , Washington: 

3 5 • 

— del Tratado Interamericano de Asistencia Reciproca: 
1948-■ 1960 , Washington: Pan American Union, 1960. 

_? Suplemento, 1960-1961 , Washington: 1962. 

Applications of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assist ¬ 

ance, 1948-1956, Washington: Pan American Union, 1957. 

International Commission for Supervision and Control in Cambodia, 
Interim reports , lst-7th, London: HMSO, 1955-1959. (Note: 
1st and 2d reports are titled: Progress report ) 

International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, 
Interim reports , lst-4th, London: HMSO, 1955-1958. 

International Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, 
Interim reports , Ist-llth, London: HMSO, 1955-1961. 

International Military Tribunal, Trial of the major war criminals 
before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 

Nov. 1945-1 Oct. 1946 ., 42 vols., Nuremberg: 1947. 

League of Nations. International Blockade Committee, Reports 

and resolutions on the subject of Article 16 of the Covenant , 

Geneva: 1927. (League of Nations doc, A.14.1927.V) 

Plischke, Elmer, Berlin: development of its government and ad ¬ 
ministration , Office of the US High Commissioner for Germany, 
Bonn: 1952. 

United Nations. 1960 Seminar on the role of substantive criminal 
law in the protection of human rights and the purposes and 

legitimate limits of penal sanctions , 1960. 

, Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, Report , 

1957. (UN doc. A/3592) 


211 































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Index 


Abrogation, of treaties, 52. 
See also Reciprocal non- 
observance . 

Aid, economic, 26 
Airlift, Berlin, 50 
Albania, 42, 104 
Anglo-German Naval Treaty, 
1935, 33 

Antarctic Treaty, 1959, 21, 
57-58, 83 

Appeal, by international 
body, 24 

Arms control, 9-10, 73, 97, 
106-07, 123-26. See 
also Disarmament; Trea¬ 
ties, arms control. 

Atomic Energy Commission, 

UN, 47. See also Inter¬ 
national Atomic Energy 
Agency. 

Austria, 88, 103 
Austrian State Treaty, 

1955, 58-59, 84 
Azerbaijan, 42. See also 
Iran. 


Bay of Pigs, 94n 

Berlin, 49-51, 70-72, 98, 

104 

Blockade. See Berlin; Quar¬ 
antine; Sanctions, 
economic. 

Bolivia, 34-35 

Boundary problems, 88. See 
also Chaco War. 

Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 

85 

Bulgaria, 42 


Cambodia, 53, 55 
Caribbean area, 46 
Chaco War, 34-35 
Checkpoint Charlie, 50 
China, Communist, 43-44, 

55, 82, 97, 126 
Clay, Gen. Lucius D, 50 
Cold War, 121-23. See also 
United States, relations 
V7ith USSR. 

Collective enforcement of 
treaties, 17 

Collective security. See 
League of Nations, Organ 
ization of American 
States, United Nations. 
Communist behavior, 80-86, 
133-35. See also China, 
Communist; Union of 
Socialist Soviet 
Republics. 

Conciliation, 46 
Congo, the, 45 
Contingency planning, 108, 
131 

Cuba, 46 

missiles crisis, 66, 73, 
97, 104, 108, 122 
Customs union, German- 
Austrian, 89 
Czechoslovakia, 88 


Damages, 22 
Dav;es Plan, 32 
Depression, world economic, 
35, 40, 89 

Disarmament. See also Arms 
control. 

collective efforts, 9-10, 
38-40, 47-48, 123-26 
German, 32, 88, 89, 98-99 













Domestic problems. See In¬ 
ternal problems. 

Dual Alliance, 1879, 17 
Dominican Republic, 46 


East European satellites, 

70, 97, 99 

Economic sanctions. See 
Sanctions, economic. 

Eisenhower, Pres. Dwight D, 
73 

Elites, role of, 139-40 

Embargo, 25 

arms, 34, 43, 44, 46 
against China, 25 
East-West trade, 25 
against Japan, 37 

Enforcement of treaties, 47- 
48, 54, 83, 96, 119-23 

Entrapment and treaties, 85, 
134 

Ethiopia, 35-36 


Fact-finding measures, 46. 
See also Inspection, 
Observation. 

Fait accompli , 24, 67-74 
Financial sanctions. See 
Sanctions, economic. 
^Flying Tigers”, 37n 
Fortification of Pacific 
islands, 38, 39 
France 

interwar policies, 32, 35, 
39, 65, 89, 90, 104, 107 

policies since World V'/ar 
'll, 43, 44-45, 53, 142 


Gaming, 108, 143 
Geneva Accords on Indochina, 
1954, 53-57 

Geneva Accords on Laos, 

1962, 56 


Geneva Conference for the Re¬ 
duction and Limitation of 
Armaments, 1932-1934, 39-40 
Geneva naval conference, 1927, 
39 

Germany, 33, 72, 81, 88-90, 

95, 97, 109 ■ ' 

Great Britain 

interwar policies, 32, 34, 
35, 39, 40, 65, 90, 104 
policies since World War 
II, 43, 44-45, 53 
Great powers, and treaty en¬ 
forcement, 34, 36, 105, 
110-12 
Greece, 42 

Guarantee, treaty enforce¬ 
ment by, 17 
Guatemala, 94 
Guerrilla warfare, 54 


Hitler, Adolf, 89-90, 103 
Ho Chi Minh, 53 
”Hot line” treaty, 9 
Hungary, 45, 66, 72, 97, 106 


Indemnity. See damages. 
Indochina, 52-57. See also 
Laos; Vietnam. 

Indonesia, 44 
Inspection, 16, 48, 51-52, 

53, 59, 83, 130 
Inter-American Treaty of Re¬ 
ciprocal Assistance, 45-46 
Internal problems, 43, 45, 

106 

International Atomic Energy 
Agency, 57 

International Control Commis¬ 
sion, for Laos, 55, 56 
International Control Commis¬ 
sion, for Vietnam, 53-54 
Iran, 23, 42, 70 
Israel, 26, 43, 44-45 
Italo-Ethiopian War, 35-36, 
37, 65, 67 


214 









Italy, 

35- 

36, 

39, 95, 

103 

Japan, 

34, 

39, 

, 40, 95, 

» 99 


110 


Kellogg-Briand Pact, 1928, 
36-38, 39, 65 
Korea, 71 

armistice, 51-52, 73-74, 
99 

invasion, 41, 43, 103-04 


Laos, 53, 55-57, 73 
Latin America, 95. See also 
individual nations . 

League of Nations, 33, 37, 
42, 104, 105, 120 
Covenant, 17-18, 20-21, 
33-34, 96 

League Preparatory Commis¬ 
sion on Disarmament, 40 
Lebanon, 103 
Locarno Pact, 17, 88 
London Naval Conference, 
1930, 39 

London Naval Conference, 
1935, 40 


Manchurian incident, 1931, 
34, 37, 70, 95 
Matsu, 103 
Mediation, 43, 46 
Memorandum of Understanding 
Regarding the Establish¬ 
ment of a Direct Communi¬ 
cations Link, 9 
Military Armistice Commis¬ 
sion, Korea, 51-52 
Military assistance, 54, 56 
Military Assistance Advisory 
Group, in Vietnam, 54 
Military occupation, 16. 

See also Ruhr occupation. 
Molotov, Foreign Minister 
V. M., 58 


Munich agreement, 1938, 68n 


Nazi-Soviet Pact, 1939, 80 
Negotiation. See Treaties, 
negotiation. 

Neutral Nations Inspection 
Teams, Korea, 51-52 
Neutral Nations Supervisory 
Commission, Korea, 51 
Neutrality Act, US, 37 
Nine Power Treaty, 1922, 

36-38 

Noncompliance, reciprocal, 

52 

Nonintervention, 46-47. See 
also Internal problems. 
Nonrecognition, 24, 34, 37 
Norodom Sihanouk, King, 53 
North Atlantic Treaty Organi¬ 
zation, 17, 125 
Norway, 98 

Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 

1963, 9, 21, 48, 59, 142 
Nuclear weapons, 195, 121-26 


Observation, 43 
Organization of American 
States, 45-47, 107 


Pact, treaty enforcement by, 

17 

Pact of Paris. See Kellogg- 
Briand Pact, 1938. 

Pacta sunt servanda , 15 
Palestine, 43. See also 
Israel. 

Panama, 120 
Paraguay, 34-35 

Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 

See Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 
Patiiet Lao, 55-56 
Philippines, 38 
Phoumi Sananikone, 55 
Polish Corridor, 88 
Portugal, 43 


215 














Potsdam Protocol, 50 
Press, 64, 70 

Propaganda, 80-81. See also 
Public opinion. 

Protest, 23-24 
Public opinion, 33, 34, 
63-75, 132, 139. See 
also Propaganda; 
Publicity. 

Publicity, 23 


Quarantine, 47 
Quemoy, 103 


Rearmament, German, 97 
Rebus sic stantibus , 15 
Reciprocal nonobservance, 

22, 131 

Reparations, 32, 88-89 
Rescission of a treaty. See 
Abrogation of a treaty; 
Reciprocal nonobservance. . 
Responses, 103-16, 130-33, 

See also Sanctions, 
corrective, 103-04 
defined, 18 
deterrent, 103-04 
diplomatic, 106, 123 
by international organiza¬ 
tions, 104, 105-06, 115 
punitive, 103-04, 105 
Revision of treaties. See 
Treaties, revision pro¬ 
vided for, 

Rhineland remilitarized, 33, 
69 

Rio Treaty, See Inter- 
American Treaty of Re¬ 
ciprocal Assistance. 
Roosevelt, Pres. Franklin D., 
37 

Ruhr occupation, 32, 89 
Russo-Polish Nonaggression 
Treaty, 85 


Sanctions, 18-27, 38. See 
also Responses; Treaties, 
sanctions provided for. 
assistance to victim, 27 
defined, 18-20 
diplomatic, 23-24, 43, 46, 
132 

economic, 25-26, 33-34, 
35-36, 39, 41, 43, 44, 
109-10, 112-16, 131-32, 

140 

against Japan, 34, 37-38 
military, 26-27, 106. 

See also Ruhr occupation. 

Shanghai, 70 

Sihanouk, King Norodom. See 
Norodom Sihanouk, King, 

Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945, 
37-38 

Small powers, and treaty en¬ 
forcement, 34, 36, 106-07 

Southeast Asia, 98, 108. 

See also Indochina and 
individual nations . 

Southeast Asia Treaty Organi¬ 
zation, 56 

Souvanna Phouma, Prince, 55 

Souvannouvong, Prince, 55 

Spain, 24, 98 

Stimson, Secretary of State 
Henry L., 37 

Suez crisis, 1956, 44, 68, 

97, 109, 115, 122 


Treaties, 9-13, 31-59, 119- 
26, 142-44 
arms control, 128 
compliance with, 15-16 
duration stated, 48, 96-97 
enforcement, 15-27, 32-38 
imposed, 96 

multilateral, 95-96. See 
also Kellogg-Briand Pact; 

League of Nations Covenant; 
Locarno Pact; Nine Power 
Treaty; United Nations 
Charter; Versailles, Treaty 
of. 

ne gotiation, 77-86, 127-30, 143 


216 



















revision orovided for, 96- 
' 97, 128,^ 143 

sanctions provided for, 

54, 58-59, 96, 129 

Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons 
Tests in the Atmosphere, 
in Cuter Space, and Under 
Water. See Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty. 

Treaty for the Renunciation 
of War. See Kellogg- 
Briand Pact, 1928. 

Treaty of Paris, 1856, 17 


Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 42, 45. See 
also Communist behavior; 
East European satellites, 
public opinion, 64 
relations with Communist 
China, 44 

relations with Germany, 

81, 90, 109 

relations with US, 49-59 
Union of South Africa, 43 
United Nations, 41-45, 105, 
120 

Charter, 17-18, 20-21, 

41, 96 

United States, 36-38, 79-80 
interwar policies, 39,40, 

42, 43 

policies since World War 
■'ll, 42, 45, 47, 48, 53, 
54, 56 

relations with USSR, 49- 
59, 125 


Violations, 34-38, 87-101 
Berlin, 50 
by erosion, 98 
of Geneva Accords, 53-54 
of Korean Armistice, 52 
listed, 92-93 

by omission, 94n, 100, 131 
timing, 97-98 


’’War guilt’^ clause, 88, 89- 
90 

Washington Naval Conference, 
1921-1922, 39 

Weeks, Lt. Gen. Sir Roland, 
50 

World Bank (IRBD), 26 


Yalta Agreements, 97 
Yugoslavia, 42, 103, 104 


Zhukov, Marshal, 50 


Verification of violations, 
47, 66, 108, 132 
Versailles, Treaty of, 16, 
31-33, 87-90, 96, 97 
Viet Minh, 53-55 
Vietnam, 53-54, 73 
Violations 


217 











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